tion declarations. It has different semantics
for void* pointers. It has different rules for numeric-parameter promotions.
And so on.
People who think C++ is a superset of C are sadly mistaken, and programmers who
act on that assumption are dangerous.
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Mic
o I wouldn't expect it to happen anytime soon unless someone
wants to submit a patch.
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
From: Kyle Hamilton [mailto:aerow...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 09 September, 2014 13:43
To: openssl-users@openssl.org; Michael Wojcik
Subject: RE: Certifica
ed it. But it
ought to work around this particular issue. The standard headers included by
openssl_c_hdrs.h will preempt their inclusion within the namespace by the
OpenSSL headers.
Of course, for C++ code you normally wouldn't include the C standard headers;
you'd use their C++ ver
tentially more dangerous than allowing RC4.
> It's just being standards-compliant.
Which standard are we talking about? In your other message you cited to I-Ds,
which are NOT standards.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message ha
amespace, it shouldn't declare anything in that
namespace, because all its contents should be skipped. I believe namespaces
don't affect macro identifiers, so the guards should work.
I could be wrong about that, though. I haven't tried it myself, and I don't
know the C++ standa
a new one.
You can also do what you describe below, but not encrypt the private key the
first time, by using the -nodes option with openssl req; that saves decrypting
it before encrypting it with your preferred cipher.
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
From: owner-opens
re feasible than those against the other two. But as
Victor said, it's better than plaintext; and it's still very widely used (often
preferentially), so there's a decent chance that an OpenSSL-based application
using the default suite list will encounter a peer that o
t; openssl::malloc not found
>
> It makes sense given that the namespace is also affecting to any other
> include within the openssl header file.
You'd have to include the standard C headers before including the OpenSSL ones,
outside the namespace, so that their inclusion by the
with macro or external-symbol identifier
collisions.
And anyone who wants this can simply include the OpenSSL headers within a
namespace declaration.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
n't look like a plausible threat to me, unless you're protecting
something really valuable.
Disclaimer - I haven't double-checked any of those figures.
Does that help?
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-opens
at's what we do. Few applications will use all,
or even most, of OpenSSL's public functionality directly anyway.
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org]
On Behalf Of Kyle Hamilton
Sent: Sunday,
ocial engineering (forged password-rest
requests and the like).
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org]
On Behalf Of dave paxton
Sent: Friday, 05 September, 2014 15:34
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subj
mised, it will almost certainly be because
they did something wrong, or an application developer did something wrong, or a
system administrator did something wrong.
I'm not in the business of issuing certificates and keys myself, so I don't
have any policies to share, I&
Reading the OpenSSL source code in an effort to learn how the SSL and TLS
protocols work is not a good idea. OpenSSL is an implementation, not a tutorial.
I suggest you get an actual description of how SSL/TLS works, such as Eric
Rescorla's book SSL and TLS.
(I believe Rich already suggested yo
t; l2) return -1;
if (l2 > l1) return 1;
us1++, us2++;
}
return 0;
}
(Untested, but copied with some modifications from an existing implementation.)
That said, I agree that case-insensitive comparison would be a good idea here.
--
Michael Wo
where, but I'd say yes, it's probably
good to drain the error queue each time a thread picks up a new piece of work.
This hadn't occurred to me before your note - I'll have to investigate whether
any of my code needs to do this as well.
Michael Wojcik
Technology Special
but none of them are "waiting for the ack for the FIN", because the
local side *received* the FIN. It will send an ACK for it, but nothing on the
local side waits for that to happen.
> The remote side then sends back the ack along with the
>Reset. When we receive the Reset,
f TLS
if you need that guarantee. (In this case, FTP will supply that, in the form of
its response messages.)
So I don't see a simple solution to your problem. I'd be tempted to wrap the
FTP client in another program and filter out the failing return code if I've
received the server
al to "ignore". SIGPIPE is a kluge for
applications that don't check the result of the write/send family of system
calls. Any well-written application should ignore it.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.
lot simpler to
have your server certificate signed directly by the root, if you don't need an
intermediate for some reason.
