Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being
Jerry, John is quoting what Peirce stated in several contexts. So he is right. In other contexts, CSP writes a lot on unconscius (subconscious etc) mind. But he definitely considered his normative logic only applicable to deliberate thought. - He also stated that a person is a bunch of habit. And on the nature of habits he had a lot to say. How is unconscious or subconscius mind present to the consicousness? CSP's answer was FEELING. - Emotions are something else, they are qualitatively different. - What you happened to write below on emotion and thought shows in itself how muddled common views on these issues are. - Peirce, by the way, did not present a theory of emotions. Cheers, Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 17.9.2018 21:51: John: On Sep 15, 2018, at 5:28 PM, John F Sowa wrote: To avoid the controversy, I'll delete the phrase "partial and narrow" and replace it with a line that says normative logic is the "theory of self-controlled or deliberate thought". Hmmm… Does this really help? How does a thought, a spontaneous thought, become normative? What is the compelling distinction between an ordinary every day emotion (say, about the sexuality of a beautiful women /man) become differentiated from normative logic? Perhaps CSP would have referred to habitual feelings held by a group of like-minded investigators or some similar rhetorical gesture? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification
List, For those who may not be familiar with the trichotomic terminology of Peirce's last classification of signs or who wish to refresh their memories, I've copied a portion of Albert Atkins 2010 article, "Peirce's Theory of Signs" in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* as perhaps an aid to better following several of the threaded discussions which employ that late terminology. Yet even Atkins brief comments are themselves not uncontroversial. For example, take trichotomy 1. Atkins writes: In respect of the Sign itself (what we have been calling the Sign-Vehicle), a sign may be either a (i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a Famisign. (By the time of the final accounts, Peirce was experimenting with terminology so these types are perhaps more familiar as Qualisigns, Sinsigns and Legisigns). I'm rather certain that not all semioticians would agree that "Sign-Vehicle" is an accurate expression for "the Sign itself" in the context of Peirce's semeiotics. But more to the point of current list discussions, it remains a question whether the trichotomy Poti-/Acti-/Famisign is equivalent to Quali-/Sin-/Legisign, that the former is just a terminological experiment. Is there a subtle change suggested by the new terminology, or is it just Peirce's suggestion for an improved terminology? Here are Atkins remarks and the 10 trichotomies of the Final Classification. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ The Final Classification Just as the Early and Interim Accounts include a corresponding classification of sign types, Peirce's final account holds similar typological ambitions. Peirce states explicitly that there are sixty-six classes of sign in his final typology. (See EP2. 481). Strictly speaking, the six elements that we have detailed yield only twenty eight sign types, but we are interested in Peirce's very final typology. He believes that we can obtain these sixty-six classes, rather in the manner of the 1903 typology, by identifying ten elements of signs and signification, each of which has three qualifying classes, and then working out their permissible combinations. These ten elements include the six sign elements identified above, plus four other elements that focus on the relation between signs, objects and interpretants. The ten elements and their respective sign types, taken from Peirce's 1908 letters to Lady Welby (EP2 483–491), then, are as follows: 1. In respect of the Sign itself (what we have been calling the Sign-Vehicle), a sign may be either a (i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a Famisign. (By the time of the final accounts, Peirce was experimenting with terminology so these types are perhaps more familiar as Qualisigns, Sinsigns and Legisigns). 2. In respect of the Immediate Object, a sign may be either i) Descriptive (ii) Designative or (iii) a Copulant. 3. In respect of the Dynamic Object, a sign may be either (i) Abstractive (ii) Concretive or (iii) Collective. 4. In respect of relation between the Sign and the Dynamic Object, a sign may be either, (i) an Icon (ii) an Index or (iii) a Symbol. 5. In respect of the Immediate Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) Ejaculative, (ii) Imperative or (iii) Significative. 6. In respect of the Dynamic Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) Sympathetic (ii) Shocking or (iii) Usual. 7. In respect of the relationship between the Sign and Dynamic Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) Suggestive (ii) Imperative or (iii) Indicative. 8. In respect of the Final Interpretant, a sign may be either, (i) Gratiffic (ii) Action Producing or iii) Self-Control Producing. 