Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 17, 2016 9:35 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness,
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2016 9:35 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Edwina, List:
Sorry, you lost me; I do not see where anyone was talking about "the aspatial
and atemporal Platonic Form" or
mus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 17, 2016 7:54 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I can see how a model could be characterized as a genuine Idea in this
> Pei
are vague termsso, I won't go
into that.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2016 7:54 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Edwina, List:
I can see how a model
mail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> ; Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
> ; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 17, 2016 5:34 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdnes
Cc: Jerry Rhee ; Helmut Raulien ; Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2016 5:34 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Edwina, List:
Jerry's first quote is from Peirce's NA (CP 6.452). He is obviously not here
talking about "the absolutely incogni
or...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> ; Jon Alan Schmidt
> <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 17, 2016 3:11 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
>
> Edwina
2016 3:11 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Edwina,
Thank you for that contribution. I think you touch on an extremely important
point. This concept of whether we can complete growth of concrete
reasonableness or whether we will forever be in a
(First apologies. I’ve not had time to read Peirce-L for a while. So forgive me
if I misread due to not having fully read all the posts in the thread or repeat
something someone else said)
> On Aug 16, 2016, at 10:46 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> You wrote:
>
> [JR]
> On Aug 17, 2016, at 1:11 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>
> I am of the opinion that it can be perfected for a given situation and only
> in a particular way. That is, I believe that we can achieve a model of the
> perfection of an Idea in the following sense:
>
> “Some
ather than the operation of the universe, is similar.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: Edwina Taborsky ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2016 2:27 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Edwina,
Many authors have interpreted Peirce's ultimate aim/growth of concrete
reasonableness/his *summum bonum*. I would recommend, Potter, Parker,
Sorenson and Thellefsen, among many others...
I think a good place to start in Peirce is with the question, "What does
right reasoning consist
Suppsupplement: Please replace, in the third line from here, "induction" with "abduction".
Supplement:
But maybe too, what I have written below is wrong: An abduction delivers a possibility, i.e., before the abduction was done, one didnt know whether something was possible or not,
Supplement:
But maybe too, what I have written below is wrong: An abduction delivers a possibility, i.e., before the abduction was done, one didnt know whether something was possible or not, and after the induction it is known that it is possible. So there is a concrete step, a grown
rn Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2016 9:12 AM
To: Jerry Rhee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Jerry R., List:
JR: Even though the parts
Jerry R., List:
JR: Even though the parts are all wrapped around each other, I have
experienced the abduction/deduction/induction cycle, in that order, one two
three.
That is indeed the proper order of the stages of inquiry, but it does not
correspond to the names of the categories. Abduction
List,
about growth of concrete reasonableness: I think, this is mostly done by induction. Abduction delivers a reasonableness without a value or predicate such as "concrete". Induction delivers a growth of the reasonableness, and deduction makes the reasonableness concrete in the meaning of
Jerry - list
You wrote, in response to Jon:
JON: So what is the purpose of an argument? Per the definition in NA, it is to
produce a definite belief.
JERRY: Peirce’s ultimate aim was growth of concrete reasonableness. So, CP
5.189 makes a claim that it will promote that purpose since it
Jon, list:
You said:
Now, as you noted, this implies that in some sense, best=normative and
argument=abduction; but the question remains, in what sense? As Ben
suggested, "better" and "best" are only meaningful relative to a specific
purpose.
That’s right. I would request that list
Jerry R., List:
I am sorry for the repeat message, but now that I am home and able to use a
real computer, I see that for some reason my phone cut off the end of it,
and yet retained reams of previous ones that I thought I had deleted. The
following is what I actually intended to send.
In
t;> are beings, in some ways natural, in other ways artifactual, but either
>> way, with histories. ...
>>
>> …eternally live metaphors are either ones whose content is extendable
>> indefinitely, yielding richer and richer interpretations without end the
>> more we
hat live and die,
>> are beings, in some ways natural, in other ways artifactual, but either
>> way, with histories. ...
>>
>> …eternally live metaphors are either ones whose content is extendable
>> indefinitely, yielding richer and richer interpretations without end the
ation every
> single law should have a suitable preamble at the beginning; for that which
> is to follow is most important, and it *makes all the difference whether
> we clearly remember the preambles or not*.
>
> “Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us …
>
> And n
niversity of New York
C 745
718 482-5690 <tel:718%20482-5690> *
On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 1:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca
<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote:
Ben - excellent post. Clear, succinct - and valid in all points.
Thanks.
Edwina
- Original
Jerry R., List:
Thank you, this response did help me better understand your thought
process. Setting aside the historical issue of what Peirce actually
said/believed, and granting your "ironic" reading of the quote that you
cited, we can now identify your hypothesis ("CP 5.189 is the best form
f iconicity.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2016 10:53 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Jon, list:
you said:
In your way of thinking, in accordance with CP 5.189, is
Jon, list:
you said:
In your way of thinking, in accordance with CP 5.189, is "Peirce says that
CP 5.189 is the best form of argument" an example of C (surprising fact) or
A (explanatory hypothesis)?
I am saying that my statement is A.
A is then, my explanatory hypothesis to C, where C
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2016 6:13 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Hi Ben, Jon, list,
Thank you for your objections. You’re right that I’m not being straight
with you but I wanted to smuggle in some rules before I giv
Jerry R., List:
You’re right that I’m not being straight with you but I wanted to smuggle
> in some rules before I give my response.
>
Why "smuggle"? That is not very conducive to helpful dialogue. Why not
just be straight with us?
