RE: [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8676] Re: self-R
Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I developed the nonreducible notion autonomy based on ideas from Kant that is based on boundary conditions and self-organization and thus is basically information based. I also have about 10 articles on autonomy on my web page. One that might be particularly useful here is Self-organization, individuation and identityhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/SOIIF.PDF, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (2004): 151-172. A more recent one with similar ideas is A dynamical approach to identity and diversity in complex systemhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdfshttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdf. In Paul Cilliers, Rika Prieser eds. Complexity, Difference and Identity: an Ethical Perspectivehttp://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/book/978-90-481-9186-4. 2010 Berlin: Springer. Obviously, I don’t think that “self” is hard to grasp scientifically, if you accept self-organization as a possibility. Maturana does not, and thus leaves self (and thus his notion of autopoiesis) rather lame. I would say, though, that some form of self-production is required for a self, but not self-reproduction, though it may often be a part of self-production. Cheers, John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 25, 2015 5:53 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8676] Re: self-R Jeff, Lists, John Collier wrote, that memory is not the same as same body. So, is self-organizing (as phenomenon) the same as memory as phenomenon? There are metal alloys that have a memory. Also a computer has a memory. So I like the self-organizing aspect, which you have mentioned at the end of your post, better than the memory aspect. What makes self-organizing observable, i.e., what is the phenomenon about it? I think, it is in the first place something quite visible and touchable: a membrane or skin, like any organism has got. But also an air bubble in water has a sort of membrane. Now the distinction between systems with and without a self, I think, lies in the question why?, i.e. causality: Why does an air bubble have a membrane? Because of surface tension, that is caused by natural laws, i.e. efficient cause. And why does a bacterium have a membrane? In order to have a boundary that leads the molecules it needs in, and the molecules it doesnt need (and which would disturb it) out. So here we have the reason of need, final cause with its finis/end to fulfill (put an end to) the actual need of the bacterium, and other needs that will be its own in the future. But isnt all this a supposition? Maybe the observable phenomenon about this is, that the membrane is kept up and repaired by determinate actions of the bacterium, and not by natural laws alone. One problem is, that anything that happens, not only happens obeying a final cause, but efficient cause too. Otherwise it would not work. So one can always say: It works because of efficient cause, and needs (final cause) are just anthropocentric suppositions by the human observer. In fact, neither the bacterium, nor the observer has or is a self, there is no such thing as a self, it is all illusion and recursive circulation. But if self and life conceptually is a circle, it nevertheless exists and is a phenomenon. Is self hard to grasp scientifically? It is, if the definition of science is based solely on deduction and efficient causation. It is not, if you define science as also conceptually appreciating induction and final causation (About abduction and example causation not now). Helmut Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edumailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu Helmut, Ben, Lists, I agree with what you say here, Helmut: Pitifully, this sort of distinction is not a scientific one. What I mean in saying this is that I don't believe that the distinctions you are making are problematic for the practice of doing science. That is, scientists don't start by reflecting on the kinds of worries you are expressing about the nature of the real relations between observer, observation, and phenomena observed. For the most part, they get the enterprise
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
I don't see an ecosystem as an individual but as a system, in its case, a CAS. It doesn't have the distinctive boundaries of an individual - either temporally or spatially. I see a human being as a system, in that its parts co-operate in a systemic manner; and it is also an individual - with distinctive temporal and spatial boundaries. But a human being is not a CAS, for it lacks the wide range of adaptive flexibility and even transformative capacities of a CAS. I have long argued that societies are a CAS; they are socioeconomic ecological systems, operating as logical adaptations to environmental realities - which include soil, climate, water, plant and animal typologies etc. All of these enable a particular size of population to live in the area and this in turn, leads to a particular method of both economic and political organization. Unfortunately, the major trends in the social sciences have been to almost completely ignore this area - except within the alienated emotionalism of AGW or Climate Change...Instead, the social sciences tend to view 'culture' or 'ideology' as the prime causal factors in societal development and organization. Whereas I view these areas as emotionalist psychological explanations, as verbal narratives for the deeper causal factors of ecology, demographics, economic modes. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Collier To: John Collier ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 1:59 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R I should have further remarked that socio-ecological systems (SESs) are a fairly recent area of study, and I would suppose that society is part of the ecology in general and separating cause involved will not be easy, if it is possible at all, so more holistic methods are needed. This seems to be a growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not social scientists. John From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Collier To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann,
