Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

___ From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com ] Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 1:11 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion Clark, list, I think that the relevance of the classification of research is in the lig

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Dear Ben Novak, list, I should add something for a broader picture. I've talked about associating a certain impatience for a new perspective with deduction. Generally, Peirce justifies abductive inference _/in general/_ as leading more expeditiously than anything else does to new truths. The

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Dear Ben Novak, list, As regards an explanation A's implying the surprising phenomenon C, that seems more on the level of implication than of an actual inference, which would be the mind's moving from A as an accepted premiss to conclude at least tentatively C. The mind already believes C and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

> On Oct 29, 2015, at 9:06 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I think that I'd agree with Kant's remark "That philosophy which mixes pure > principles with empirical ones does not deserve the name of philosophy" > if by "philosophy" one takes him to mean pure philosophy, or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Ben U, List ~ This is a great discussion but I wanted to interject a practical/physical element that is missing. One issue touched on is the role of impatience or dissatisfaction as a trigger for deductive/predictive thinking. Of course, one can whip up impatience or dissatisfaction at will,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Tom, list, You wrote, In the vast majority of our deductions, we are not propelled by any specific urge or sensation. [End quote] I wouldn't say that we are _/propelled/_ by an urge or sensation to deduction in the way that we are propelled by surprise or perplexity to an abductive

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

> On Oct 21, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > The main thing I want to add to what you've said is prompted by a remark that > Kant makes about philosophical methodology. In the Preface of the Grounding, > he puts a sharp edge on the claim. He

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

> On Oct 21, 2015, at 2:11 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I think that the relevance of the classification of research is in the light > shed on the logical supports among fields in the build-up of knowledge. > Physics doesn't decide which math is mathematically right, which

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Dear Ben Novak, I haven't been following that thread carefully, since I've gotten busy with practical matters. On re-reading my previous message, I find that I misplaced a phrase (in one of my two uses of it) in such a way that you may have thought that I was criticizing you, suggesting

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

> On Oct 21, 2015, at 11:25 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > The positivists divided sciences into formal (i.e., mathematics and deductive > logic) and factual. I never got clear on where they put philosophy, I suspect > they hoped to make it into a formal science. I think

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Clark, list, I think that the relevance of the classification of research is in the light shed on the logical supports among fields in the build-up of knowledge. Physics doesn't decide which math is mathematically right, which combined mathematical postulates are consistent and nontrivial,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

ff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 1:11 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion Clark, list, I thin

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Dear Ben Udell: Please rest assured that I did not take any of your comments as criticism. Rather, I am very interested in the issues that you have raised, and eager to understand them. I therefore appreciate very much your explanatory emails, both in response to me and to others, as well as of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Dear Ben Novak, On the one hand, in calling attention to surprise and perplexity as the occasion of abductive inference (as opposed to deductive and inductive inference), Peirce is talking about a generic necessary condition which the general character of abduction reflects in being a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

___ From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: Sunday, October 11, 2015 4:41 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion List, Some may remember my attempts to outline, as forming a system, such heuristic aspects, given by conclusions to premisses

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Dear Ben Udell: I really didn't intend to send only to you, but I guess I didn't notice that merely hitting reply resulted in that. It is my hope that my email and your reply will now appear on the list, and we can see if others find them of interest... Back to the subject. What I am suggesting

RE: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: Sunday, October 11, 2015 4:41 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion List, Some may remember my attempts to outline, as forming a system, such heuristic

[PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

List, Some may remember my attempts to outline, as forming a system, such heuristic aspects, given by conclusions to premisses, as an abductive inference's natural simplicity, an induction's verisimilitude, an attenuative deduction's new aspect, and an equipollential deduction's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Ben, you sent this right at the end of my time for philosophical studies today. So I can't say much now, except that it relates to CP 7.198, to which Jon Awbrey directed me when I inquired here about "the hard problem of consciousness". Matt On 10/11/15 7:41 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List,