> Once again:
> - This PR *recognizes* the fact that special cases do in fact *exist*.
??? Is there application that heavily relies on some specific overlap
percentage?
> - The EVP layer has to be more aware of special cases anyhow.
Where does it come from? Why does it *have to* be more aware of
On 03/29/18 16:07, Andy Polyakov wrote:
> On 03/09/18 17:13, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
>>
>> No. The intention is to make the partially overlapping check follow
>> the underlying cipher's implementation needs, not the other way round.
>
> I don't follow. What does "underlying cipher's implementation
On 03/09/18 17:13, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
> On 03/08/18 12:06, Andy Polyakov wrote:
>>
>>> Andy pointed out that my last e-mail was probably not clear enough.
>>>
>>> I want to drop the current partially overlapping checks
>>> on the WRAP mode ciphers (which were ineffective anyways).
>>>
>>> And al
On 03/08/18 12:06, Andy Polyakov wrote:
>
>> Andy pointed out that my last e-mail was probably not clear enough.
>>
>> I want to drop the current partially overlapping checks
>> on the WRAP mode ciphers (which were ineffective anyways).
>>
>> And allow the following additional use case for any cip
> Andy pointed out that my last e-mail was probably not clear enough.
>
> I want to drop the current partially overlapping checks
> on the WRAP mode ciphers (which were ineffective anyways).
>
> And allow the following additional use case for any cipher
>
> unsigned char *in = buf + sizeof(buf)
Hi,
Andy pointed out that my last e-mail was probably not clear enough.
I want to drop the current partially overlapping checks
on the WRAP mode ciphers (which were ineffective anyways).
And allow the following additional use case for any cipher
unsigned char *in = buf + sizeof(buf) - X, *out =
On 03/01/18 10:59, Andy Polyakov wrote:
I'd like to request more opinions on
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
whether or not following fragment should work
unsigned char *inp = buf, *out = buf;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(
> Related
> thing to recognize in the context is that *disputable* condition, the
> one that triggered this discussion, is exercised only when
> ctx->block_size is larger than 1, because then ctx->buf_len remains 0.
I naturally meant "because *otherwise* ctx->buf_len remains 0". In other
words ctx
>>> I'd like to request more opinions on
>>> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
>>> whether or not following fragment should work
>>>
>>> unsigned char *inp = buf, *out = buf;
>>>
>>> for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
>>> EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, o
On 02/28/18 17:25, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>
>
>> On Feb 28, 2018, at 5:39 AM, Andy Polyakov wrote:
>>
>> I'd like to request more opinions on
>> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
>> whether or not following fragment should work
>>
>> unsigned char *inp = b
In message <39cb0562-d313-c2d7-8d84-58badaaaf...@openssl.org> on Wed, 28 Feb
2018 18:09:38 +0100, Andy Polyakov said:
appro> >>> I'd like to request more opinions on
appro> >>> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
appro> >>> whether or not following fragment shou
On 28/02/18 17:09, Andy Polyakov wrote:
I'd like to request more opinions on
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
whether or not following fragment should work
unsigned char *inp = buf, *out = buf;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf)
>>> I'd like to request more opinions on
>>> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
>>> whether or not following fragment should work
>>>
>>> unsigned char *inp = buf, *out = buf;
>>>
>>> for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
>>> EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &o
> On Feb 28, 2018, at 11:32 AM, Viktor Dukhovni
> wrote:
>
>>> I'd like to request more opinions on
>>> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
>>> whether or not following fragment should work
>>>
>>> unsigned char *inp = buf, *out = buf;
>>>
>>> for (i = 0;
On 28/02/18 16:32, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>
>
>> On Feb 28, 2018, at 11:25 AM, Viktor Dukhovni
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I'd like to request more opinions on
>>> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
>>> whether or not following fragment should work
>>>
>>> unsigned c
> On Feb 28, 2018, at 11:25 AM, Viktor Dukhovni
> wrote:
>
>> I'd like to request more opinions on
>> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
>> whether or not following fragment should work
>>
>> unsigned char *inp = buf, *out = buf;
>>
>> for (i = 0; i < s
> On Feb 28, 2018, at 5:39 AM, Andy Polyakov wrote:
>
> I'd like to request more opinions on
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5427. Key dispute question is
> whether or not following fragment should work
>
>unsigned char *inp = buf, *out = buf;
>
>for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf);
> Collateral question also is whether or not it would
> be appropriate to make this kind of change in minor release.
One can wonder if this is actually more burning question. But keep in
mind that ...
> ... there is no
> contradiction, as fixing the bug doesn't have to mean that specific
> corner
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