Re: Patch to mitigate CVE-2014-3566 (POODLE)

2014-10-18 Thread Bodo Moeller
mancha manc...@zoho.com: Bodo Moeller wrote: I certainly think that the claim that new SCSV does not help with [the SSL 3.0 protocol issue related to CBC padding] at all is wrong, and that my statement that TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV can be used to counter CVE-2014-3566 is right. The point

Re: Patch to mitigate CVE-2014-3566 (POODLE)

2014-10-18 Thread Bodo Moeller
Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com: Is there a way to compile without the patch? I think I would rather 'config no=ssl3' and omit the additional complexity. Its additional protocol complexity and heartbleed is still fresh in my mind. There's no way to compile without the patch, other than

Re: Patch to mitigate CVE-2014-3566 (POODLE)

2014-10-18 Thread Jeffrey Walton
Thanks for the patch. Is there a way to compile without the patch? I think I would rather 'config no=ssl3' and omit the additional complexity. Its additional protocol complexity and heartbleed is still fresh in my mind. Also, are there any test cases that accompany the patch? I'm trying to

[openssl.org #3572] [BUG] Memory leak in DTLS re-negotiation

2014-10-18 Thread Dmitry Sobinov via RT
Hi, There's a memory leak in DTLS code when re-negotiating already established session. valgrind output: ==5475== HEAP SUMMARY: ==5475== in use at exit: 2,285 bytes in 17 blocks ==5475== total heap usage: 7,973 allocs, 7,956 frees, 789,213 bytes allocated ==5475== ==5475== 432 (168 direct,

RFC's 5280 and 5262

2014-10-18 Thread Philip Prindeville
Hi, I’m working on Network Time Security and the draft specification requires RFC-5280 and -5652 formatting (i.e. pkcs#9 and pkcs#7). How complete is OpenSSL’s support for both of these standards? And if it’s not complete, what’s missing (i.e. how much effort would be needed to round it out)?