9. In respect of the relation between the Sign and the Final Interpretant, a sign may be either a (i) Seme (ii) Pheme or (iii) a Delome. [earlier, rheme, dicisign, argument GR] 10. In respect of the relation between the Sign, Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) an Assurance of Instinct (ii) an Assurance of Experienceor (iii) an Assurance of Form. The reason that Peirce believes these ten elements will yield sixty-six classes is clear enough, the same combinatorial considerations given for the interim typology (outlined above in 3.4) apply here. However, the precise manner and order in which these elements interact will determine what the sixty-six classes of signs will look like in the final typology. Unfortunately, these ten divisions and their classes represent a baffling array of under-explained terminology, and there is little to indicate precisely how we should set about the task of combining them. Even though we may be confident on the number of signs in the final typology, other details are sketchy and underdeveloped, and there still exists no fully satisfactory account of the sixty-six classes. *As Nathan Houser points out, “a sound and detailed extension of Peirce's analysis of signs to his full set of ten divisions and sixty-six classes is perhaps the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification
Gary R., List:
I agree with your comments about Atkins's unfortunate take on the
trichotomy according to the Sign itself. It certainly does not pertain to
"the Sign-Vehicle," since this is a term that Peirce himself never used.
The closest that he came was when he wrote in an unidentified fragment, "A
sign stands *for *something *to *the idea which it produces, or modifies.
Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without" (CP
1.339). On the other hand, he clearly *distinguished *a Sign from a
vehicle when discussing the "somewhat imperfect example" of a mosquito
transmitting a disease.
CSP: ... the active medium is in some measure of the nature of a *vehicle*,
which differs from a medium of communication in acting upon the transported
object and determining it to a changed location, where, without further
interposition of the vehicle, it acts upon, or is acted upon by, the object
to which it is conveyed. A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it
fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the
definition of a medium of communication. (EP 2:391; 1906)
At about the same time, Peirce also wrote, "One selfsame thought may be
carried upon the vehicle of English, German, Greek, or Gaelic; in diagrams,
or in equations, or in graphs: all these are but so many skins of the
onion, its inessential accidents" (CP 4.6; 1906). Here it seems to be a
Sign-*Replica*, rather than the Sign *itself*, that serves as a "vehicle."
As I have said before, I find it noteworthy that Peirce's late taxonomy
sometimes characterized this division as being according to the Mode of
Apprehension or Presentation of the Sign, rather than its Mode of
Being--although this difference becomes less significant if we understand
"mode of being" in a phenomenological rather than metaphysical/ontological
sense. There is certainly a parallel between Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign,
Tone/Token/Type, and Potisign/Actisign/Famisign; but to treat them as
strictly equivalent is only one plausible interpretation, by no means
definitive.
I find Atkins's list of all ten 1908 trichotomies misleading in that he
overlooks Peirce's own comments at EP 2:489 to the effect that he switched
#5 to #7 (note the repetition of "Imperative"), such that #5 became ("with
great hesitation") Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative. I have previously
suggested that these correspond to the number of lines of identity
(zero/one/multiple) needed to represent the Sign in an Existential Graph.
I have also offered my own proposal and supporting rationale for ordering
all ten trichotomies to produce 66 Sign classes (3, 2, 1, 4, 8, 6, 5, 9, 7,
10).
Finally, Peirce's remark at EP 2:483, as quoted by Atkins, potentially
provides mild warrant for the somewhat innovative framework that I posted
yesterday. He went on to characterize both Potisign/Actisign/Famisign and
Descriptive/Designative/Copulant as "tolerable but not thoroughly tried
conception[s]," although the latter was closer to being one of which he
"had a clear apprehension," if only he had been "satisfied with the
distinction between Descriptives and Denominatives." Unfortunately, he did
not signal his level of confidence in any of the others.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 3:08 PM, Gary Richmond
wrote:
> List,
>
> For those who may not be familiar with the trichotomic terminology of
> Peirce's last classification of signs or who wish to refresh their
> memories, I've copied a portion of Albert Atkins 2010 article, "Peirce's
> Theory of Signs" in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* as perhaps
> an aid to better following several of the threaded discussions which employ
> that late terminology.
