Re: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot
kurang lebih sih isinya bahwa ada rencana coup oleh Prabowo klik dan Wiranto klik pada saat mei dg dasar kerusuhan mei, jakarta kosong melompong atau dibiarkan rusuh gitu kira - kira ... eh tau tau Pak Arief dr AL yg mengirim pasukan dr surabaya utk menyelamatkan jakarta tetapi akhirnya malah dicopot krn mengganggu jlnnya coup bener ngak inti cerita nya begitu ? From: Peter Alimin To: OB Sent: Saturday, June 27, 2009 10:22:41 PM Subject: Re: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot Ad terjemahannya ga pak? Sent from my BlackBerry® powered by Sinyal Kuat INDOSAT -Original Message- From: Vic Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2009 14:42:47 To: Subject: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot mumpung belum cut-off-time hehehe. -- The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot Anonymous 03 June 2004 Back in May 98, when Jakarta was literally burning, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, Chief Admiral Arief Kushariadi, was on his way for some pre-scheduled trip using the Navy helicopter. As he was flying over Jakarta, he could not help noticing the movement of rioters on the ground and the fires they started. He was amazed that he could not see any sizeable force of security personnel to oppose the rampaging rioters. He assessed the situation that strategic places such as the presidential palace had not been completely secured by sizeable military units visible from the air. Being in a separate chain of command (thus he had no control of any Army or Police units), and thinking that Jakarta was in danger, he immediately contacted the Commanding Officer of Marines 2nd Infantry Brigade based in Cilandak, Southern Jakarta. Adm. Kushariadi inquired of available forces that the 2nd Marines Brigade could move at that instant. To his surprise, the Brigade commander replied that he had none. All of his available forces had been BKO-ed to Jakarta Military Garrison (Komando Garnizun Jakarta) and they were already fielded when Adm. Kushariadi reached him over the radio. This even include all combat support (Banpur) personnel, artilery and cavalry. The marines had a battalion of cavalry (amphibious PT-76 tanks and BTR-50 amphibious Armored Personnel Vehicle) in Cilandak. However, those armored cars remained in their base with nobody left to operate them. Unbeknownst to the Admiral, the Marines based in Cilandak Jakarta had been involved in a plot engineered by Commander of the Army Strategic Reserves (Kostrad), Lieut. Gen. Prabowo and his clicks. Prabowo had realized that the Marines was the only military unit that was able to contest his Army Special Forces (Kopassus) in combat. He happens to be a good friend of Maj. Gen. Suharto, the Marines Corps Commanding General at the time, when they shared quarters during their days at the Integrated Staf and Command College (Seskogab) in Bandung a few years before. When Prabowo was in charge of the Kopassus, he tried to bring the two corps closer together. Having almost unlimited source of funding (thanks to the support he enjoyed from Cendana), Prabowo not only beefed up his Kopassus but he also sent some contributions to the Marines, commanded then by this old roommate of his. After living as a step son for more than three decades, the Marines received Prabowo contribution with a warm feeling. However, Suharto was aware of some moves from Prabowo that might follow the contributions. It did come in 1997, when Prabowo proposed "to better integrate" Kopassus and the Marines. How? By interchanging personnel between the two corps. He wanted to have some Kopassus men in every Marines unit and to be part of the unit during the operation. Suharto flatly refused this proposal. Politely, he explained to Prabowo that the Marines has a different doctrine from its counterparts in Kopassus. The Indonesian Marines (owing to much similarities to the USMC) follow the doctrine as a professional combat unit. They never did nor wish to ever raise their weapons against their own countrymen. The marines subscribes to a frontal type combat style where the objective is as clearly defined as the identity of the enemy. When the Marines are landing on the beach, they must assume that the beach was part of Indonesian soil invaded by some foreign enemies. So "mendarat dan menang" just simply does not apply to the Indonesian Army doctrines. Knowing that he could not influence the neutrality and professionalism of the Marines, Prabowo decided that he should at least tied up all available Marines units in Jakarta area when his troops were to secure power from then defunct government of President Soeharto. He was able to do this because Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Samsoeddin, the Commanding General of Jakarta Military Area Command (Kodam Jaya),, ex officio the Jakarta Garrison Commander, was his old friend from the Milit
Re: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot
saya juga nyari, tapi belum ketemu pak. memang itu belum ada yg verifikasi. tapi kita bandingin aja sama pengalaman pribadi kita waktu kerusuhan 1998, rasanya sih ada benang merahnya. --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, "Peter Alimin " wrote: > > Ad terjemahannya ga pak? > Sent from my BlackBerry® > powered by Sinyal Kuat INDOSAT > > -Original Message- > From: Vic > > Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2009 14:42:47 > To: > Subject: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot > > > mumpung belum cut-off-time hehehe. > -- > > The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot > > Anonymous > 03 June 2004 > Back in May 98, when Jakarta was literally burning, the Chief of Staff of > the Indonesian Navy, Chief Admiral Arief Kushariadi, was on his way for some > pre-scheduled trip using the Navy helicopter. As he was flying over Jakarta, > he could not help noticing the movement of rioters on the ground and the > fires they started. He was amazed that he could not see any sizeable force of > security personnel to oppose the rampaging rioters. He assessed the situation > that strategic places such as the presidential palace had not been completely > secured by sizeable military units visible from the air. > > Being in a separate chain of command (thus he had no control of any Army or > Police units), and thinking that Jakarta was in danger, he immediately > contacted the Commanding Officer of Marines 2nd Infantry Brigade based in > Cilandak, Southern Jakarta. Adm. Kushariadi inquired of available forces that > the 2nd Marines Brigade could move at that instant. To his surprise, the > Brigade commander replied that he had none. All of his available forces had > been BKO-ed to Jakarta Military Garrison (Komando Garnizun Jakarta) and they > were already fielded when Adm. Kushariadi reached him over the radio. This > even include all combat support (Banpur) personnel, artilery and cavalry. The > marines had a battalion of cavalry (amphibious PT-76 tanks and BTR-50 > amphibious Armored Personnel Vehicle) in Cilandak. However, those armored > cars remained in their base with nobody left to operate them. > > Unbeknownst to the Admiral, the Marines based in Cilandak Jakarta had been > involved in a plot engineered by Commander of the Army Strategic Reserves > (Kostrad), Lieut. Gen. Prabowo and his clicks. Prabowo had realized that the > Marines was the only military unit that was able to contest his Army Special > Forces (Kopassus) in combat. He happens to be a good friend of Maj. Gen. > Suharto, the Marines Corps Commanding General at the time, when they shared > quarters during their days at the Integrated Staf and Command College > (Seskogab) in Bandung a few years before. When Prabowo was in charge of the > Kopassus, he tried to bring the two corps closer together. Having almost > unlimited source of funding (thanks to the support he enjoyed from Cendana), > Prabowo not only beefed up his Kopassus but he also sent some contributions > to the Marines, commanded then by this old roommate of his. After living as a > step son for more than three decades, the Marines received Prabowo > contribution with a warm feeling. However, Suharto was aware of some moves > from Prabowo that might follow the contributions. > > It did come in 1997, when Prabowo proposed "to better integrate" Kopassus > and the Marines. How? By interchanging personnel between the two corps. He > wanted to have some Kopassus men in every Marines unit and to be part of the > unit during the operation. Suharto flatly refused this proposal. Politely, he > explained to Prabowo that the Marines has a different doctrine from its > counterparts in Kopassus. The Indonesian Marines (owing to much similarities > to the USMC) follow the doctrine as a professional combat unit. They never > did nor wish to ever raise their weapons against their own countrymen. The > marines subscribes to a frontal type combat style where the objective is as > clearly defined as the identity of the enemy. When the Marines are landing on > the beach, they must assume that the beach was part of Indonesian soil > invaded by some foreign enemies. So "mendarat dan menang" just simply does > not apply to the Indonesian Army doctrines. > > Knowing that he could not influence the neutrality and professionalism of > the Marines, Prabowo decided that he should at least tied up all available > Marines units in Jakarta area when his troops were to secure power from then > defunct government of President Soeharto. He was able to do this because Maj. > Gen. Sjafrie Samsoeddin, the Commanding General of Jakarta
Re: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot
Ad terjemahannya ga pak? Sent from my BlackBerry® powered by Sinyal Kuat INDOSAT -Original Message- From: Vic Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2009 14:42:47 To: Subject: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot mumpung belum cut-off-time hehehe. -- The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot Anonymous 03 June 2004 Back in May 98, when Jakarta was literally burning, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, Chief Admiral Arief Kushariadi, was on his way for some pre-scheduled trip using the Navy helicopter. As he was flying over Jakarta, he could not help noticing the movement of rioters on the ground and the fires they started. He was amazed that he could not see any sizeable force of security personnel to oppose the rampaging rioters. He assessed the situation that strategic places such as the presidential palace had not been completely secured by sizeable military units visible from the air. Being in a separate chain of command (thus he had no control of any Army or Police units), and thinking that Jakarta was in danger, he immediately contacted the Commanding Officer of Marines 2nd Infantry Brigade based in Cilandak, Southern Jakarta. Adm. Kushariadi inquired of available forces that the 2nd Marines Brigade could move at that instant. To his surprise, the Brigade commander replied that he had none. All of his available forces had been BKO-ed to Jakarta Military Garrison (Komando Garnizun Jakarta) and they were already fielded when Adm. Kushariadi reached him over the radio. This even include all combat support (Banpur) personnel, artilery and cavalry. The marines had a battalion of cavalry (amphibious PT-76 tanks and BTR-50 amphibious Armored Personnel Vehicle) in Cilandak. However, those armored cars remained in their base with nobody left to operate them. Unbeknownst to the Admiral, the Marines based in Cilandak Jakarta had been involved in a plot engineered by Commander of the Army Strategic Reserves (Kostrad), Lieut. Gen. Prabowo and his clicks. Prabowo had realized that the Marines was the only military unit that was able to contest his Army Special Forces (Kopassus) in combat. He happens to be a good friend of Maj. Gen. Suharto, the Marines Corps Commanding General at the time, when they shared quarters during their days at the Integrated Staf and Command College (Seskogab) in Bandung a few years before. When Prabowo was in charge of the Kopassus, he tried to bring the two corps closer together. Having almost unlimited source of funding (thanks to the support he enjoyed from Cendana), Prabowo not only beefed up his Kopassus but he also sent some contributions to the Marines, commanded then by this old roommate of his. After living as a step son for more than three decades, the Marines received Prabowo contribution with a warm feeling. However, Suharto was aware of some moves from Prabowo that might follow the contributions. It did come in 1997, when Prabowo proposed "to better integrate" Kopassus and the Marines. How? By interchanging personnel between the two corps. He wanted to have some Kopassus men in every Marines unit and to be part of the unit during the operation. Suharto flatly refused this proposal. Politely, he explained to Prabowo that the Marines has a different doctrine from its counterparts in Kopassus. The Indonesian Marines (owing to much similarities to the USMC) follow the doctrine as a professional combat unit. They never did nor wish to ever raise their weapons against their own countrymen. The marines subscribes to a frontal type combat style where the objective is as clearly defined as the identity of the enemy. When the Marines are landing on the beach, they must assume that the beach was part of Indonesian soil invaded by some foreign enemies. So "mendarat dan menang" just simply does not apply to the Indonesian Army doctrines. Knowing that he could not influence the neutrality and professionalism of the Marines, Prabowo decided that he should at least tied up all available Marines units in Jakarta area when his troops were to secure power from then defunct government of President Soeharto. He was able to do this because Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Samsoeddin, the Commanding General of Jakarta Military Area Command (Kodam Jaya),, ex officio the Jakarta Garrison Commander, was his old friend from the Military Academy days and part of his click. Samsoeddin cleverly ordered the Marines to stand guard at some less important locations far away from the area being destroyed by rampaging rioters. Now, back to Adm. Kushariadi. Realizing that there was no effective military unit to protect Jakarta, the prudent Admiral immediately raised the Commanding Officer of the Marines 1st Infantry Brigade based in Karang Pilang, Surabaya, East Java. Kushariadi ordered Surabaya to get ready one full infantry battalion equipped for combat
Re: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot
cuma mengingatkan aja, bahwa masih ada pr yg belum selesai. memori manusia memang pendek. apalagi kalau ada intervensi duit n posisi. contohnya, sekarang ini banyak terjadi pelacuran intelektual. semoga kita di sini bisa melihat dengan hati. --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, BEJ Watch wrote: > > Kalo ingat ini mah bikin kesal aja adanya > Udah contreng No 2 aja... >
Re: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot
Kalo ingat ini mah bikin kesal aja adanya Udah contreng No 2 aja...
