Re: tls1_process_heartbeat/dtls1_process_heartbeat don't check RAND_pseudo_bytes return value

2014-04-11 Thread Joseph Birr-Pixton
On 10 April 2014 18:54, Kylo Ginsberg k...@kylo.net wrote: Looking at the heartbeat code, I notice that neither of the process heartbeat functions check whether RAND_pseudo_bytes returned success when it is generating the heartbeat padding. I don't know if there are real-world scenarios where

valgrind and ubsan tests

2014-04-11 Thread Reini Urban
Hi In light of recent bad news I checked openssl master against some of the typical tools. (As many other I guess) Not symbolic sat solvers yet, stp with cryptominisat is used by some fine fuzzers, checkers and other tools already. * valgrind https://gist.github.com/rurban/10414413 valgrind

[openssl.org #3149] [patch] Fast and side channel protected implementation of the NIST P-256 Elliptic Curve, for x86-64 platforms

2014-04-11 Thread Bodo Moeller via RT
For the record, I have reviewed Adam's versions of the code before these were posted here, and Adam has resolved the problems that I pointed out. As of the latest patch, I think the code is suitable for inclusion in OpenSSL. The final missing part is support that makes it easy to build with or

Re: Getting patches applied

2014-04-11 Thread Matt Caswell
On 11 April 2014 00:00, Steve Marquess marqu...@opensslfoundation.com wrote: With the very, very important caveat that I'm not one of the people who directly carry this burden: There is certainly room for improvement in the process by which patches are reviewed and merged into OpenSSL. For

Re: valgrind and ubsan tests

2014-04-11 Thread Hubert Kario
- Original Message - From: Reini Urban re...@cpanel.net To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Sent: Thursday, 10 April, 2014 11:57:32 PM Subject: valgrind and ubsan tests Hi In light of recent bad news I checked openssl master against some of the typical tools. (As many other I guess) Not

[openssl-dev] Maximum length of passwords

2014-04-11 Thread Jakob Kramer
Hello, In the apps `pkcs8', `passwd', `enc' and `pkcs12' there are hard-coded maximum lengths for passwords given: (all of the following examples will use the respective char * as buffer for `EVP_read_pw_string') pkcs8.c: 86 char pass[50], /* ... */; enc.c: 78 #define SIZE

Re: [openssl-dev] Maximum length of passwords

2014-04-11 Thread Hubert Kario
- Original Message - From: Jakob Kramer jakob.kra...@gmx.de To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Sent: Friday, 11 April, 2014 3:01:42 PM Subject: [openssl-dev] Maximum length of passwords There should either be a function that automatically allocates enough memory to put the whole password

[openssl.org #3301] [PATCH] Silently discard too long heartbeat messages per RFC 6520

2014-04-11 Thread Erik Auerswald via RT
RFC 6520, section 4 states that The total length of a HeartbeatMessage MUST NOT exceed 2^14 or max_fragment_length when negotiated as defined in [RFC6066]. and If the payload_length of a received HeartbeatMessage is too large, the received HeartbeatMessage MUST be discarded silently.

Re: Getting patches applied

2014-04-11 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 10:26:08AM +0100, Matt Caswell wrote: On 11 April 2014 00:00, Steve Marquess marqu...@opensslfoundation.com wrote: With the very, very important caveat that I'm not one of the people who directly carry this burden: There is certainly room for improvement in the

Re: tls1_process_heartbeat/dtls1_process_heartbeat don't check RAND_pseudo_bytes return value

2014-04-11 Thread Kylo Ginsberg
On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 12:04 PM, Joseph Birr-Pixton jpix...@gmail.comwrote: On 10 April 2014 18:54, Kylo Ginsberg k...@kylo.net wrote: Looking at the heartbeat code, I notice that neither of the process heartbeat functions check whether RAND_pseudo_bytes returned success when it is

Re: [openssl-dev] Maximum length of passwords

2014-04-11 Thread Douglas E Engert
On 4/11/2014 8:51 AM, Hubert Kario wrote: - Original Message - From: Jakob Kramer jakob.kra...@gmx.de To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Sent: Friday, 11 April, 2014 3:01:42 PM Subject: [openssl-dev] Maximum length of passwords There should either be a function that automatically allocates

Re: OpenSSL has exploit mitigation countermeasures to make sure its exploitable

2014-04-11 Thread Loganaden Velvindron
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 5:17 AM, Salz, Rich rs...@akamai.com wrote: Karma has a sense of humor. http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile?f=h;rev=1.29 http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libssl/ssl/Makefile.diff?r1=1.29;r2=1.30;f=h Two people

Re: RSA [FIPS 186-4] issue

2014-04-11 Thread JDM
Steve Marquess-3 wrote I think you will find that a number of other code modifications will also be required. Are you saying that you think more than just what Leon mentioned will have to be changed in order to validate RSA Key Generation? Is there any chance that OpenSSL would be willing to

Re: RSA [FIPS 186-4] issue

2014-04-11 Thread JDM
Leon Brits wrote I am in no way capable of writing such a patch and was hoping that someone is willing to share. To be more specific I need a patch that will change the key generation from: d = e-1 mod((p-1)(q-1)) to this: d = e-1 mod(LCM(p-1, q-1)) We’re also pursuing a patch to RSA Key

Re: OpenSSL has exploit mitigation countermeasures to make sure its exploitable

2014-04-11 Thread Carlos Alberto Lopez Perez
On 10/04/14 18:46, Salz, Rich wrote: We've been compiling -DOPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS forever. Our only complaint is that the BUF is misspelled :) Theo can be obnoxious. This should not be news to most folks. /r$ -- Principal Security Engineer Akamai Technology Cambridge,

Re: [openssl.org #3301] [PATCH] Silently discard too long heartbeat messages per RFC 6520

2014-04-11 Thread Peter Dettman
Hi Erik, Presumably this restriction is already enforced at the record level for all message types? Regards, Pete Dettman On 11/04/2014 9:43 PM, Erik Auerswald via RT wrote: RFC 6520, section 4 states that The total length of a HeartbeatMessage MUST NOT exceed 2^14 or