>
> Yet even Atkins brief comments are themselves not uncontroversial. For
> example, take trichotomy 1. Atkins writes:
>
> In respect of the Sign itself (what we have been calling the
> Sign-Vehicle), a sign may be either a (i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a
> Famisign.
>
> (By the time of the final accounts, Peirce was experimenting with
> terminology so these types are perhaps more familiar as Qualisigns,
> Sinsigns and Legisigns).
>
> I'm rather certain that not all semioticians would agree that
> "Sign-Vehicle" is an accurate expression for "the Sign itself" in the
> context of Peirce's semeiotics. But more to the point of current list
> discussions, it remains a question whether the trichotomy
> Poti-/Acti-/Famisign is equivalent to Quali-/Sin-/Legisign, that the former
> is just a terminological experiment. Is there a subtle change suggested by
> the new terminology, or is it just Peirce's suggestion for an improved
> terminology?
>
> Here are Atkins remarks and the 10 trichotomies of the Final
> Classification.
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
> The Final Classification
>
>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Brief note on the passing of V. Tejera at 95 years
Atila, List, Please pardon my delay in responding to your generous note on Tejera's work available digitally and in print. I've been inordinately busy these past few weeks, so for now just a few inter-laced comments. You wrote: AB: The 3 main journals I found his works on Peirce were *Transactions of CSP Society, American Journal of Semiotics*, and *Semiotische Berichte*. I was unable to find the digital versions today, but I will try to get them out this fall (I work from hardcopy). Because of copyright restrictions, we cannot place *Transactions* articles on Arisbe. Fortunately, however, many Peirce-L members read *Transactions* online and/or in its print edition. I'll hunt up some of the VT's articles you pointed to myself. As for the other two journals, I'll have to look into seeing if it is possible to place some of VT's articles on our website. AB: I think VT’s books have shown that Peirce was more consistent in his usage than our contemporary counterparts in Habermas, Eco, and Barthes. The main driver was to use Peirce’s way of thinking to address aesthetics and poetics as philosophic. He took the disciplines of aesthetics, semeiotic and poetics as the disciplines to understand literary art, an effort he advanced since his dissertation in 1956. While acknowledging that many, including some people on this list, have found considerable value in the work of Habermas, Eco, and Barthes (I have myself, especially as regards some of the work of Habermas), I too tend to 'return to Peirce' for insights into most philosophical matters I'm considering. And while most of Peirce's writing on semiotic and aesthestic (or esthetic, as he preferred to spell it when discussing in as a normative science) occur in his work in cenoscopic science (philosophy as he conceived of it), I was reminded by Nathan Houser at the Charles S. Peirce International Centennial Congress held at UMass Lowell in 2014, that not all was. Yet much of this extra-scientific writing appears, I believe, in unpublished letters and MSS. Still, there are many hints and suggestions of Peirce's conception of aesthetics and poetics which some scholars have already vigorously pursued (in architecture, literature, music, theology, linguistics, etc.) AB: For his examination on the Hypothesis of Continuity in Parmenides, and Peirce, I would direct you to chapters 17-18 in *Two Metaphysical Naturalisms* 2015. These were long slated for publication, with some overlap in the chapters - the editorial decision was to place them together in that book without reducing them into one. VT was particular that Parmenides is correct in conceptualizing Being in the sense of the All as the exclusive alternative of not-being, opposing the view that something can both be and not-be. This is most interesting. It immediately brought to mind the extraordinary contemporary work in continuity and aesthetics, poetics, and much else being done by the Colombian scholar, Fernando Zalamea. See for example his *Peirce's Logic of Continuity*: https://www.docentpress.com/books/peirces-logic-of-continuity/ I was fortunate to attend a month long seminar series he gave in 2015 at The Pratt Institute in New York City (and later, with Bev Corwin, to invite him to speak at a Semiotics Web meetup/mashup when he next visited NYC). https://zalameaseminarnyc.wordpress.com This brief blurb on the series hints at the range of his interests. Professor Zalamea‘s lectures introduce the groundbreaking work of twentieth century French mathematician Alexander Grothendieck in relation to the work of C.S. Peirce, Novalis, P. Valéry, theories