[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: New York Pragmatist Forum 11/20/15: News from Paris, African American Pragmatism

2015-11-09 Thread Gary Richmond
NEW YORK PRAGMATIST FORUM Fordham University @ Lincoln Center Columbus (9th) Ave & 60th St, New York, New York, USA Lowenstein Building, Room 708 Friday, November 20, 2015, 5:30-7:30 p.m. - - - - - - - News from Paris: African American Pragmatism Today - - - - - - - Jacoby Carter (John Jay

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

2015-11-09 Thread Franklin Ransom
Ben, Jerry, In general, I ditto Ben's interleaved remarks from his post. In particular, I will note a couple of differences: Jerry wrote: Consider the sentence: > Harry fought Peter and contrast it with it's "twin", Peter fought Harry. > Does it have the same logical meaning as the first sentenc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

2015-11-09 Thread kirstima
List, Jerry, Peirce was interested in relations, right? - So, with a sentence, he reduced it to a relational rhema, like - fought -. This expresses the ralation of figthing. The lines just express a logical "place", which may be be Harry or Peter, or Kirsti or anyone. This rhema is about a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Peirce's categories - and chemical logic

2015-11-09 Thread kirstima
Hi, To my mind, Jerry is right in pointing out a general neglect on the significance of chemistry in Peirce's philosophy. - Today, browsing Essential Peirce, vol 2, I was dismayed, again, with the note of the editors of a footnote of CSP on chemistry, left out. - With the excuse, that it is l

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

2015-11-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Come to think of it, Peirce would probably call "copulative conjunction" the conjunction of two predicates just as well as the conjunction of two propositions. More generally it seems simply the logical "and". /p/&/q/ /Gx/&/Hx/ ∃(/G/&/H/) etc. or more typically /pq/ /GxHx/ ∃/GH/ etc. The Centu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

2015-11-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jerry, Frank, list, Responses interleaved below. On 11/9/2015 1:56 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: [JC] List, Frank, Ben: This discussion has very deep roots into the foundations of CSP's thinking, at least in my opinion. Pragmatically, the situation of the logic of grammatical terms and it re

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

2015-11-09 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
List, Frank, Ben: This discussion has very deep roots into the foundations of CSP's thinking, at least in my opinion. Pragmatically, the situation of the logic of grammatical terms and it relationships to formal logics is an unresolved issue, at least from my perspective. CSP's writings open u

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

2015-11-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Helmut, list, The immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants are 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, respectively, in their trichotomy, and abduction, induction, and deduction are usually considered 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, respectively in their trichotomy. So they align in some sense; they rhyme, 1st with 1st,

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

2015-11-09 Thread Helmut Raulien
  Ben, List, I am sorry for having not known this (scientifical) meaning of "degenerate". Now, do you think, that abduction, induction, and deduction somehow can be assigned to the immediate, dynamical, and final interpretant? In this case, maybe, every sign "posesses" these three inferences, bec

[PEIRCE-L] “When we have analyzed a proposition so as to throw into the subject everything that can be removed from the predicate…”

2015-11-09 Thread Jon Awbrey
Peircers, This has to do with hypostatic abstraction and its iterative limit in what Peirce called “continuous predicates”. Some excerpts and discussion on these pages: • http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/08/hypostatic-abstraction/ • http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Hypostatic_abst

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

2015-11-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Helmut, list, I didn't mean that remembering, for example, is a result of an actual degeneration of inference. I meant that, if one considers it as inference, it seems a lower form of it, lacking certain properties that one associates with inference, such that one wouldn't usually think of it