Re: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot
Panjang banget ulasan... Yang jelas terjadi penjarahan dan pemerkosaan waktu itu, apa penyebabnya? Sent from my BlackBerry® powered by Sinyal Kuat INDOSAT -Original Message- From: "Vic" Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2009 14:42:47 To: Subject: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot mumpung belum cut-off-time hehehe. --- The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot Anonymous 03 June 2004 Back in May 98, when Jakarta was literally burning, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, Chief Admiral Arief Kushariadi, was on his way for some pre-scheduled trip using the Navy helicopter. As he was flying over Jakarta, he could not help noticing the movement of rioters on the ground and the fires they started. He was amazed that he could not see any sizeable force of security personnel to oppose the rampaging rioters. He assessed the situation that strategic places such as the presidential palace had not been completely secured by sizeable military units visible from the air. Being in a separate chain of command (thus he had no control of any Army or Police units), and thinking that Jakarta was in danger, he immediately contacted the Commanding Officer of Marines 2nd Infantry Brigade based in Cilandak, Southern Jakarta. Adm. Kushariadi inquired of available forces that the 2nd Marines Brigade could move at that instant. To his surprise, the Brigade commander replied that he had none. All of his available forces had been BKO-ed to Jakarta Military Garrison (Komando Garnizun Jakarta) and they were already fielded when Adm. Kushariadi reached him over the radio. This even include all combat support (Banpur) personnel, artilery and cavalry. The marines had a battalion of cavalry (amphibious PT-76 tanks and BTR-50 amphibious Armored Personnel Vehicle) in Cilandak. However, those armored cars remained in their base with nobody left to operate them. Unbeknownst to the Admiral, the Marines based in Cilandak Jakarta had been involved in a plot engineered by Commander of the Army Strategic Reserves (Kostrad), Lieut. Gen. Prabowo and his clicks. Prabowo had realized that the Marines was the only military unit that was able to contest his Army Special Forces (Kopassus) in combat. He happens to be a good friend of Maj. Gen. Suharto, the Marines Corps Commanding General at the time, when they shared quarters during their days at the Integrated Staf and Command College (Seskogab) in Bandung a few years before. When Prabowo was in charge of the Kopassus, he tried to bring the two corps closer together. Having almost unlimited source of funding (thanks to the support he enjoyed from Cendana), Prabowo not only beefed up his Kopassus but he also sent some contributions to the Marines, commanded then by this old roommate of his. After living as a step son for more than three decades, the Marines received Prabowo contribution with a warm feeling. However, Suharto was aware of some moves from Prabowo that might follow the contributions. It did come in 1997, when Prabowo proposed "to better integrate" Kopassus and the Marines. How? By interchanging personnel between the two corps. He wanted to have some Kopassus men in every Marines unit and to be part of the unit during the operation. Suharto flatly refused this proposal. Politely, he explained to Prabowo that the Marines has a different doctrine from its counterparts in Kopassus. The Indonesian Marines (owing to much similarities to the USMC) follow the doctrine as a professional combat unit. They never did nor wish to ever raise their weapons against their own countrymen. The marines subscribes to a frontal type combat style where the objective is as clearly defined as the identity of the enemy. When the Marines are landing on the beach, they must assume that the beach was part of Indonesian soil invaded by some foreign enemies. So "mendarat dan menang" just simply does not apply to the Indonesian Army doctrines. Knowing that he could not influence the neutrality and professionalism of the Marines, Prabowo decided that he should at least tied up all available Marines units in Jakarta area when his troops were to secure power from then defunct government of President Soeharto. He was able to do this because Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Samsoeddin, the Commanding General of Jakarta Military Area Command (Kodam Jaya),, ex officio the Jakarta Garrison Commander, was his old friend from the Military Academy days and part of his click. Samsoeddin cleverly ordered the Marines to stand guard at some less important locations far away from the area being destroyed by rampaging rioters. Now, back to Adm. Kushariadi. Realizing that there was no effective military unit to protect Jakarta, the prudent Admiral immediately raised the Commanding Officer of the Marines 1st Infantry Brigade based in Karang Pilang, Surabaya, East Java. Kush
[ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot
mumpung belum cut-off-time hehehe. --- The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot Anonymous 03 June 2004 Back in May 98, when Jakarta was literally burning, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, Chief Admiral Arief Kushariadi, was on his way for some pre-scheduled trip using the Navy helicopter. As he was flying over Jakarta, he could not help noticing the movement of rioters on the ground and the fires they started. He was amazed that he could not see any sizeable force of security personnel to oppose the rampaging rioters. He assessed the situation that strategic places such as the presidential palace had not been completely secured by sizeable military units visible from the air. Being in a separate chain of command (thus he had no control of any Army or Police units), and thinking that Jakarta was in danger, he immediately contacted the Commanding Officer of Marines 2nd Infantry Brigade based in Cilandak, Southern Jakarta. Adm. Kushariadi inquired of available forces that the 2nd Marines Brigade could move at that instant. To his surprise, the Brigade commander replied that he had none. All of his available forces had been BKO-ed to Jakarta Military Garrison (Komando Garnizun Jakarta) and they were already fielded when Adm. Kushariadi reached him over the radio. This even include all combat support (Banpur) personnel, artilery and cavalry. The marines had a battalion of cavalry (amphibious PT-76 tanks and BTR-50 amphibious Armored Personnel Vehicle) in Cilandak. However, those armored cars remained in their base with nobody left to operate them. Unbeknownst to the Admiral, the Marines based in Cilandak Jakarta had been involved in a plot engineered by Commander of the Army Strategic Reserves (Kostrad), Lieut. Gen. Prabowo and his clicks. Prabowo had realized that the Marines was the only military unit that was able to contest his Army Special Forces (Kopassus) in combat. He happens to be a good friend of Maj. Gen. Suharto, the Marines Corps Commanding General at the time, when they shared quarters during their days at the Integrated Staf and Command College (Seskogab) in Bandung a few years before. When Prabowo was in charge of the Kopassus, he tried to bring the two corps closer together. Having almost unlimited source of funding (thanks to the support he enjoyed from Cendana), Prabowo not only beefed up his Kopassus but he also sent some contributions to the Marines, commanded then by this old roommate of his. After living as a step son for more than three decades, the Marines received Prabowo contribution with a warm feeling. However, Suharto was aware of some moves from Prabowo that might follow the contributions. It did come in 1997, when Prabowo proposed "to better integrate" Kopassus and the Marines. How? By interchanging personnel between the two corps. He wanted to have some Kopassus men in every Marines unit and to be part of the unit during the operation. Suharto flatly refused this proposal. Politely, he explained to Prabowo that the Marines has a different doctrine from its counterparts in Kopassus. The Indonesian Marines (owing to much similarities to the USMC) follow the doctrine as a professional combat unit. They never did nor wish to ever raise their weapons against their own countrymen. The marines subscribes to a frontal type combat style where the objective is as clearly defined as the identity of the enemy. When the Marines are landing on the beach, they must assume that the beach was part of Indonesian soil invaded by some foreign enemies. So "mendarat dan menang" just simply does not apply to the Indonesian Army doctrines. Knowing that he could not influence the neutrality and professionalism of the Marines, Prabowo decided that he should at least tied up all available Marines units in Jakarta area when his troops were to secure power from then defunct government of President Soeharto. He was able to do this because Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Samsoeddin, the Commanding General of Jakarta Military Area Command (Kodam Jaya),, ex officio the Jakarta Garrison Commander, was his old friend from the Military Academy days and part of his click. Samsoeddin cleverly ordered the Marines to stand guard at some less important locations far away from the area being destroyed by rampaging rioters. Now, back to Adm. Kushariadi. Realizing that there was no effective military unit to protect Jakarta, the prudent Admiral immediately raised the Commanding Officer of the Marines 1st Infantry Brigade based in Karang Pilang, Surabaya, East Java. Kushariadi ordered Surabaya to get ready one full infantry battalion equipped for combat deployment (they did not have extensive anti-riot (PHH) equipments). He also ordered Surabaya to get ready all available tank and armored car (panser) crews. Using all available planes belonging to the Navy fleet air arm (including the Nomad & CA
