again all,
-Brian
On 2024-03-26 19:04, Brian Knight via NANOG wrote:
> What's presently the most commonly used open source toolset for monitoring
> AS-to-AS traffic?
>
> I want to see with which ASes I am exchanging the most traffic across my
> transits and IX links. I want
What's presently the most commonly used open source toolset for
monitoring AS-to-AS traffic?
I want to see with which ASes I am exchanging the most traffic across my
transits and IX links. I want to look for opportunities to peer so I can
better sell expansion of peering to upper management.
AWS this year. Those who may not be trading address blocks are starting to feel the bite.-BrianOn Feb 15, 2024, at 5:31 PM, Tom Beecher wrote:$/IPv4 address peaked in 2021, and has been declining since. On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 16:05 Brian Knight via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:On 2024-02-15
On 2024-02-15 13:10, Lyndon Nerenberg (VE7TFX/VE6BBM) wrote:
I've said it before, and I'll say it again:
The only thing stopping global IPv6 deployment is
Netflix continuing to offer services over IPv4.
If Netflix dropped IPv4, you would see IPv6 available *everywhere*
within a month.
As
On 2024-01-13 04:03, Brett O'Hara wrote:
They have no interest in trying new things or making new technology
work without a solid financial reason and there is none for them
implementing ipv6.
When I left $DAYJOB-1 almost 2 years ago, they had just finished
increasing fees on IPv4 blocks
On 2023-11-15 21:47, Christopher Hawker wrote:
Hello everyone,
Aftab Siddiqui is currently exploring the possibility of using Route
Object Authorisations (ROAs) as a potential replacement to LOAs.
Separate to this (and unknowing of Aftab's research), I had started a
discussion on the RPKI
On 2023-09-19 09:41, Matthew Petach wrote:
On Tue, Sep 19, 2023 at 7:19AM Mike Hammett wrote:
[...]
I've never understood companies that acquire and don't completely
integrate as quickly as they can.
Ah, spoken with the voice of someone who's never been in the position
of:
a) acquiring
It seems to say more about fluctuating funding and IT management.I seem to recall an issue with the FAA’s NOTAM / TFR database a few weeks back, one that grounded all flights one fine morning. Wasn’t network-related, but the articles I read about the application’s architecture and fault-tolerance
Ask your upstream providers for a BGP community tag that lowers localpref below
100 within their network. Set that community tag on any backup routes along
with your (moderate) path prepending.
The backup upstream will then install that route only if there is no other way
to get to your AS.
On 2022-02-10 11:42, John Todd wrote:
"The Prudent Mariner never relies solely on any single aid to
navigation"
It's best to ping multiple targets, and take action only if all targets
do not return replies.
For route tracking a la $VENDOR_C's IP SLA, if possible, we'll ping
next-hop IP,
Also, lots of people out sick with the ‘rona. Fortunately, Omicron seems much
less harmful than other variants.
Hope all are staying safe and well.
-Brian
> On Jan 3, 2022, at 2:06 PM, Josh Luthman wrote:
>
>
> Likely a parallel between vacation, ie people not touching things, and things
On 2021-09-04 23:33, Mark Tinka wrote:
On 9/5/21 04:49, John Levine wrote:
I have asked my ISP about IPv6 and their answer is that that they're
not opposed to
it but since I am the only person who has asked for it, it's quite low
on the list
of things to do.
Supporting the routing and
On 2021-03-05 15:40, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
For comparison purposes, I'm curious about the difference in wattage
results between:
a) Your R640 at 420W running DPDK
b) The same R640 hardware temporarily booted from a Ubuntu server live
USB, in which some common CPU stress and memory disk/IO
On 2021-03-05 12:22, Etienne-Victor Depasquale wrote:
Sure, here goes:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/results/SM-BJ9FCT6K9/
Thanks for sharing these results. We run DPDK workloads (Cisco nee
Viptela vEdge Cloud) on ESXI. Fwiw, a quick survey of a few of our Dell
R640s running mostly vEdge
On 2021-02-17 13:28, John Kristoff wrote:
On Wed, 17 Feb 2021 14:07:54 -0500
John Curran wrote:
I have no idea what outages were most memorable for others, but the
Stanford transfer switch explosion in October 1996 resulted in a much
of the Internet in the Bay Area simply not being reachable
As a final update to this thread, we started blocking spoofed and
invalid traffic as of early Thursday morning Nov 19th. So far, knock on
wood, no reports of issues from our customer base.
In addition, I've been able to verify with the security research team's
test tool that we are no longer
Randy, thank you for the reminder to look also at what services (L4
ports) should be generally blocked.
As I was implementing a similar rule for logging purposes, I discovered
an oddity with $VENDOR_C_XR ACLs. I created the following:
object-group port TCPUDP-BLOCKED
eq 0
eq sunrpc
eq
ll.com.au/pfs/_media/workshops/05-bgp-bcp.pdf
Regards.
El mar., 13 oct. 2020 a las 19:52, Brian Knight via NANOG
() escribió:
Hi Mel,
My understanding of uRPF is:
* Strict mode will permit a packet only if there is a route for the
source IP in the RIB, and that route points to the interfa
CL. I think
that's good for an enterprise network, but as an SP, I'm very hesitant
to include this. Is this included in anyone else's transit / peer / IX
ACL?
Is there anything else that I'm not thinking of?
Thanks,
-Brian
On 2020-10-14 09:25, Brian Knight via NANOG wrote:
Hi Marcos,
T
o DoS a single /32 endpoint IP
> being targeted, as in common online gaming disputes?
>
> What volume of pps or Mbps would appear as spurious traffic as a result of
> this attack?
>
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 3:14 PM Brian Knight via NANOG
> wrote:
>
>> We recently
-bcp.pdf
Regards.
El mar., 13 oct. 2020 a las 19:52, Brian Knight via NANOG
() escribió:
Hi Mel,
My understanding of uRPF is:
* Strict mode will permit a packet only if there is a route for the
source IP in the RIB, and that route points to the interface where the
packet was received
* Loose
per:
>
> https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/task/configuration/interfaces-configuring-unicast-rpf.html
>
>
> -mel beckman
>
>> On Oct 13, 2020, at 3:15 PM, Brian Knight via NANOG wrote:
>
>> We recently received an email notice from a grou
We recently received an email notice from a group of security
researchers who are looking at the feasibility of attacks using spoofed
traffic. Their methodology, in broad strokes, was to send traffic to
our DNS servers with a source IP that looked like it came from our
network. Their attacks
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