John, List:
JFS: This is my last note on this thread until 2/29 or later.
Understood, and at this point, I doubt that there is much more for either
of us to say without further repeating ourselves anyway.
JFS: Metalanguage is the only feature required to define modality.
Peirce never said
Jon, List
> On Feb 23, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
>
> JLRC> First, the question of modern modal symbolic logic is remote from
> probability theory and even remoter from the Peircian notion of “qualisign,
> sinsign, legisign”
>
> That is true of Peirce's modal logic of 1903,
Jon,
I am preparing slides for a Zoom talk on 2/28. (I'll send the abstract and
link tomorrow.) This is my last note on this thread until 2/29 or later.
JAS> Even in the printed book, the line attached to the first oval on page 151
is thinly drawn, exactly like the oval itself, while the
John, List:
JFS: I admit that I was looking at the printed book, Reasoning and the
logic of things. In that book, the transcription shows a clearly drawn line
that connects the oval to the word 'is'.
Even in the printed book, the line attached to the first oval on page 151
is *thinly *drawn,
Michael,
I have always seen Peirce positing 'objective idealism" as essentially a
*metaphysical* doctrine as he contrasts it with two other 'doctrines' in
"The Architecture of Theories" and, in fact, refers to "objective idealism"
*as* a 'theory' in his definition.
The materialistic doctrine