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org]
On Behalf Of Marco Bambini
Sent: Sa
OpenSSL is SSL_CTX_load_client_CA_file:
SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(CTX,
SSL_CTX_load_client_CA_file("/path/to/CAcerts.pem"));
(or with, you know, error handling, if you want to be fancy). See
http://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_load_client_CA_file.html.
Micha
it happens infrequently
enough that we're unlikely to forget it - it's part of our documented process
for updating to a new release.
We've found that to be simpler than trying to override aspects of the existing
configurations when none of them match our build settings.
--
d pointer, per ISO
9899-1990 et seq.) Code often checks for a null return from malloc and friends
and treats it as an error even if it was trying to allocate a zero-byte area.
- Heap corruption.
- Runaway recursion that actually does eat up the entire available heap.
ything" can be one defensive
technique, it also obstructs others. It is not an unalloyed Good Thing.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
> From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-
> us...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of Jens Maus
> Sent: Wednesday, 25 June, 2014 14:07
>
> Am 25.06.2014 um 18:22 schrieb Michael Wojcik
> :
>
> > [...]
> > Now, if you need additional application-speci
/* Serialize as necessary */
static int index = -1;
if (index < 0) index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(...);
return index;
}
/* After creating the SSL object */
SSL_set_ex_data(conn, get_index(), my_data_ptr);
...
n acceptable defense?
It's possible that the answer to your technical question is "use cipher suites
that support anonymous key exchange". This is quite likely the Wrong Thing for
most real-world applications that have some perceived need for communications
security.
Michael Wojcik
trying to get C
programmers to actually follow the specification is a waste of time. So do what
you like.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
to replace the reserved names
elsewhere in the source.
I suppose it's a bit quixotic to talk about the proper use of C in an OpenSSL
forum, but trying to follow the rules (even in code that's not part of the
library itself) would be a step in the right direction.
--
Michael Wojcik
Tec
> From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-
> us...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of Tilman Sauerbeck
> Sent: Friday, 09 May, 2014 18:57
>
> Michael Wojcik [2014-05-09 21:12]:
>
> > > From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-
> >
ssued any later than the indicated date.
So yes, you can issue a new CRL before the date in the Next Update field.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websens
nt more control over the behavior of a passive TCP endpoint still
use nonblocking sockets.
> Please CC me in your replies; I'm not subscribed to the list.
Hmm. In my day, that was considered rude. You kids with your music that's not
identical to my music and hairstyles that aren&
nd TLS by email is an
enterprise fraught with danger and disappointment.
If I understand your requirements, a better approach would probably be a
generic SSL/TLS tunnel utility like STunnel, or a VPN.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malw
t;get an SSL Error", what *exactly* do you see?
In your original notes you also mentioned client certificates. Are you using a
client certificate in the browser? Is it configured to send the certificate
automatically, or to prompt you? Where did the client certificate come from?
--
Mic
t is an X.509v1 certificate - why isn't it v3?
I admit I don't understand the problem description from the original note, but
it doesn't seem to match what we have with these three certificates.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been s
any of the other proposals.
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org]
On Behalf Of Tim Hudson
Sent: Tuesday, 29 April, 2014 16:32
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subject: Re: Increment certificate serial number
hell, or wmic
- there are various examples online. On Linux, UNIX, and iOS, use uuidgen (you
may have to grab the source and build it). uuidgen is also available for
Windows, e.g. as part of Cygwin.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
e functions in question have no parameters, and
(since OpenSSL is not OO and does not carry hidden data around) thus cannot
know about any sockets?
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
___
bserved a few adjacent
serial-number values could determine what parameters you used, and you'd be
back to, in effect, incrementing serials. Whether that's a risk depends on your
threat model.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
etend it isn't.
Of course the point of *any* security system is to raise the work factor for
attackers until the cost of breaking the system is greater than the return for
breaking it, under your threat model. SSL/TLS raises that cost over unencrypted
communications. But it doesn't raise
n't designed to be helpful, but to do
whatever specific things need to be done for the functions OpenSSL provides.
It's not how I would have designed them, but I haven't written an SSL/TLS
implementation, and the OpenSSL developers have, so that's hardly a compelling
critique. They do the work; they get to make the decisions.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
memoryBio, &pp);
certificate.assign (pp, length);
// or if certificate isn't already declared:
// string certificate (pp, length);
BIO_free (memoryBio);
(Untested.)
