Hello Gary F, John S, Helmut, Kirsti, List,
I take John to be asking a good question about whether or how the
part/whole distinction might or might not apply to the account of
relations and relationships as it is applied in the normative science
of semiotics. Given the context of our discussion, we can ask similar
questions about how the distinction should be applied in the formal
logic of the EG.
In asking "what practical difference would it make," I take John to be
asking the very same kind of thing that Peirce asked in his account of
relations and relationships when he moves from the first (i.e.,
familiarity) and second (logical) grades of clarity, to a third
pragmatic grade of clarity (see _The Logic of Relatives_ starting at
CP 3.456 and also 6.318 below).
Starting with the texts, I see that Peirce applies the distinction in
a number of places to the account of relations and relationships. Here
are several relevant passages (note: words both underlined and in bold
are my emphasis):
1. CP 2.316. Let us now proceed to compare the conclusions from the
abstract
definition of a Dicisign with the facts about propositions. The first
conclusion is that every proposition contains a Subject and a
Predicate, the former representing (or being) an Index of the Primary
Object, or Correlate of the relation represented, the latter
representing (or being) an Icon of the Dicisign in some respect.
Before inquiring whether every proposition has such PARTS, let us see
whether the descriptions given of them are accurate, when there are
such PARTS. The proposition "Cain kills Abel" has two subjects "Cain"
and "Abel" and relates as much to the real Objects of one of these as
to that of the other. But it may be regarded as primarily relating to
the Dyad composed of Cain, as first, and of Abel, as second member.
This Pair is a single individual object having this relation to Cain
and to Abel, that its existence consists in the existence of Cain and
in the existence of Abel and in nothing more. The Pair, though its
existence thus depends on Cain's existence and on Abel's, is,
nevertheless, just as truly existent as they severally are. The Dyad
is not precisely the Pair. The Dyad is a mental Diagram consisting of
two images of two objects, one existentially connected with one member
of the pair, the other with the other; the one having attached to it,
as representing it, a Symbol whose meaning is "First," and the other a
Symbol whose meaning is "Second." Thus, this diagram, the Dyad,
represents Indices of Cain and Abel, respectively; and thus the
subject conforms to our conclusion.
2. CP 4.173 A part of a collection called its whole is a collection
such that whatever is u of the part is u of the whole, but something
that is u of the whole is not u of the part. (174) It is convenient to
use this locution; namely, instead of saying A is in the relation, r,
to B, we may say A is an r to B, or of B; or, if we wish to reverse
the order of mentioning A and B, we may say B is r'd by A. If a
relation, r , is such that nothing is r to two different things, and
nothing is r'd by two different things, so that some things in the
universe are perhaps r to nothing while all the rest are r, each to
its own distinct correlate, and there are some things perhaps to which
nothing is r, but all the rest have each a single thing that is r to
it, then I call r a one-to-one relation. If there be a one-to-one
relation, r, such that every unit of one collection is r to a unit of
a second collection, while every unit of the second collection is r'd
by a unit of the first collection, those two collections are commonly
said to be in a one-to-one correspondence with one another. . . .
3. CP 2.311 This latter Object may be distinguished as the Primary
Object, the other being termed the Secondary Object. The Dicisign in
so far as it is the relate of the existential relation which is the
Secondary Object of the Dicisign, can evidently not be the entire
Dicisign. It is at once a PART of the Object and a PART of the
Interpretant of the Dicisign. Since the Dicisign is represented in its
Interpretant to be an Index of a complexus as such, it must be
represented in that same Interpretant to be composed of two PARTS,
corresponding respectively to its Object and to itself [the Dicisign].
That is to say, in order to understand the Dicisign, it must be
regarded as composed of two such PARTS whether it be in itself so
composed or not. It is difficult to see how this can be, unless it
really have two such PARTS; but perhaps this may be possible. Let us
consider these two represented parts separately. The PART which is
represented to represent the Primary Object, since the Dicisign is
represented to be an Index of its Object, must be represented as an
Index, or some representamen of an Index, of the Primary Object. The
PART which is represented to represent a part of the Dicisign is
represented as at once part of the Interpretant and part of the
Object.
4. CP 4.564 In the first place, the most perfectly analytical system
of representing propositions must enable us to separate illative
transformations into indecomposable PARTS. Hence, an illative
transformation from any proposition, A, to any other, B, must in such
a system consist in first transforming A into AB, followed by the
transformation of AB into B. For an omission and an insertion appear
to be indecomposable transformations and the only indecomposable
transformations. That is, if A can be transformed by insertion into
AB, and AB by omission in B, the transformation of A into B can be
decomposed into an insertion and an omission.
5. CP 3.493 For the purpose of this algebra, I entirely discard the
idea that every compound relative consists of an antecedent and a
consequent PART. I consider the circle round the antecedent as a mere
sign of negation, for which in the algebra I substitute an obelus over
that antecedent. The line between antecedent and consequent, I treat
as a sign of an "operation" by itself. It signifies that anything
whatever being taken as correlate of the first written member --
antecedent or consequent -- and as first relate of the second written
member, either the one or the other is to be accepted.
