Lowell Lecture fans,
The eighth and final lecture of the series is now up on my website at
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell8.htm. It is now possible to read the whole 1903
series, beginning at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm, and to view the
manuscripts side by side with the 'raw' transcriptions at
Helmut,
Unicorns and phoenixes (phoenices?) do not exist apart from their being
represented, but representations of them certainly do exist, and thus can serve
as dynamic objects that determine future references to them, and as objects of
study. Myths are not factual, but mythologies are. The
Forwarded FYI GR
The special issue of Zeitschrift für Semiotik on biosemiotic ethics guest-
edited by myself, Yogi Hendlin and Jonathan Beever is now freely available
online, downloadable in PDF format. It includes contributions by the
editors,
John Deely, Andreas Weber, Hans Werner Ingensiep,
Dear list,
I’m convinced our construction and communication of Peirce’s system is a
unicorn;
or even more appropriately- a phoenix.
For I distinctly recall this conversation to have happened before..
then it died..
And now, it bursts forth to reliably disappear again..
It is
Jon, List,
ok, but "unlimited and final study would" not show what a phoenix or a unicorn would be, because if it does not exist, why "would" it anything? This study would only show the concept´s extension. And: "What unlimited and final study would show it to be" is now: A concept. So I am not
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}JAS, list
Well, in my view, biosemiosis is not a kind of subset of semiosis,
i.e., with semiosic actions specific only to itself. Biosemiosis is a
natural, logical analysis of the process of semiosis within the
Helmut, List:
Peirce's example was a phoenix, rather than a unicorn.
CSP: A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical
Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of camels, common to
the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes, even if this one is
not
Edwina, List:
As far as I am aware, no one disputes that the Object affects the Sign, and
the Sign affects the Interpretant. The problem is that the word
"interaction" implies effects in *both *directions, such that the Sign
affects the Object, and the Interpretant affects the Sign--both of
Jon, List,
I just want to tell how I came to my view: To understand a theory or a mathematical equation, it is good to look at the extreme conditions. An extreme condition for a DO would be, that it does not exist, like a unicorn. In the unicorn case, people (somebody in this list many years
Helmut, List:
With all due respect, that does not solve any problems, it just changes the
terminology in a way that deviates from Peirce's own consistent usage. The
DO *is* "the thing itself," while the IO is closer to "the thing's concept."
CSP: ... the *immediate* object, if it be the idea
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}JAS, list
I think it's more complex than you outline. After all, if there is
no Sign [and do you mean the sign/representamen or the full triad?] -
without some thing functioning as a Dynamic Object, then clearly,
And about replicas, types and tokens: What I wrote: " The IO (2.1.) is the part of the intension that is brought along with the sign." is all about that, I think, and I feel that to call every sign a replica is blowing the topic up and distorting it until it appears like a Platonic copycat
Dear colleagues,
Interesting discussion: but I can no longer resist telling of Marks and
Spencer’s rejecting a computer system designed for stock management in favour
of easier access to the under-the-display storage-space. Staff were trained to
check the piles of underwear, not by trying
Gary F., List:
To clarify my own remark, what would dissolve if the Sign were merely
"representing" itself is its mediation aspect. An Object directly
affecting something else is dyadic action/reaction/interaction, not triadic
mediation.
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 11:26 AM, wrote:
Edwina, List:
As far as I am aware, no one disputes that there is no Sign without a
Dynamic Object that *determines *it. What I find problematic is any claim
that the Dynamic Object is a *part *or *component *of the Sign, since
Peirce clearly stated (in what I quoted below and elsewhere) that it
Jon, list,
I’m not sure what you mean by saying the sign “would dissolve,” but yes, a
genuine Secondness between sign and object is required if the Thirdness of its
mediation is to be genuine. (It’s in this respect that the icon is described as
“degenerate” in “New Elements”). The index, on
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}Stephen, list
Mechanism is not identical with 'materialism'. Peirce's view was
that 'matter is effete mind' [6.25]; "Matter is mind hidebound with
habits" [6.158]. A mechanical system has no 'mind' but a material
Peirce: CP 1.162 "Thus, the universe is not a mere mechanical result of the
operation of blind law.†1 The most obvious of all its characters cannot be
so explained. It is the multitudinous facts of all experience that show us
this; but that which has opened our eyes to these facts is the principle
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}JAS, list
And this suggests that my insistence that the Sign cannot exist 'per
se', as an isolate actuality, but is necessarily interactive with an
'other than itself', i.e., with the Dynamic Object is a valid
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