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
We mean something different by “individual”, Edwina. I am using it in the sense that species are individuals. It was David HulI who put the ecologists onto me because of my work on individuality. I don’t think that further discussion with you on this topic is likely to be fruitful for either of us. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 8:23 PM To: John Collier; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R I don't see an ecosystem as an individual but as a system, in its case, a CAS. It doesn't have the distinctive boundaries of an individual - either temporally or spatially. I see a human being as a system, in that its parts co-operate in a systemic manner; and it is also an individual - with distinctive temporal and spatial boundaries. But a human being is not a CAS, for it lacks the wide range of adaptive flexibility and even transformative capacities of a CAS. I have long argued that societies are a CAS; they are socioeconomic ecological systems, operating as logical adaptations to environmental realities - which include soil, climate, water, plant and animal typologies etc. All of these enable a particular size of population to live in the area and this in turn, leads to a particular method of both economic and political organization. Unfortunately, the major trends in the social sciences have been to almost completely ignore this area - except within the alienated emotionalism of AGW or Climate Change...Instead, the social sciences tend to view 'culture' or 'ideology' as the prime causal factors in societal development and organization. Whereas I view these areas as emotionalist psychological explanations, as verbal narratives for the deeper causal factors of ecology, demographics, economic modes. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 1:59 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R I should have further remarked that socio-ecological systems (SESs) are a fairly recent area of study, and I would suppose that society is part of the ecology in general and separating cause involved will not be easy, if it is possible at all, so more holistic methods are needed. This seems to be a growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not social scientists. John From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
I should have further remarked that socio-ecological systems (SESs) are a fairly recent area of study, and I would suppose that society is part of the ecology in general and separating cause involved will not be easy, if it is possible at all, so more holistic methods are needed. This seems to be a growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not social scientists. John From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8686] Natural Propositions seminar
Dear seminar participants, There's little substantive that I can add to what Gary Fuhrman has said so well in this post announcing the conclusion of the seminar on *Natural Propositions*. I too would like to thank all the participants, moderators and managers of both lists, and, most especially, Frederik, whose extraordinary posts I've begun to reread to my benefit, and whose book I'll be consulting for years to come. This exploration of the dicisign has been an incredible journey for many of us, Frederik included. In his first post in the seminar he wrote: The book Natural Propositions grew out of my investigation of Peirce's general notion of diagrams and diagrammatical reasoning in Diagrammatology (2007). If it indeed the case that all deduction takes place by means of transformation of diagrams, implicitly or explicitly, it follows that a single diagram, before transformation, must depict a proposition, namely that stating the premiss of the argument. (Likewise, the post-transformation diagram will depict another proposition, that of the conclusion). This observation made me take some interest in Peirce's notion of proposition - or, as he renames it in the generalization of triads which he undertook in shaping his final semiotics from 1902-3 onwards - Dicisigns. During a stay as visiting scholar in Berlin 2010 I began working on this and realized that Peirce's notion of proposition deviates considerably from the simultaneous conceptions of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and others. Peirce's semiotic and purely functional definition of proposition do not presuppose any specific formalism (like human language or special, formalized languages), neither does it presuppose accompaniment of conscious, intentional acts. Peirce simply said that a Dicisign is a sign which is involved twice with one and the same object - 1) it refers to the object (P's generalization of the Subject part of a proposition; 2) it describes that object (P's generalization of the Predicate). This made me realize the revolutionary potential of such a definition: it is not confined to human beings and it is not confined to language. So this gives us the possibility of a semiotics which in a fluid way encompasses biological communication as well as non-linguistic human semiotics involving pictures, gestures, diagrams, etc. on a par with language. In my opinion, Frederik's explication of Peirce's brilliant and original generalization of the proposition as the dicisign, and his exploration of its revolutionary potential for both human and biosemiotics, offers an approach which might prove incredibly fruitful to both should it be fully developed. At the conclusion of *Natural Propositions* Frederik writes: *The crooked and not very successful history of modern semiotics [. . .] is not testimony to the idea that it should be easy to steer such a conception of signs away from the dangers of received subject-object dichotomies.