of topoi and sheaves, networks, art, and music, towards a generalized theory of transgression for mathematics, philosophy, and contemporary culture in our transmodern world. AB: Taken together, I think [VT] sought to formalize how art addresses the human condition, at a certain level which he calls the perspective of humanity – see his *Literature, Criticism and the Theory of Signs* book. Also, see these 2 main papers here which continue the train of thought; "A Peircean Semeiotic for the Human Sciences, with Special Reference to Aesthetics,"*European Journal for Semiotic Studies* Vol.8 (2,3) and Annales d' Esthetique Athens Greece: 1992-1993 Vol. 31-32 "Generality and Reflective Quality in Works of Art: A Peircean Account," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy Vol. XI, No.4, pp. 280-296 Perhaps I'm suggesting that it might be interesting and potentially valuable to compare and contrast the work of these two great scholars, both deeply informed by the work of Peirce. There are certainly those here quite interested in discussing Peirce in relation to the human sciences, fine arts, etc. Thank you for bringing V. Tejera's life and work to our attention. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 7:39
[PEIRCE-L] Percepts, Signs, and Objects (was Categories and Modes of Being)
List: As quoted and discussed below, Peirce stated in 1903 that a Percept "does not stand for anything," thus implying that a Percept *is not* a Sign. In a letter to William James dated October 1904, he added, "Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so for phenomenology" (CP 8.300). However, as quoted in another thread last week, he stated in 1906 that "a Percept is a Seme" and then referred to "the Percept, which is a Seme" (CP 4.539-540), thus implying that a Percept *is *a Sign--specifically, something "which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538). Further digging turned up the following, which the EP 2 editors dated to late 1904. CSP: Some of the requisites of communication which analysis has signalized are obvious enough; others are not so. Thus, it is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not independent of *all *representation. This is intelligible from the point of view of pragmatism, according to which the objects of which ordinary general propositions have to be true, if they are to be true at all, are the body of future percepts. But percepts are themselves signs, whether veracious or not. The fact that the characters of the future percepts are independent of what they have been expected to be does not in the least prevent their being signs. (EP 2:328) My first observation is that Peirce clearly affirmed here that Percepts *are* Signs, consistent with the 1906 passage. I therefore have to wonder if he rather abruptly changed his mind about this near the end of 1904; and if so, whether it had anything to do with the other new developments in his thinking around the same time, such as recognizing two Objects and three Interpretants. My second observation is that this is another place where Peirce implied that the Object of a Sign must also be of the nature of a Sign, similar to one that I brought up a while back. CSP: Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of thought or of a sign. (CP 1.538; 1903) I suggested then that Peirce was hinting at either the uncontroversial Dynamic/Immediate Object distinction or the speculative General/Dynamic Object distinction that I am currently advocating. It is interesting that in the 1904 quote he identified "the objects of which ordinary general propositions have to be true" as "the body of future percepts." My guess is that this is a reference to the idea of *conditional necessity*, consistent with understanding the General Object as what a Sign (Type) *would *denote at the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community. Likewise, his statement that this Object's "characters are not independent of *all *representation" is consistent with understanding the Final Interpretant as what a Sign (Type) *would *signify in accordance with the ultimate opinion. I keep finding myself drawn back to Peirce's summary of this regulative hope, also written in 1904. CSP: The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 5:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > ... phenomenology is the study of phenomena *in themselves*, while > Normative Science is the study of phenomena *in their relations to ends* > (cf. EP 2:197; 1903). However, Peirce placed Logic as Semeiotic under the > latter, rather than the former, precisely because he viewed its subject > matter as "those things whose end is to represent something" (EP > 2:200)--not Signs as merely *apparent*, but Signs as *purposive*. > > Perhaps this is the basis for
