List:
For Peirce, degeneracy has to do with *relations*. Genuine and degenerate
2ns correspond to the two different kinds of *dyadic *relations.
CSP: This distinction between two kinds of seconds, which is almost
involved in the very idea of a second, makes a distinction between two
kinds of
John,
Auke
> Cees Schuyt, a Dutch Peirce scholar, suggested to distinguish being,
> existence and reality.
John
Suppose somebody (Euclid for example) said "If there exists a line AB, then
there exists an equilateral triangle ABC with AB as one side."
Where would the line AB and the triangle
Helmut, list
Sorry- but I don't see that when Peirce wrote about the degenerate
modes, he also used the term 'form'.
He refers to 'two distinct grades of Secondness and three grades of
Thirdness' [1.365] And refers to s 'degenerate sort' [1.365]
Edwina
On
Edwina, List,
Yes, but when Peirce wrote about degenerateness, he mostly used the term in combination with "form": "Degenerate form" of something. "Form", I would say, is "class". The sign classes is a classification of compositions. I think the topic of classification versus composition,
Helmut, list
When I am referring to such terms as genuine Secondness and
degenerate Secondness - as I'm sure you know, these are the terms
Peirce used to describe these categories. Nothing to do with a
natural language understanding of the term 'degenerate'.
Edwina
On
John S., Gary F., List:
JFS: But the current ISO proposal (by a philosopher named Barry Smith) has
only one mode of existence ... He allows tokens, but no types.
Indeed, the nominalism that Peirce so persistently and vehemently opposed
is alive and well today, still masquerading as
Supp.: I think it is mole, not mule, small black animal, underminer...
Edwina, List,
you know, one of my favourite topics is that of the distinction between classification and composition (following Stanley N. Salthe). In this respect I have come to the conclusion, that degeneration
Edwina, List,
you know, one of my favourite topics is that of the distinction between classification and composition (following Stanley N. Salthe). In this respect I have come to the conclusion, that degeneration only is a matter of classification, like in the sign classes (I write
John, have you considered ideal/actual for the root dichotomy?
(Or the trichotomy ideal/actual/significant?)
Gary f.
-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa
Sent: 23-Aug-18 11:26
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer
to?
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}John, list
Agreed - my point is that the world is more complex than a simple
set of two or even three terms. That's why Peirce expanded his
categories into their genuine and degenerate modes.
I would
Edwina, List:
These characterizations strike me as clearly inconsistent with Peirce's
writings. He held that space and time are *continuous *(3ns), while a
quality *in itself*--i.e., not embodied in a particular individual--is
non-spatial and non-temporal (1ns). Pure Mind is indeed 3ns, but
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}John, list
Interesting suggestions about the hierarchies of ontologies
What about Peirce's Six Categorical modes: - which makes the world a
rather complex place.
There's 3-3 [Thirdness as
John S., List:
JFS: What I'm looking for is a clear distinction with a pair of terms that
can distinguish signs and reality or pure math from applied math.
I am curious--why insist on a dichotomy, when Peirce clearly advocated a
trichotomy? Signs and conditional necessity (3ns) are just as
On 8/23/2018 4:06 AM, A. Mani wrote:
1. Obviously \exists x is \exists x.
Why should it refer to models?
When the subject matter is mathematics, existence is not obvious.
This issue has been debated for over two millennia: If mathematical
objects exist, where are they? In a Platonic heaven?
John,
You asked:
Does anyone have any preferences for or against the pair
Transcendental/Physical instead of Mathematical/Physical?
--
Against, because it muddles the original question i.e. the relation of math
with the other sciences (whether theoretical like phenomenology, semiotic and
Some issues relating to possible formalisms :) are
0. Hidden assumptions about collectivizing mathematical objects
including ones that have not been properly defined. Peirce's position
does not appear to be very practical because if the semantic domain
(in a formal/generalized sense) is
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