* * I hope this books makes a case for Peircean semiotics being able to follow that course, with a conception of signs in which biological intentionality must, from the very beginning, be taken to instantiate simple inferences. Such a view, a semiotics in a certain sense naturalized, where a congnitve appreciation of logic becomes a central axis, will allow us to integrate biosemiotics and human semiotics in a broader picture, just like man's plural set of different, externalized semiotic systems with all their varied action purposes will be seen to share, in different ways, the fundamental reliance upon truth claimed by Dicisigns and their ongoing development in reasoning.* It is my personal belief that acceptance of such a 'naturalized semiotics' might prove crucial to the advance of cognitive semiotics in this century, that Peirce's work in this area may yet come to be seen as the centerpiece of his late semiotics, and that Frederik's explication and development of this late work based on a purely functional definition of proposition will be seen as seminal towards this advance . In any event, this was the kind of thinking which led me to propose that we have a seminar on* Natural Propositions *involving both peirce-l and the biosemiotics list. This brings me to my final 'thank you', namely, to Gary Furhman, first for introducing me to *Natural Propositions* (as he earlier had introduced me to Frederik's *Diagrammatology*), and then for organizing the seminar so well in addition to participating in it as frequently and thoughtfully as he was able to in a period in which, I know, there were considerable constraints on his time. One last word: All seminar participants should feel free to continue discussion in any of the threads which have been opened even as new non-seminar related threads are introduced. One should, perhaps, be careful not to reflexively cross-post to both lists as the subject matter may be considerably more suited to one or the other fora. Again, thanks to all for a very productive
[PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8684] Re: self-R
John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von:John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I dont think it need be (memory in current computers, for example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I developed the nonreducible notion autonomy based on ideas from Kant that is based on boundary conditions and self-organization and thus is basically information based. I also have about 10 articles on autonomy on my web page. One that might be particularly useful here is Self-organization, individuation and identity,Revue Internationale de Philosophie59(2004): 151-172. A more recent one with similar ideas is A dynamical approach to identity and diversity in complex systems. In Paul Cilliers, Rika Prieser eds.Complexity, Difference and Identity: an Ethical Perspective. 2010 Berlin: Springer. Obviously, I dont think that self is hard to grasp scientifically, if you accept self-organization as a possibility. Maturana does not, and thus leaves self (and thus his notion of autopoiesis) rather lame. I would say, though, that some form of self-production is required for a self, but not self-reproduction, though it may often be a part of self-production. Cheers, John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 25, 2015 5:53 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8676] Re: self-R Jeff, Lists, John Collier wrote, that memory is not the same as same body. So, is self-organizing (as phenomenon) the same as memory as phenomenon? There are metal alloys that have a memory. Also a computer has a memory. So I like the self-organizing aspect, which you have mentioned at the end of your post, better than the memory aspect. What makes self-organizing observable, i.e., what is the phenomenon about it? I think, it is in the first place something quite visible and touchable: a membrane or skin, like any organism has got. But also an air bubble in water has a sort of membrane. Now the distinction between systems with and without a self, I think, lies in the question why?, i.e. causality: Why does an air bubble have a membrane? Because of surface tension, that is caused by natural laws, i.e. efficient cause. And why does a bacterium have a membrane? In order to have a boundary that leads the molecules it needs in, and the molecules it doesnt need (and which would disturb it) out. So here we have the reason of need, final cause with its finis/end to fulfill (put an end to) the actual need of the bacterium, and other needs that will be its own in the future. But isnt all this a supposition? Maybe the observable phenomenon about this is, that the membrane is kept up and repaired by determinate actions of the bacterium, and not by natural laws alone. One problem is, that anything that happens, not only happens obeying a final cause, but efficient cause too. Otherwise it would not work. So one can always say: It works because of efficient cause, and needs (final cause) are just anthropocentric suppositions by the human observer. In fact, neither the bacterium, nor the observer has or is a self, there is no such thing as a self, it is all illusion and recursive circulation. But if self and life conceptually is a circle, it nevertheless exists and is a phenomenon. Is self hard to grasp scientifically? It is, if the definition of science is based solely on deduction and efficient causation. It is not, if you define science as also conceptually appreciating induction and final causation (About abduction and example causation not now). Helmut Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu Helmut, Ben, Lists, I agree with what you say here, Helmut: Pitifully, this sort of distinction is not a scientific one. What I mean in
