Ralf S. Engelschall wrote:
> Then this is a client problem! The server cannot do anything here. At least
> Netscape is very smart and remembers that he is reconnecting to a server with
> a GlobalID cert and then _immediately_ starts with a strong cipher and never
> does the stepup again (at least
On Tue, Mar 23, 1999, Patrik Carlsson wrote:
> Ralf S. Engelschall wrote:
>
> > Don't look at Microsoft papers when you want to understand anything, please.
> > Instead look inside the SSLv3 spec or the TLSv1 RFC. Yes, the stuff is called
> > renegotation of parameters and is nothing more than
Ralf S. Engelschall wrote:
> Don't look at Microsoft papers when you want to understand anything, please.
> Instead look inside the SSLv3 spec or the TLSv1 RFC. Yes, the stuff is called
> renegotation of parameters and is nothing more than a new SSL handshake, of
> course. The interesting point
On Tue, Mar 23, 1999, Patrik Carlsson wrote:
> How does this stepup really works?
I'm surprised that the README.GlobalID document isn't detailed enough...
> The server has this special GSID certificate, but is he otherwise "modified"
> (he must be able to use strong ciphers) in some way to be
How does this stepup really works?
The server has this special GSID certificate, but is he otherwise
"modified" (he must
be able to use strong ciphers) in some way to be able to handle the
stepup?
Isn't it actually just a client issue, i.e. the client sees the GSID
and, in the Netscape
case, fini
