On Tue, Oct 07, 2008 at 07:42:19PM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
Over the last few days, the torstatus pages appear to have confirmed
what I see when I watch the activity of my tor server: another precipitous
drop in traffic load over the entire tor network. This is the second such
Thanks a lot, I´ll be running tests I´ll post the results
anonym escribió:
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On 08/10/08 01:09, Jonathan Addington wrote:
With Wireshark you can filter by port.
..
To address the above, filter by ports, and then by your IP inside the
On Wed, Oct 08, 2008 at 10:52:32AM +0200, Martin Mulazzani wrote:
In the past few days there was a drop in the number of servers with the
guard flag set. See the attatched picture. Number of running, running
exit and running fast servers is as usual.
That sounds like it might be related to bug
Hi!
In the past few days there was a drop in the number of servers with the
guard flag set. See the attatched picture. Number of running, running
exit and running fast servers is as usual.
If you are interested I can check what countries changed the number of
guard servers compared to regular
Is there any reason i get the same first hope for a number of days? Even
when i form a new identity in vidalia, i still get the same first hops. i
dont feel comfortable with that.
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 4:50 PM, M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Is there any reason i get the same first hope for a number of days? Even
when i form a new identity in vidalia, i still get the same first hops. i
dont feel comfortable with that.
It increases your security.
someone tell me how to get off this list
i dont see any instructions included in any emails on how to leave
the emails are way way too much
--- On Wed, 10/8/08, F. Fox [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: F. Fox [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: same first hops
To: or-talk@freehaven.net
Date:
Thanx Gregory and F.Fox...understood the concept. Just one note though:
Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when
the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For example,
suppose the attacker is watching the Tor relay you choose to enter the
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:23 PM, M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Thanx Gregory and F.Fox...understood the concept. Just one note though:
Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when
the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For example,
suppose the
On Tue, Sep 02, 2008 at 08:20:47AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
A short time ago, I found that 212.205.53.212 had several hundred open
TCP connections to my tor server's DirPort, and very little relay traffic
seemed to be getting past all of that. I've now taken steps to prevent such
but it says first hop
On Thu, Oct 9, 2008 at 6:31 AM, Gregory Maxwell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:23 PM, M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Thanx Gregory and F.Fox...understood the concept. Just one note though:
Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:34 PM, M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, Oct 9, 2008 at 6:31 AM, Gregory Maxwell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:23 PM, M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Thanx Gregory and F.Fox...understood the concept. Just one note though:
Tor (like all current
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M wrote:
Thanx Gregory and F.Fox...understood the concept. Just one note though:
Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails
when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For
example, suppose the
ok understood, so in actuality he would have to be observing 3 things:
1) The user' s computer (timing and size)
2) the first hop ((timing and size)
3) the last hop ((timing, size and anythign else)
He would have to be observing the user computer, as there would be no other
way to correlate the
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:50 PM, M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
ok understood, so in actuality he would have to be observing 3 things:
1) The user' s computer (timing and size)
2) the first hop ((timing and size)
3) the last hop ((timing, size and anythign else)
He would have to be observing
sorry for the many questions... How can i find the $fingerprint of TOR nodes
i was to set as the entry?
On Thu, Oct 9, 2008 at 7:11 AM, Gregory Maxwell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:50 PM, M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
ok understood, so in actuality he would have to be
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