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R
Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I developed the nonreducible notion autonomy based on ideas from Kant that is based on boundary conditions and self-organization and thus is basically information based. I also have about 10 articles on autonomy on my web page. One that might be particularly useful here is Self-organization, individuation and identityhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/SOIIF.PDF, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (2004): 151-172. A more recent one with similar ideas is A dynamical approach to identity and diversity in complex systemhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdfshttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdf. In Paul Cilliers, Rika Prieser eds. Complexity, Difference and Identity: an Ethical Perspectivehttp://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/book/978-90-481-9186-4. 2010 Berlin: Springer. Obviously, I don’t think that “self” is hard to grasp scientifically, if you accept self-organization as a possibility. Maturana does not, and thus leaves self (and thus his notion of autopoiesis) rather lame. I would say, though, that some form of self-production is required for a self, but not self-reproduction, though it may often be a part of self-production. Cheers, John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 25, 2015 5:53 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Aw:
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions seminar
Dear discussion participants, lists - Thanks to all participants and thread leaders in the long discussions about my book – and especially thanks to Gary for organizing and keeping the the focus over many months. It has been highly instructive to encounter and speculate over the many different types of qualified questions, queries, counterarguments. Many of them will be sure to influence future work - Best Frederik To all participants in the Natural Propositions seminar on the peirce-l and biosemiotics lists, It's about time to wrap up the seminar by thanking you all for taking part. I think the cross-conversation between the two lists has helped to break some new ground on both, and you have all contributed to that. We did run into some delays and interruptions along the way (we'd originally planned to finish in January!) but such things are unavoidable in a large project like this. Thanks are especially due to the volunteer thread leaders: Jeff Kasser, Jeff Downard, Tyler Bennett, Mara Woods, John Collier, Doug Hare, Gary Richmond, Cathy Legge, Yogi Hendlin and Franklin Ransom. The moderators/managers of both lists were also very helpful, and special thanks are due to Gary Richmond for proposing the seminar in the first place. I think the greatest thanks of all are due to Frederik Stjernfelt — not only for writing Natural Propositions, and agreeing to the seminar proposal, but for the superb quality of his posts in all the threads. I think his lucidity and generosity of thought and language was extraordinary throughout, and considerably raised the level of discourse on these lists. This despite recurring health problems that interfered with his participation during the winter months (I think they are now resolved). Frederik's broad and deep contextual knowledge of the many logical and semiotic issues raised during the seminar greatly enhanced our study of Peirce's doctrine of dicisigns, a study which was already a major contribution (in my view) to both Peircean and biosemiotic scholarship. If our seminar has at least brought more attention to the book, i think it's been worthwhile. If my own participation has been rather spotty during the past few months, it was due to lack of time, not lack of interest on my part. Thanks again to everyone who did find the time to be involved in the seminar. Gary Fuhrman - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions seminar
To all participants in the Natural Propositions seminar on the peirce-l and biosemiotics lists, It's about time to wrap up the seminar by thanking you all for taking part. I think the cross-conversation between the two lists has helped to break some new ground on both, and you have all contributed to that. We did run into some delays and interruptions along the way (we'd originally planned to finish in January!) but such things are unavoidable in a large project like this. Thanks are especially due to the volunteer thread leaders: Jeff Kasser, Jeff Downard, Tyler Bennett, Mara Woods, John Collier, Doug Hare, Gary Richmond, Cathy Legge, Yogi Hendlin and Franklin Ransom. The moderators/managers of both lists were also very helpful, and special thanks are due to Gary Richmond for proposing the seminar in the first place. I think the greatest thanks of all are due to Frederik Stjernfelt — not only for writing Natural Propositions, and agreeing to the seminar proposal, but for the superb quality of his posts in all the threads. I think his lucidity and generosity of thought and language was extraordinary throughout, and considerably raised the level of discourse on these lists. This despite recurring health problems that interfered with his participation during the winter months (I think they are now resolved). Frederik's broad and deep contextual knowledge of the many logical and semiotic issues raised during the seminar greatly enhanced our study of Peirce's doctrine of dicisigns, a study which was already a major contribution (in my view) to both Peircean and biosemiotic scholarship. If our seminar has at least brought more attention to the book, i think it's been worthwhile. If my own participation has been rather spotty during the past few months, it was due to lack of time, not lack of interest on my part. Thanks again to everyone who did find the time to be involved in the seminar. Gary Fuhrman - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R
