Jeffrey, list,
A beutiful example of ethics of interpretation you offered, Jeffrey.
Thanks.
With quotes from Collected Papers my sincere wish is that the year of
writing is mentioned, whenever possible. Those are to be found in the
small footnotes.
Peirce was not just a corpuscular
Gary,
I am feeling quite dull at the moment about all this, I have lost tracks, what remains is the idea, that the meaning of the term "is" might be something that can be symbolized with EGs, though by negations only, but why not, and that EGs (or at least their non-textual symbols like cuts and
Helmut, Gary f. Jeff, list,
I have found at least some of the parts/whole, classification/composition
discussion not quite to the point of Peirce'comments in this section of
Lowell 3. Gary f's formulation today was, however, helpful for me in
sorting at least some of this out.
Gf: I don’t see a
Supplement:
Kirsti, All, to be frank, I think I have lost the overview about this whole topic a bit. I was thinking, that classification "is a kind of" and composition "is a part of" were two completely different affairs. But on the other hand one can say instead of "is a kind of": "is a
c-17 13:33
To: jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com; Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
Hello Gary F, John S, Helmut, Kirsti, List,
I take John to be asking a good q
Hello Gary F, John S, Helmut, Kirsti, List,
I take John to be asking a good question about whether or how the part/whole
distinction might or might not apply to the account of relations and
relationships as it is applied in the normative science of semiotics. Given the
context of our
Kirsti,
is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot take a