> I’ve said something similar in the past, so I knew what to
e <jerryr...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, August 15, 2016 6:13 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
>
> Hi Ben, Jon, list,
>
>
>
>
ouldn't be that hard to find the actual text.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Gary Richmond
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2016 6:13 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Hi Ben, Jon, list,
Thank you for your objec
t;*
>
> On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 1:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Ben - excellent post. Clear, succinct - and valid in all points. Thanks.
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.
ist.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Monday, August 15, 2016 12:36 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
>
> Jerry, Jon S., list,
>
> Jerry, it sounds like you're arguing against yourself. It was you who
> claimed that Peirce himself thought that CP
Jerry, Jon S., list,
Jerry, it sounds like you're arguing against yourself. It was you who
claimed that Peirce himself thought that CP 5.189 —
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect
Jon, list:
A burstlike argument (“a simple answer”) rarely decides an issue. What if
my purpose was not only to satisfy you but also to convince *all who
investigate*?
For instance, let's say that I provide that citation. What then? It
satisfies your request but what effect will that have
Jerry R., List:
JR: Do you mean Peirce did *not* say that CP 5.189 is the best form of
argument?
I did not say that. I merely asked exactly when and where Peirce *did* say
that CP 5.189 *is *the best form of argument. That is your claim, so I
assumed that you would be prepared to defend it
Gary, list,
I think, that is a good nutshell package, and not foolish at all. So the ordinality depends on whether one looks at the representation or the determination. I have the impression, that one first has to buy Peirce´s usage of the terms "determination", "active", "passive", before one
Jon, Gary, Helmut, list:
What?
Do you mean Peirce did *not* say that CP 5.189 is the best form of argument?
But how could that be? Being a philosopher, that is, hating “the lie in
the soul” more than anything else, and knowing that the only moral evil is
not to have an ultimate aim,
Jerry R., List:
I hesitate to jump in here, especially since I am currently on vacation
with very limited access to the Internet; but in case it might help ...
JR: But did not Peirce say that CP 5.189 is his best form of argument?
Exactly when and where did he say this? Please provide a
2
> (and many other Peirce texts). And I feel I’m still far from the entelechy,
> but heading in that direction is enough, for me.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13-Aug-16 14:47
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
t;g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Dear Gary f., list:
“I do not understand you” is the phrase of an angry man.
Your most recent utterance is confusing to me, as interpreter, becaus
Dear Gary f., list:
“I do not understand you” is the phrase of an angry man.
Your most recent utterance is confusing to me, as interpreter, because you
utter that signs and objects can each be first, second and third, although
*this* cannot be a sign and object at the same time- that they
Helmut, list,
Ordinality comes into semiosis with the order of determination: the object
determines the sign to determine the interpretant. In that order, the sign
comes second. Peirce also says that the object has to affect the sign and not
vice versa. The dynamic object has to be
Dear Jerry, list, please give me some time to answer. I am both interested in theology and in semiotics, but at the moment there is a sort of switch between them for me I have to overcome first. Questions about God for me are charged with emotions, while questions about semiotics are purely
Gary f., Jerry, Jeff, list,
I guess, the question about ordinality and categoriality is an interesting and relevant one. Maybe firstness, secondness, thirdness are not identical with a first, a second, a third, but maybe too, that there is a connection between these two concepts. Some months
Gary f., list:
It is a nuanced point I am making, and I am not surprised you do not
understand me.
Ordinality is the difference between “less correct” and correct enough for
striving toward the *summum bonum*. It is an orienting of one’s horizon
and no doubt, there will be resistance and
Jerry,
What you say you “disagree” with is a very loose paraphrase of what I wrote,
which was a rather simple point about Peircean phenomenology and nothing more.
Jeff has found some complexities in it that I was not taking into account, and
I think I see what he means. You seem to be
Helmut, I think you’re getting much closer. But I think information also
belongs more to the interpretant than to the immediate object. I would say
(based on CP 8.314) that if you say to me “My dog is barking,” the immediate
object is our shared collateral experience of the subject, ie. the
Dear list:
Here is a synopsis:
Hence there may well be an art whose aim would be to effect this very
thing, the conversion of the soul… not to put the power of sight in the
soul’s eye, which already has it, but to insure that, instead of looking in
the wrong direction, it is turned the way
Supplement:
The example with the marsupial dog was wrong, I think, as it rather concerns the interpretant, not the object. I think the dynamic object is any existing dog, meaning someone of all existing dogs. The immediate object, the object as it is brought along with the sign, is nothing
[jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2016 10:58 AM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: Gary Fuhrman; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation
Gary f, list:
What do you mean by “Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are not ordinal
concepts in Peirce’s phenomenology”, p
Jerry,
I mean that Firstness is not the quality of being first in a sequence or
ordered collection of three (or any number of) members; Secondness is not the
quality of being second in a sequence; and Thirdness is not the quality of
being third in a sequence.
[[ Firstness is that which
Gary f, list:
What do you mean by “Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness *are not ordinal
concepts *in Peirce’s phenomenology”, please?
Best
Jerry R
On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Gary f., list,
>
> I have not read it thoroughly yet, but here an
Gary f., list,
I have not read it thoroughly yet, but here an example for a term/rheme, a rhematic symbolic legisign: The written word "dog", read by somebody. The immediate object is the concept of "dog" as conveyed by the sign, and the dynamic object is the concept of "dog" as it exists in
Jerry,
I don’t see what you are presenting an “alternative ordering” of. Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness are not ordinal concepts in Peirce’s phenomenology.
As for grasping Peircean terminology, I think what facilitates it best is
paying close attention to the context of each usage
Helmut, list,
As luck would have it, I was just now looking through back issues of
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society online and discovered that
Winfried Nöth himself, in a 2011 article, has covered the same ground as my
post, and answered your question on the origin of the use
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