Re: [OAUTH-WG] New OAuth for Browser-Based Apps draft -02

2019-07-24 Thread Tomek Stojecki
I agree that 6.1 takes too broad of a swipe, but I'd say with same-site cookies and (sadly) without token-binding, the suggestion to use cookie based session following oauth/oidc auth is a good one and should be incorporated perhaps in 6.2? Leo sums it up well here: > We need to be clear on

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens

2019-07-22 Thread Tomek Stojecki
> FWIW, in addition, those can be used together -- sliding & absolute.  Azure AD does both at this point. They used to do 90 days absolute, now it is a sliding, 72 hours by default I believe.  Good discussion overall, would this be a good summary for the type of a client the spec is for:

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-12-05 Thread Tomek Stojecki
s that I think context is important here. So when you point out these best practices, some of them will get people confused as far as what it means in the browser based app scenario. Maybe it is just me :) > > On Tuesday, December 4, 2018, 2:08:55 PM GMT+1, Torsten Lodderstedt >

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-12-04 Thread Tomek Stojecki
(can't authenticate the client, confidentiality in storage? - not sure how to read that in the context of a browser) On Tuesday, December 4, 2018, 2:08:55 PM GMT+1, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote: Hi Tomek, > Am 04.12.2018 um 09:50 schrieb Tomek Stojecki > : > > I agree w

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-12-04 Thread Tomek Stojecki
I agree with Vittorio, Dominick et al.  > I disagree.  > Existing deployments that have not mitigated against the concerns with > implicit should be ripped up and updated. Yes, just like future deployments that will not mitigate against the concerns of code in the browser should be a concern.

Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-parecki-oauth-browser-based-apps-00

2018-11-16 Thread Tomek Stojecki
>> The AS can bind the lifetime of the refresh tokens to the session lifetime, >>i.e. automatically revoke it on logout.  > Yea, I saw your other email asking about refresh token revocation relating to > session management. Obviously for certain clients, this won't make sense, but > for

Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-parecki-oauth-browser-based-apps-00

2018-11-08 Thread Tomek Stojecki
cors) Finally, how is the AT going to be refreshed? Are we allowing for long lived RT in the browser? I see that the document mentions CSP in 7.7, but doesn't the same apply to securing AT with Implicit? Regrads, Tomek Stojecki On Tuesday, November 6, 2018, 10:55:40 AM GMT+1, Hannes Tschofenig wrote: