Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-29 Thread Richard Backman, Annabelle
> on behalf of Filip Skokan <mailto:panva...@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 9:11 AM To: George Fletcher <mailto:gffle...@aol.com> Cc: oauth <mailto:oauth@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps Apologies, I misse

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-29 Thread Joseph Heenan
.org/html/rfc8252#section-8.6> still apply. >> -- >> Annabelle Richard Backman >> AWS Identity >> >> >> From: OAuth <mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org> on >> behalf of Filip Skokan <mailto:panva...@gmail.com> >> Date: Wednesday, November 28

[OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-29 Thread Christian Mainka
lf of Filip Skokan > > Date: Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 9:11 AM > To: George Fletcher > Cc: oauth > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps > > Apologies, I missed the issued in "issued a shared secret", just reading > "sha

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-28 Thread Filip Skokan
Apologies, I missed the *issued* in "issued a shared secret", just reading "shared secret" alone is the exact opposite of a per-instance secret. The rest is clear and as you say it brings the benefit of the secret never being sent over the wire (except during the initial registration via TLS).

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-28 Thread George Fletcher
It's "confidential" in that the shared secret is unique to that app instance registration (as Dennis described in his response). If an attacker gets my phone and compromises the data stored on my device, they only get the secret for my device. This is no different than a server side client

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-28 Thread Filip Skokan
Hi George, #2 doesn't seem confidential, it's still a secret shared amongst installations and anyone reverse engineering the apk, extracting the secret, can form the client_secret_jwt client_assertion with it just fine. Best, Filip On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 4:48 PM George Fletcher wrote: > In

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-28 Thread George Fletcher
In addition, a few additional patterns are enabled... 1. The native app can generate a public/private key pair and then use private_secret_jwt as the client credential validation method via the client credentials flow (defined in OpenID Connect). 2. Maybe more simply, if the native app is

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-27 Thread William Denniss
If the secret is dynamically provisioned then you have a confidential client. Anyone reverse engineering their own installation of the native app would only extract their own client's credentials, as opposed to the shared secret of all installations. Having a confidential client means that

[OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration with Native Apps

2018-11-27 Thread Christian Mainka
Hi, we just stumbled upon this [1] statement: "Except when using a mechanism like Dynamic Client Registration    [RFC7591] to provision per-instance secrets, native apps are    classified as public clients ..." What does this mean for us? Native App + Dynamic Client Registration = Confidential