Seems relevant for this list :)
Haven't looked close at it yet
- Sent from my tablet
-- Vidarebefordrat meddelande --
Från: Dmitri Vitaliev dmi...@equalit.ie
Datum: 10 dec 2014 17:31
Ämne: [liberationtech] (n+1)sec = more privacy on the internet
Till:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 13.56, Mike Hearn wrote:
I would like to hear opinions on the value of deniability in OTR
like protocols.
From a privacy perspective the rationale is fairly clear.
Has anyone ever seen a case where cryptographic deniability was
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 14.57, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
On 12/10/14, Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org wrote:
On 2014.12.10 13.56, Mike Hearn wrote:
From a privacy perspective the rationale is fairly clear.
Has anyone ever seen a case where cryptographic
On 10/12/14 22:00, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
On 2014.12.10 15.52, Ximin Luo wrote:
Yes, deniability won't prove the lack of authorship in legal
settings, because in current systems there's lots of other
evidence that suggests (or proves-in-court) authorship. However,
once we have systems that
On Wed, Dec 10, 2014, at 19:56, Mike Hearn wrote:
I would like to hear opinions on the value of deniability in OTR like
protocols.
From a privacy perspective the rationale is fairly clear.
The practical value of deniability at the protocol level would be much
higher if it was deeply
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 16.31, moderncry...@mkern.fastmail.fm wrote:
On Wed, Dec 10, 2014, at 19:56, Mike Hearn wrote:
I would like to hear opinions on the value of deniability in OTR
like protocols.
From a privacy perspective the rationale is fairly
On 12/10/14, Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 14.57, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
On 12/10/14, Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org wrote:
On 2014.12.10 13.56, Mike Hearn wrote:
From a privacy perspective the rationale is fairly
On 12/10/2014 04:49 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
On 2014.12.10 16.31, moderncry...@mkern.fastmail.fm wrote:
The practical value of deniability at the protocol level would be
much higher if it was deeply integrated into the user interface of
(commonly used) client software.
Under which
On 10/12/14 22:24, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
On 2014.12.10 16.12, Ximin Luo wrote:
There are a bunch of reasons why deniability doesn't work in the
field. Once we neutralise those reasons, it would work in the
field. For example, metadata leaks and bad endpoint security. So
blaming it doesn't
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 17.21, Ximin Luo wrote:
Systems that provide unlinkability would help to prevent those
transcripts from being leaked. Better endpoint security would also
help. It's a matter of reducing risk - it will always be there,
but taking
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 19.29, Sam Lanning wrote:
On 10/12/14 22:41, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
Un-signed and deniable are distinct properties. I'm definitely
not arguing against unsigned transcripts; making an active effort
to make repudiation difficult is
On 12/10/14, Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 17.00, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Why not have both options, legally and cryptographically?
Because if you want to have both options, even if there was absolutely
no cost in terms
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 19.45, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
On 12/10/14, Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org wrote:
On 2014.12.10 17.00, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Why not have both options, legally and cryptographically?
Because if you want to have both options,
On 11/12/14 00:38, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
On 2014.12.10 19.29, Sam Lanning wrote:
On 10/12/14 22:41, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
Un-signed and deniable are distinct properties. I'm definitely
not arguing against unsigned transcripts; making an active effort
to make repudiation difficult is a
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 19.58, Sam Lanning wrote:
The high level concepts in my previous message extend from a
single message to a channel. i.e. the contents of a channel can be
provably from no one, a single person, or one of two people.
No, because
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 20.27, Sam Lanning wrote
And it will stand up in a court of law as strongly as a chain
of PGP signed emails.
We have no evidence that supports this assertion.
No. But for all intents and purposes, it is technically identical.
A few points:
First: even if deniability were to come for close to free (which it doesn't,
generally) Mike's original question wasn't whether the overhead was worth it,
but if the property is worth considering/prioritizing in the first place.
Also, whether it's even desirable.
Second:
On Wed, Dec 10, 2014, at 23:41, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 17.12, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
On 12/10/2014 04:49 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
On 2014.12.10 16.31, moderncry...@mkern.fastmail.fm wrote:
The practical value of
On 12/11/14, Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 2014.12.10 19.45, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
On 12/10/14, Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org wrote:
On 2014.12.10 17.00, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Why not have both options, legally and
19 matches
Mail list logo
