Edwina, Charles, List,
Maybe it just is a matter of how one defines "truth". Maybe for Peirce it is an end (or is "ends" the word?), and in markedness theory and Buddhism it is the absence of falsity and karma. In a primordial continuum there is no falsity. I like a concept of original
Supplement: But perhaps this comparison with objective (or ontological) models is not even necessary, as it might be enough to go from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. I must read your texts, Charles, maybe it is in them.
I just am thinking, is the falsity in language due to what I
Charles, Edwina, List,
I understand the falsity-truth distinction abstractly, because Spencer-Brown´s calculus is isomorphic with Peirce´s Entitive Graphs, and the cut in them is, translated to Boolean, a "NOT". The truth of the unmarked space then would not be ultimate, but original truth.