6. CP 6.318. I have, since 1870, written much about the logic of
relations. In those writings, I have usually restricted the terms
"relations" and "relationships" to existential relations and
relationships. By a relationship I understand the conception of a fact
about a set of things abstracted from the representation of the things
themselves or, in other words, a predicate which requires more than
one subject to complete a proposition, or conception of a fact. A
"relation" only differs from a "relationship" in that one of the
subjects is regarded as being taken account of first, and is usually
called the subject nominative, while the others are called the direct
and indirect objects. In other words a relation is a predicate
requiring one subject nominative and one or more objects in a definite
sequence. In my earlier papers [in Volume 3] I use the conception of
relation chiefly; in my later ones that of relationship. The
difference is little more than trifling. An existential relation or
relationship is distinguished from others by two marks. In the first
place, its different subjects all belong to one universe; which
distinguishes it very strikingly from such relations as that which
subsists between a thing and its qualities, and that which subsists
between portions of matter and the form into which they are built; as
for example between the cells of a living body and the whole body, and
often times between the different singulars of a plural and the plural
itself. In the second place, an existential relation or relationship
differs from some other relations and relationships in a respect which
may be described in two ways, according as we employ collective or
distributive forms of expression and thought. Speaking collectively,
the one logical universe, to which all the correlates of an
existential relationship belong, is ultimately composed of units, or
subjects, none of which is in any sense separable into PARTS that are
members of the same universe. For example, no relation between
different lapses of time -- say, between the age of Agamemnon and that
of Homer -- can be an existential relation, if we conceive every lapse
of time to be made up of lapses of time, so that there are no
indivisible units of time.
7. CP 3.576. By a seed (granum) of an existential relation is to be
understood an existing individual which not only stands in that
relation to some correlate, but to which also some relate stands in
that relation. By a spike of a relation is to be understood any
collection of seeds of it of which it is both true that every one of
them stands in that relation to some one of them; and it is also true
that to every one seed of the spike some seed of the spike stands in
that same relation. Thus, two spikes of the same relation may have
common seeds, or one may even be a PART of another. A simple spike is
a spike not containing any other spike as a PART of it.
Looking at these seven passages, it seems clear to me that Peirce is
applying the distinction between part and whole to the relations and
relationships that are found in the science of semiotics and in the
formal logic of the EG. What is more, he applies the distinction in
his both his logical (i.e., 2nd level of clarity) and in his pragmatic
(i.e., 3rd level) definitions and explanations of how the correlates
are related to one another in both degenerate and genuinely dyadic and
triadic relations. Having said that, he is being remarkable careful
about when and how the distinctions should be applied.
It is possible that Peirce is mistaken in applying the distinction
between part and whole the way he does to semiotic relations and
relationships but, for my part, I don't see anything that stands out
as a clear error on his part. As such, my aim is to follow his lead in
the proper use of these terms--at least when I'm trying to interpret
his texts.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
FROM: Helmut Raulien <[email protected]>
SENT: Friday, December 22, 2017 10:36:32 AM
TO: [email protected]
CC: Peirce List; John F Sowa
SUBJECT: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
Jerry, John, List,
you wrote:
"
If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”
Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!
".
I dont understand this. If anybody asks, if relations have parts, why
can this not be an intrinsically motivated question? Why does the CSP
spirit suggest, that this question must be extrinsically motivated, so
that the asker does not just want to know the answer, because he/she
finds it interesting, but has obscure motives, and wants to use the
answer for something weird, something other than just gaining
knowledge? Ok, you can always ask: Why do you want to gain knowledge?
That is always a good question, I admit. But: If the knowledge gainer
shares this knowledge, then I think it is clear to see, that she/he
just wants to commit to the scientific progress, and is not Dr. No, or
Frankenstein.
I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts,
but there are also composed relations, that consist of other
relations, which are their parts (given that I may use the term
"parts" in this functional way, but maybe not, this still has got to
be discussed, or is already, and I might have missed it).
Best,
Helmut
22. Dezember 2017 um 17:55 Uhr
"Jerry LR Chandler" <[email protected]>
List, John:
Comments inserted within text:
> On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, [email protected] wrote:
>> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and
predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these
“parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice
of whether it has one “subject” or several.
>
> But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.
>
> A sign is a triadic relation. But it's not clear whether
> you can or should say that a relation has parts. For example,
> consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.
>
> If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
> and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
> But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.
>
Well stated!
But, this is traditional mathematical usage because of the role of
well-defined, separate, clear and distinct symbols of the orderly
display of numbers that must be aligned in sequence along a
one-dimensional geometric line.
The formation of collections of pairs of atoms generates relations
that depend on symbols as parts of the molecule (Mereology). This is
essential to the emergence of the whole, as in the formation of chiral
centers. The alignment of the parts of the chiral molecule are in
space. This proven by well-defined emanations necessary for the
patterns of x-ray diffraction of the sinsign.
In the material world of the chirality of molecular genetics, the
symbols where A is the symbol for adenosine and G is the symbol for
guanosine, the three symbols,
A > G
makes no logical sense.
In other words, the mathematization of symbols is dependent of the
symbol system under inquiry.
(A few days ago, John referenced the paper by Church on semantics and
syntax which is highly relevant to this discussion.)
> That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
> relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
> relationships. And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
> is only one of many ways of "having”.
A chemical example of this is the abductive set of isomers of a given
molecular formula, such as was discussed for Pastuer's chiral forms of
tartaric acid.
>
> One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
> infinite set of pairs. But that does not imply that
> greater-than has infinitely many parts.
Agreed.
>
> The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
> (several statements with multiple symbols). But those
> axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.
Agreed.
Abstractly, this is one component of the “alphabetic” sign system
for chemical notation. The composition of the names of the parts (as
names of atoms) generates a new name for the molecule that is the
"difference that makes a difference” between atoms and molecules.
The new name must give an exact accounting of the spatial organization
of the parts, as with tartaric acid and virtually all other
biochemicals.
>
> In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
> describe any relation, including the sign relation.
Agreed.
>
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”
Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!
From my perspective, I would suggest that John assertions are closely
tied to the general problem of taxonomy / categorization /
classification / order and organization which are intrinsic to the
mathematization of natural sorts and kinds, as well as a host of other
problems associated with the bare grammatical usage of the term
“part” in the context of philosophy and public rhetoric.
Cheers
Jerry
>
> John
>
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