On 1/2/10 11:38 PM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
... it would be interesting if some process were developed to
deaccredit or otherwise kill off the shell registrars
Suresh, Why?
ICANN accreditation provides the registrar with a right to attempt
OTE with registries, the Verisign operated
On Sun, Jan 3, 2010 at 10:24 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams
brun...@nic-naa.net wrote:
On 1/2/10 11:38 PM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
... it would be interesting if some process were developed to
deaccredit or otherwise kill off the shell registrars
Suresh, Why?
My comment was more in the
While not at all touching the accuracy of knujon's stats with a
bargepole, it would be interesting if some process were developed to
deaccredit or otherwise kill off the shell registrars .. and the bogus
LIRs (which is how the thread started).
On Thu, Dec 31, 2009 at 10:02 PM, Eric
At the Montevideo ICANN meeting, in August, 2001, I was surprised, and
disapointed, that the ISP Constituency had reduced to ... a couple of IP
attorneys.
So, as a point of departure, were one going to advocate policy which
affects ISPs as ISPs, as opposed to ISPs as trademark portfolio
The obvious change RIRs could make would be to make sure the contracts
they allocate resources under give them the latitude to cancel those
contracts if certain boundaries of behavior are breached.
YES I REALIZE EASIER SAID THAN DONE.
But just as allocation of resources is not a transfer of
Barry Shein wrote:
The obvious change RIRs could make would be to make sure the contracts
they allocate resources under give them the latitude to cancel those
contracts if certain boundaries of behavior are breached.
YES I REALIZE EASIER SAID THAN DONE.
But just as allocation of resources is
On Dec 31, 2009, at 11:32 AM, Paul Timmins wrote:
Cool. Then you just have to figure out how to unilaterally withdraw a
resource that doesn't have a centralized automated verification system.
Taking you out of whois doesn't automatically take you out of people's BGP
tables, after all.
See
From: Paul Timmins [p...@telcodata.us]
Cool. Then you just have to figure out how to unilaterally withdraw a
resource that doesn't have a centralized automated verification system.
Taking you out of whois doesn't automatically take you out of people's
BGP tables, after all.
That's step two of the
Cool. Then you just have to figure out how to unilaterally withdraw a
resource that doesn't have a centralized automated verification system.
Taking you out of whois doesn't automatically take you out of people's
BGP tables, after all.
That's step two of the problem - enforcement. Enforcement
On Wed, Dec 23, 2009 at 01:58:47AM -0500, Christopher Morrow wrote:
The ARIN meetings (at least) are open, please come and help guide
policies. I'm sure RIPE also wouldn't mind a discussion, if there
could be some positive policy outcome.
Why should I or anyone else do that? It will cost us,
If ARIN and/or RIPE and/or ICANN and/or anyone else were truly
interested in making a dent in the problem, then they would have
already paid attention to our collective work product.
the rirs, the ietf, the icann, ... each think they are the top of the
mountain. we are supposed to come to
If ARIN and/or RIPE and/or ICANN and/or anyone else were truly
interested in making a dent in the problem, then they would have
already paid attention to our collective work product.
the rirs, the ietf, the icann, ... each think they are the top of the
mountain. we are supposed to come to
Randy Bush ra...@psg.com writes:
If ARIN and/or RIPE and/or ICANN and/or anyone else were truly
interested in making a dent in the problem, then they would have already
paid attention to our collective work product.
the rirs, the ietf, the icann, ... each think they are the top of the
One might say the same about the IETF, which Randy likes to lampoon.
Not sure how it comes up in this context, as (as Randy loves to remind
us) while many operators attend, it is not first-and-foremost an
operational community. As to ICANN, I think Rich may be talking about
the registries
on spammers and their infrastructure
Wouldn't that be kind of pointless? ARIN policies are proposed by the
public, not ARIN staff or board members.
https://www.arin.net/policy/pdp.html
Policy proposals may be submitted by anyone in the global Internet
community except for members
On Tue, 22 Dec 2009, Leo Vegoda wrote:
ASSIGNED PA: This address space has been assigned to an End User for use
with services provided by the issuing LIR. It cannot be kept when
terminating services provided by the LIR.
My interpretation of the above is ASSIGNED PA is the equivalent of
Wouldn't that be kind of pointless? ARIN policies are proposed by the
public, not ARIN staff or board members.
https://www.arin.net/policy/pdp.html
Policy proposals may be submitted by anyone in the global Internet
community except for members of the ARIN Board of Trustees or the ARIN
On Dec 24, 2009, at 8:59 AM, Jon Lewis wrote:
[…]
I am sure that your interpretation was the original intent of the policy
text. However, the wording could also be read in a way that allows an LIR to
just provide registry services, without providing any connectivity services.