John, lists, now I have only one proposal left, but it is a bit weird. It is about social systems. I dont know whether it is transferable to ecosystems: I assume, that the Luhmannean intention a system has, is the only intention that is pre-self: The intention to become a self, and by this order to establish clearer and clearer boundaries. pre-self may also be called pre-emergent. When emergence is achieved, boundaries are clear: A membrane, a skin, or an iron wall letting no one flee. I do not understand, why Luhmann called himself an anti-humanist, because from a humanist perspective it is easy to conclude: Dont let the system act out its pre-self-intention to become a self, dont let it achieve autonomy that would strip the members from their autonomies. Well, this pre-self-intention is an exception, and thus may seem far-fetched, but maybe something like that is the driving force in emergence of a self, eg. when single-cellers agglomerate and form a multi-cellular organism? Cheers, Helmut Von:John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I dont know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von:John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I dont think it need be (memory in current computers, for example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I developed the nonreducible notion autonomy based on ideas from Kant that is based on boundary conditions and self-organization and thus is basically information based. I also have about 10 articles on autonomy on my web page. One that might be particularly useful here is Self-organization, individuation and identity,Revue Internationale de Philosophie59(2004): 151-172. A more recent one with similar ideas is A dynamical approach to identity and diversity in complex systems. In Paul Cilliers, Rika Prieser eds.Complexity, Difference and
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R
Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Collier To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I developed the nonreducible notion autonomy based on ideas from Kant that is based on boundary conditions and self-organization and thus is basically information based. I also have about 10 articles on autonomy on my web page. One that might be particularly useful here is Self-organization, individuation and identity, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (2004): 151-172. A more recent one with similar ideas is A dynamical approach to identity and diversity in complex systems. In Paul Cilliers, Rika Prieser eds. Complexity, Difference and Identity: an Ethical Perspective. 2010 Berlin: Springer. Obviously, I don’t think that “self” is hard to grasp scientifically, if you accept self-organization as a possibility. Maturana does not, and thus leaves self (and thus his notion of autopoiesis) rather lame. I would say, though, that some form of self-production is required for a self, but not self-reproduction, though it may often be a part of self-production. Cheers, John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 25,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions seminar
Thank you, Gary, for administering the seminar so reliably and well. I would also like to thank Frederik for participating so richly in the discussions, with such flair for clarifying differences and finding common ground. I'm going to go off the peirce-L list for a while now because I have some academic writing projects I urgently need to finish. Thanks all, Cathy On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: To all participants in the *Natural Propositions* seminar on the peirce-l and biosemiotics lists, It's about time to wrap up the seminar by thanking you all for taking part. I think the cross-conversation between the two lists has helped to break some new ground on both, and you have all contributed to that. We did run into some delays and interruptions along the way (we'd originally planned to finish in January!) but such things are unavoidable in a large project like this. Thanks are especially due to the volunteer thread leaders: Jeff Kasser, Jeff Downard, Tyler Bennett, Mara Woods, John Collier, Doug Hare, Gary Richmond, Cathy Legge, Yogi Hendlin and Franklin Ransom. The moderators/managers of both lists were also very helpful, and special thanks are due to Gary Richmond for proposing the seminar in the first place. I think the greatest thanks of all are due to Frederik Stjernfelt — not only for writing *Natural Propositions*, and agreeing to the seminar proposal, but for the superb quality of his posts in all the threads. I think his lucidity and generosity of thought and language was extraordinary throughout, and considerably raised the level of discourse on these lists. This despite recurring health problems that interfered with his participation during the winter months (I think they are now resolved). Frederik's broad and deep contextual knowledge of the many logical and semiotic issues raised during the seminar greatly enhanced our study of Peirce's doctrine of dicisigns, a study which was already a major contribution (in my view) to both Peircean and biosemiotic scholarship. If our seminar has at least brought more attention to the book, i think it's been worthwhile. If my own participation has been rather spotty during the past few months, it was due to lack of time, not lack of interest on my part. Thanks again to everyone who did find the time to be involved in the seminar. Gary Fuhrman - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