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense
get you're
using, and add -fPIC to its compiler options list.
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist
Micro Focus
michael.woj...@microfocus.com<mailto:michael.woj...@microfocus.com>
519 West Ash Street
Mason, MI 48854-1553
Direct:+1 517 639 0892
Mobile : +1 517 862 9464
From:
eally. The OpenSSL sources aren't as difficult to read as some people make
them out to be, but they are far from trivial. And since they're written in C,
knowing "a bit [of] C++" will only hurt, as many people who don't have
extensive C experience have trouble keeping those two quite different languages
apart.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
equired is often the sort of thing that falls by the wayside, even when
everyone has good intentions.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
_
y stepped through the code in question, but it appears to be
what you're looking for.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
__
OpenSSL P
runs into software that can't handle such certificates will get a useful
bit of education in certificate signature algorithms.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
:��I"Ϯ��r�m
(Z+�K �+1���x ��h[�z�(Z+� ��f�y�� �f���h��)z{,���
urce tree and copy it to a temporary directory.
Then replace your symlink-filled openssl/include with the temporary directory.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
__
stackoverflow.com/questions/6646841/what-is-the-difference-between-x509-store-and-x509-store-ctx
http://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.html
This may also be useful:
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/16291809/openssl-programatically-verify-certificate-chain-in-c-in-memory-certs
--
encrypted
portions of the flows.
The Wireshark documentation is decent. See http://wiki.wireshark.org/SSL to
start; the wireshark.org search function finds a lot more information about
SSL/TLS dissection.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
ourself, or simply remove the calls to NetStatisticsGet
in your own OpenSSL build.
--
Michael Wojcik
Technology Specialist, Micro Focus
This message has been scanned for malware by Websense. www.websense.com
__
OpenSSL Pro
ates to check,
but I'm using Outlook 2001 (idiotic company standard, unfortunately) and
it's too much effort.
Michael Wojcik
Principal Software Systems Developer, Micro Focus
Department of English, Miami University
> -Original Message-
> From: Andrew T. Finnell [mailto:[EMA
#endif
> ...
A style note: the #ifdef / #endif is unnecessary and clutters the source.
As of at least C90 #undef with a name that is not currently defined is
ignored. See ISO 9899-1990 6.8.3.5.
[And wouldn't openssl-dev be the more appropriate forum?]
Michael Wojcik
Principal Soft
ument
over HTTP?
Michael Wojcik402 438-7842
Software Systems DeveloperMicro Focus
> From: Mohan Atreya [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2002 8:03 AM
>
> I am having trouble sending Base64 data over HTTPS POST. Does
> anybody have
> an
ar to me whether Scott was looking for HTTP protocol
information, though, or OpenSSL API help. Scott?
Michael Wojcik
Principal Software Systems Developer, Micro Focus
Department of English, Miami University
> -Original Message-
> From: Neff Robert A [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
efault behavior), thanks to the "-L.. -lcrypto" on the command line.
However, typically ld's -L option appends the specified directory to the search path, which means ".." is the *last* directory to be searched for libcrypto.a.
Does your system have another libcrypto.a, or
enSSL-users list, since no one's responded to your original query with definite information one way or another.
(By the way, "first" and "second" are already adverbs. No need to suffix them with "ly".)
Michael Wojcik
Principal Software Systems Developer, Micr
against one another, with the appropriate import/export files.)
Try
dump -nv *.a | awk '/ EXP / {print $NF}'
to see a list of symbols exported by shared objects in your archives.
Michael Wojcik
Principal Software Systems Developer, Micro Focus
Department of English, Miami Universit
escriptor. I don't know if this actually makes a
difference on any platform; it doesn't appear to on Solaris 2.6. The Unix
Programming FAQ from comp.unix.programmer documents using O_RDWR with no
special cautions.
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of Engl
tion modes, the SRP Java Telnet client
served from a web page so remote users could get a secure session from any
Java-equipped browser, SSH, and Kermit, and the infrastructure necessary to
support public authentication. Give the users some options and gradually
transition them away from the unsafe on
th the SRP distribution. And you get EPS,
which provides strong password hashing for platforms that lack it.