That's one
On Wed, Dec 23, 2009 at 01:58:47AM -0500, Christopher Morrow wrote:
no real arguement, but... 'please provide some set of workable solutions'
The set of workable solutions at this point looks something like null
routes, firewall rules, blacklist entries -- in order to deny traffic
to and from
Rich Kulawiec wrote:
On Wed, Dec 23, 2009 at 01:58:47AM -0500, Christopher Morrow wrote:
no real arguement, but... 'please provide some set of workable
solutions'
The set of workable solutions at this point looks something like
null routes, firewall rules, blacklist entries -- in order to
On Dec 22, 2009, at 11:58 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
On Wed, Dec 23, 2009 at 1:12 AM, Paul Ferguson fergdawgs...@gmail.com wrote:
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Folks should not be so obtuse about these activities. It's almost blatantly
in-your-face, so to speak. These
http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/attackers-buying-own-data-centers-botnets-spam-122109
It this something new ? The article seems to mix various issues together.
And this would seem highly inefficient to me compared to traditional
botnets (renting your own rack for a botnet doesn't really make
On Tue, 22 Dec 2009, Phil Regnauld wrote:
http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/attackers-buying-own-data-centers-botnets-spam-122109
It this something new ? The article seems to mix various issues together.
And this would seem highly inefficient to me compared to traditional
botnets (renting
With the added refinement of spammer / botmaster controlled LIRs ..
after spammer / botmaster controlled registrars.
I did wonder sometimes how some snowshoe spammers could keep acquiring
a series of /20 to /15 sized CIDRs over the past year or two.
On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 6:38 PM, Tony Finch
On Tue, 22 Dec 2009, Phil Regnauld wrote:
http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/attackers-buying-own-data-centers-botnets-spam-122109
It this something new ? The article seems to mix various issues together.
And this would seem highly inefficient to me compared to traditional
botnets (renting
On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 4:24 PM, Jon Lewis jle...@lewis.org wrote:
Should US based networks be willing to route RIPE ASSIGNED PA space
customers provide?
this is an interesting question, which when I worked for an ISP I
always wondered about. In fact, when we'd see solely based US
customers
Christopher Morrow wrote:
On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 4:24 PM, Jon Lewis jle...@lewis.org wrote:
Should US based networks be willing to route RIPE ASSIGNED PA space
customers provide?
Are any of your customers multinationals?
this is an interesting question, which when I worked for an ISP
On Tue, 22 Dec 2009, Joel Jaeggli wrote:
Should US based networks be willing to route RIPE ASSIGNED PA space
customers provide?
Are any of your customers multinationals?
They may be. I don't agree that it's relevant. You can disagree with the
RIPE wording or with RIPE policies, or maybe
On 22/12/2009 23:36, Jon Lewis wrote:
On Tue, 22 Dec 2009, Joel Jaeggli wrote:
On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 4:24 PM, Jon Lewis jle...@lewis.org wrote:
Should US based networks be willing to route RIPE ASSIGNED PA space
customers provide?
I would argue not and the bofh in me would be inclined to
On 22/12/2009 3:36, Jon Lewis jle...@lewis.org wrote:
[...]
They may be. I don't agree that it's relevant. You can disagree with the
RIPE wording or with RIPE policies, or maybe I'm misinterpreting
ASSIGNED PA: This address space has been assigned to an End User for use
with services
On Wed, Dec 23, 2009 at 4:24 AM, Joel Jaeggli joe...@bogus.com wrote:
Christopher Morrow wrote:
On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 4:24 PM, Jon Lewis jle...@lewis.org wrote:
Should US based networks be willing to route RIPE ASSIGNED PA space
customers provide?
Are any of your customers
the issue,
when really it's their own stuff that they shuffle around.
Regards,
Alex Lanstein
From: Jon Lewis [jle...@lewis.org]
Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2009 4:24 PM
To: Phil Regnauld
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Article on spammers
On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 7:03 PM, Nick Hilliard n...@foobar.org wrote:
On 22/12/2009 23:36, Jon Lewis wrote:
So, if you're not multihomed with jump.ro as one of your providers, is
'multihomed' here could mean: we have an IPSEC vpn, we need to use
globally unique ip space, we may have exit points
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On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 8:58 PM, Alex Lanstein alanst...@fireeye.com
wrote:
I might as well reply to this here. The folks from threatpost had me
talk at length about the various issues with doing cybercrime enforcement
and how things have
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On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 10:58 PM, Christopher Morrow
morrowc.li...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Dec 23, 2009 at 1:12 AM, Paul Ferguson fergdawgs...@gmail.com
wrote:
Folks should not be so obtuse about these activities. It's almost
blatantly
On Wed, Dec 23, 2009 at 2:05 AM, Paul Ferguson fergdawgs...@gmail.com wrote:
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On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 10:58 PM, Christopher Morrow
morrowc.li...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Dec 23, 2009 at 1:12 AM, Paul Ferguson fergdawgs...@gmail.com
wrote:
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On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 11:14 PM, Christopher Morrow
morrowc.li...@gmail.com wrote:
IP-address issues can't get solved without policy changes, which
happen today via community consensus. Domain-name issues have to get
hammered out from the top
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