Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice | Issue in Mix-Up Countermeasure

2019-12-03 Thread Brian Campbell
On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 7:20 AM Daniel Fett wrote: > Am 26.11.19 um 14:24 schrieb Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen: > > Depending on its implementation the client might simply extract all data > > contained in the Client Information Response and use it for > > authorizations with the specific AS. > >

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: New Version Notification for draft-fett-oauth-dpop-03.txt

2019-12-03 Thread Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 4:35 PM Richard Backman, Annabelle wrote: > > Session cookies serve the same purpose in web apps as access tokens for > APIs but there are much more web apps than APIs. I use the analogy to > illustrate that either there are security issues with cloud deployments of > web

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice | Issue in Mix-Up Countermeasure

2019-12-03 Thread Daniel Fett
Am 03.12.19 um 10:21 schrieb Christian Mainka: > Hi, > > according to [1], countermeasure (1) describes to > >> configure [the] authorization servers to return an AS identitifier > ("iss") and the "client_id" for which a code or token was issued in the > authorization response. > > So if an MixUp

Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice | Issue in Mix-Up Countermeasure

2019-12-03 Thread Christian Mainka
Hi, according to [1], countermeasure (1) describes to > configure [the] authorization servers to return an AS identitifier ("iss") and the "client_id" for which a code or token was issued in the authorization response. So if an MixUp attack is running, the victim contacts A-AS but is redirected

[OAUTH-WG] Meeting Minutes

2019-12-03 Thread Hannes Tschofenig
Here are the meeting minutes from the Singapore IETF meeting: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/106/materials/minutes-106-oauth-03 Tony was our scribe. Thanks! IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the