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
__
OpenSSL Pro
If you're looking for small signatures I'd recommend that you take a look
at
> the Cryptonessie signatures (http://www.cryptonessie.org) A few of them
> offer small signatures.
But note in general that small signatures aren't going to be very secure.
Michael Wojc
nment_; it's one of the historical BSD/USL differences.) On some
platforms, you can control whether slow system calls restart (rather than
failing with EINTR) when particular signals are raised, using flags to
sigaction. I don't recall offhand whether UW is one.
Personally, I prefe
(-1);
}
else if (errno != EINTR)
break;
> + } while (ret < 0);
I moved the EINTR test into the loop to avoid having an overly complex
invariant after the while. Adjust the logic to suit your taste, of course.
(Personally, I'd p
your server, for example. (Look at the IIS + Access bugs that let people
submit arbitrary SQL queries against web front-ended databases. That's a
hell of a lot easier than breaking an SSL session by trying to predict the
PRNG.)
Gather ye entropy while ye may, but don't make it an o
me the default, deprecate all the other versions, and
then practice decent DLL hygiene, like the grown-up operating systems do.)
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
__
OpenSSL Proj
me* - statically or dynamically linked - and not
to whether the *target* is a DLL.)
I believe people have reported running into this in the past on
openssl-users.
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
ges on the
list, which I find more troublesome than list messages accidentally sent to
me (or by me to someone else).
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
__
OpenSSL Project
er is likely to tromp on. Portable C code should strive
to use restricted, well-defined portions of namespace. It's probably too
late to fix OpenSSL now, though.)
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
lose a lot of sleep over.
If so, then you'd be better off hiring crypto and security experts to vet
your application.
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
__
. The server MUST close the connection after
sending the response if the client did not include a valid Keep-alive header
requesting a persistent connection. (The server MAY close the connection
after returning the response even if the client did request a persistent
connection; it's not bound
a bit, an HTTP/1.1-compliant application
SHOULD use "HTTP/1.1" as its HTTP-Version, and MUST use "HTTP/1.1" if it
uses any features not compatible with HTTP/1.0 - such as persistent
connections.
Michael Wojci
y when there are much better alternatives seems like a
poor choice, though.
Remember that historically poor PRNG seeding has been one of the classic
faults in SSL use. There's a reason (discussed ad nauseum on openssl-users)
why OpenSSL now tries to get a decent entropy source. Fooling i
've forgotten which one it is. It has a nice discussion of the
seeding problem, issues with the obvious techniques (eg. network timings),
compression functions used to reduce bias in seed material, etc. Should be
easy to find from one of the online RFC sources.
Micha
e vagaries of AIX
linking. The moral, of course, is that you never know enough about how the
linker and loader work.)
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
__
OpenSSL Project
at's even an option). Convincing
the user probably won't be difficult - anyone who ran the ILY trojan is a
likely candidate - but on-line businesses typically aren't interested in
taking that chance. If you are, fine.
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERA
s or 24 bytes, but its effective key length is 168 bits.)
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mail
;ve ever run into a revoked one - because
they're a sign of sloppiness, but they're not a significant risk under my
threat model.)
A CA oversight or governing body might marginally increase safety, but there
are much bigger risks that ought to be addressed first.
Michae
rypt.random-numbers) might also be of interest. Many
there seem to lean toward hardware solutions (deriving small amounts of
entropy from noisy sources), though that approach has its pitfalls too.
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
___
l correctors,
and similar issues. It points out how vulnerable even likely-looking
sources like network time skew can be to a dedicated attacker in the right
place.
With crypto PRNGs, you have two choices: use a complete implementation (from
seeding on up) designed for the purpose from a source you
subject, the standard text for
computer implementation of contemporary crypto is Schneier's _Applied
Cryptography_.
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
__
OpenSSL Project
nix95 or any of the other specs require a bc implementation
sufficient to pass all the BN tests? I don't know.
Michael Wojcik [EMAIL PROTECTED]
MERANT
Department of English, Miami University
__
OpenS
wbacks) to get out of the read() if data isn't received in a certain
timeframe - regardless of whether it knows how much data to receive.
And, of course, a good HTTP/1.1 application should be paying attention to
the Content-length header if present, or the Transfer Encoding, or
whatever&#x
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