Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Notion of falsifiability (from RE: Presentations to the Fifth International....)
I am not sure about what is wrong with staying close to the intuitive judgments of science. It is only partly accurate to say that falsifiability has not received any interest among philosophers of science. First, things are more complicated. The question to which Popper posed the falsifiability thesis as an answer is itself passe. This is What Criterion Demarcates Science From Non-Science (or Nonsense). The positivists posed a Verification Criterion (Scientific statements can be verified by empirical observation, roughly). Popper proposed a F-Criterion, Scientific statements can be falsified by empirical observation. But the issue of demarcation is not a big concern and has not been for decades. Partly this is because of the influence of Quine, Goodman, and the neopragmatists,w which have tended to blur the line between science and other kinds of activity. That doesn't mean that the F-Criterion or something like it isn't a good rough test of whether a hypothesis is worth entertaining from a scientific p.o.v.. What's the use of a hypothesis that is immune to test? Btw, so regarded Popper was anticipated by JS Mill in his Logic, where Mill's Methods a re falsifiability tests. Secondly, Popper himself soon realized the point later made with great force by Quine and the neoprags, that simple F-test of Die Logik der Forschung was flawed because it did not take into account the holism of scientific statements, the fact that, as Quine later and Duhem earlier had put it, you could hold true any statement in the face of apparent refutation bu making suitable adjustments elsewhere in the web of belief (Quine's term). Not all adjustment are equally easier, which is why the F test has some bite. Third, neoPopperians of various stripes, including mostly Lakatos as well as a whole whole of English neo-Pops developed Popper's ideas to a more sophisticated level and got them incorporated into the philosophy of science mainstream or at least discussion. Lakatos was a big influence on Feyerabend, not that PKF was mainstream. The neo-Pops were big in Britain at least last when I checked and when I was in grad school there in the early 80s, though more at London and a bit at Oxford than at Cambridge. On the other hand in the 1980s while in phil grad school at Michigan I had to argue my Quine, Kuhn Rorty trained (same as me) phil of sci teacher into including Popper in his phil of sci class that I was TA-ing. Less Ayer, I said, more Popper. He did it, though. --- CeJ [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: One observation and then one part of the discussion that created a point of interest for me. 1. Papers and presentation texts don't make for very good discussion topics, but I don't think they are posted for that purpose. I for one appreciate them more than 'clippings' from the NYT, like we see on all those other lists, like A-List, Marxmal, RadGreen, etc. At least there is the potential of having one's attention drawn to something in the mainstream media. 2. RD's response to the presentation at this point caught my interest: This appears to be the germ of a critique of Popper. While the notion of falsifiablity appears to be commonly accepted among the scientific community, I don't see much evidence of a detailed interest in Popper's ideas or for that matter any concern whatever about certainty, which is the philosopher's anxiety. I would have to agree, but I would bet most scientists publishing research in the 'scientific community' believe that they 'prove what is true' (while most put their names on papers they had nothing to do with, not in the writing or in the research--haven't most likely even read the papers their names go on as second authors). Popper never really moved that far away from intuitive judgements about what scientists might actually do and believe. Perhaps philosophy of the 20th century would have been better if Wittgenstein had brained him with the poker. As for the philosophy of science, post-Kuhn, post-Feyerabend, and post-Lakatos, the notion of falsifiability itself doesn't get much discussion anymore. It is too cutting edge for the belief sets of practicing scientists, and quaint for philosophers and sociologist of science. CJ ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis Tonight's top picks. What will you watch tonight? Preview the hottest shows on Yahoo! TV. http://tv.yahoo.com/ ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Notion of falsifiability (from RE: Presentations to the Fifth International....)
I have discussed falsifiability on various lists. See: http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/2002/2002-January/82.html http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/marxism/2004w52/msg00209.htm On Sun, 30 Sep 2007 10:51:26 -0700 (PDT) andie nachgeborenen [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I am not sure about what is wrong with staying close to the intuitive judgments of science. It is only partly accurate to say that falsifiability has not received any interest among philosophers of science. First, things are more complicated. The question to which Popper posed the falsifiability thesis as an answer is itself passe. This is What Criterion Demarcates Science From Non-Science (or Nonsense). The positivists posed a Verification Criterion (Scientific statements can be verified by empirical observation, roughly). Popper proposed a F-Criterion, Scientific statements can be falsified by empirical observation. But the issue of demarcation is not a big concern and has not been for decades. Partly this is because of the influence of Quine, Goodman, and the neopragmatists,w which have tended to blur the line between science and other kinds of activity. That doesn't mean that the F-Criterion or something like it isn't a good rough test of whether a hypothesis is worth entertaining from a scientific p.o.v.. What's the use of a hypothesis that is immune to test? Btw, so regarded Popper was anticipated by JS Mill in his Logic, where Mill's Methods a re falsifiability tests. Secondly, Popper himself soon realized the point later made with great force by Quine and the neoprags, that simple F-test of Die Logik der Forschung was flawed because it did not take into account the holism of scientific statements, the fact that, as Quine later and Duhem earlier had put it, you could hold true any statement in the face of apparent refutation bu making suitable adjustments elsewhere in the web of belief (Quine's term). Not all adjustment are equally easier, which is why the F test has some bite. Third, neoPopperians of various stripes, including mostly Lakatos as well as a whole whole of English neo-Pops developed Popper's ideas to a more sophisticated level and got them incorporated into the philosophy of science mainstream or at least discussion. Lakatos was a big influence on Feyerabend, not that PKF was mainstream. The neo-Pops were big in Britain at least last when I checked and when I was in grad school there in the early 80s, though more at London and a bit at Oxford than at Cambridge. On the other hand in the 1980s while in phil grad school at Michigan I had to argue my Quine, Kuhn Rorty trained (same as me) phil of sci teacher into including Popper in his phil of sci class that I was TA-ing. Less Ayer, I said, more Popper. He did it, though. --- CeJ [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Notion of falsifiability (from RE: Presentations to the....)
AN wrote this I am not sure about what is wrong with staying close to the intuitive judgments of science. in response to this: CJPopper never really moved that far away from intuitive judgements about what scientists might actually do and believe. --- Intuitive judgments of science? How objective or empirical or experimental or controlled could these be? What I meant though was that Popper, a non-scientist, didn't really understand what most scientists believe or what most scientists actually do (not the same thing). This from a guy who thought he could tell you how to tell a pseudo-science from science. What is that saying about, 'Those who can't, TEACH'. Judging from the scientists across campus they don't even have a notion of falsifiability. Now that science is mostly applied science and invented technology, it is even further away from the concerns of this sort of philosophy of science. Perhaps Schon and Argyris ought to be added to philosophy of 'science' (in the sense that just about every topic taught and researched at North American universities claims to be empirical and scientific) and Popper dropped altogether. It wouldn't hurt to add Lyotard while I am at it. If I had to come up with a term to describe the approach to epistemology in 'science' as I see it, I would say naive positivist, or even romantic positivist. CJ ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Presentations to the Fifth International Marx Congress
Ralph, Why are you saying all this stuff about humanity is doomed and there will never be communism? It contradicts the efforts you have made as an auto-didact and to make liberatory material available to other people. True if we want to get from where we are now to communism we will need a well-debated and intelligent programme for communism. For the beginnings of this try googling the Democratic Socialist Alliance and reading the pieces by Phil Sharpe. Cheer up doom may never happen, Phil Walden -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ralph Dumain Sent: 29 September 2007 08:56 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: *** SPAM *** Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Presentations to the Fifth International Marx Congress Re: Scientific method: logical representation vis à vis dialectical reproduction (i.e., the consciousness dominated by alienation for believing itself an abstractly free one vis à vis the consciousness that advances in its freedom by being aware of its alienation) I have never been able to understand Juan's views over the past decade or more. For the moment I'll just point out passages that puzzle me. Capitals needs concerning scientific cognition face a contradiction. To increase relative surplus value by means of the system of machinery, capital is compelled to submit all production and consumption to science. Nevertheless, insofar as scientific cognition is simply a concrete form of the production of surplus value, science must reproduce the alienation of human consciousness in capital. At the same time it has to be an objective consciousness, it needs to be a consciousness that looks upon itself in a non-objective way by accepting the appearance of being an abstractly free consciousness. For this reason, it is about a science that needs to appear as if the foundations of its objectivity were rooted outside itself This foundation must appear to arise from a pure abstractly free subjectivity, . . . I think I do understand thus far (could be a critique of Popper, Dawkins, et al), but: as if it were based on philosophy, and more specifically, on a philosophy based on the appearance of free individuality inherent in the circulation of commodities. I don't understand how science is based on philosophy, or that it is commonly held by scientists that science is based on philosophy. Scientific theory, namely logical representation, is this contradiction resolved. Scientific theory represents real concatenations by taking the forms where the necessity has been already realized needs have already been fulfilled -which is to say, the concrete forms- as if they were not, at the same time, forms that carry within themselves a necessity to be realized -which is to say, abstract forms. It thus defines real forms as unable to move by themselves. From this point of view, they can only be linked by an external relationship. It is here that logic comes into play. Placed as incapable of moving by themselves, real forms are represented as forms that affirm themselves through the appearance of being abstract immediate affirmations. Consequently, consciousness could be affirmed as a free one or it could be affirmed as an alienated one. However, it is logically impossible for alienated consciousness to affirm itself through its own negation under the concrete form of free consciousness. I can't make a bit of sense out of this. In fact, the appearance of being an immediate abstract affirmation corresponds to the actual quantitative determination considered in itself. Scientific theory subscribes to the logic that is genuinely necessary for mathematical cognition and represents it as the objective necessity that relates qualitatively the abstract immediate affirmations to which all real forms have been previously reduced. Mathematical logic is thus represented as formal logic. Based on this premise, scientific theory represents the real abstract determinations by the relationships of measure between their concrete forms. This representation allows the subject to govern actions upon real forms consciously: although the real necessity at stake is not truly known, it is nevertheless possible to act upon the magnitude of the real forms, thus transforming their quantity until this corresponds to that of a qualitatively different form. Its quality itself has thus been transformed.4 I don't understand this either. Are we talking about physics envy here? A purely quantitative notion of scientific theory? How does mathematical logic relate to theories in physics? Scientific theory revolutionizes once and again human control on natural forces, based on transforming quantitative differences into qualitative differences with objective knowledge. Its development seems to have no limit other than the conscious control over all the processes that concern human life. Therefore,
