Bernard, List:
We cannot answer the question of "how we ought to practice the science of
phaneroscopy today" without first establishing what the science of
phaneroscopy *is*, which according to Peirce requires carefully
distinguishing it from mathematics as a strictly hypothetical science and
Supplement:
Ok, you may say, that it is a result of experience, that when you put two things together, for the sum it doesnt matter, which one you have first, and which one you then add. Now imagine an alien universe, in which it is so, that "a + b" is 90% of a and 110% of b, because the thing
Le 12/08/2021 à 02:10, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :
Bernard, List:
BM: The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the
exchanges that consist most often in some kind of gloss of
Peirce's writings, as if they were gospels.
JAS: Peirce's writings are our only definitive
Dear Jon, List
You evoke many concepts with their relations, the explanation of which
would take a considerable amount of time, to the point that you are reduced
to answering yourself. I want to question you on the point that interests
me particularly, which concerns your entry into Peirce's
Helmut, List
The case of Peirce's semiotics is different from that of the empirical
sciences...it does not require induction to be verified and in this sense
it can be said to be "robust" a priori. Indeed, the mathematical modeling
by an abstract structure of Poset isomorphic to the organization
Jon, List
I am familiar with this type of confusion, and it is not because it has
been in Wikipedia for 15 years that it is validated. It existed in my
immediate environment that I finally break. I will first make some remarks
and then ask you a question.
The remark: you spend without
Gary F, list
This is exactly what some of us have been saying - in our
questioning of the isolation by De Tienne of mathematics from the
Real World. And asking - if the practice of mathematics is so
cerebral, so detached from material reality, so isolated - then,
what's its
Robert, Edwina, List
The skeleton metaphor for a poset makes sense to me. Is it also a good metaphor for mathematics being the skeleton of all other sciences?
I earlier wrote, that mathematics is based on axioms, and axioms are not hypothetical, but inducted. Edwina asked what I mean by
Helmut, List
In general algebra, we define particular types of structure formed by a set
with one or more "internal" laws of composition possessing certain
properties. I voluntarily leave aside the external laws with operator
domains on the set. The laws themselves are ways of associating any two
Cf: Relations & Their Relatives • Discussion 1
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/27/relations-their-relatives-discussion-1/
Re: Peirce List
https://web.archive.org/web/20150619134001/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15704
::: Helmut Raulien
Cf: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Comment 3
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/12/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-comment-3/
All,
It helps me to compare sign relations with my other favorite class
of triadic relations, namely, groups. Applications of mathematical
groups came up
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}JAS, list
By factual world, I am referring to the sensate world of the
particular - and that includes the images in my mind. I don't mean,
by factual world, the quantitative alone but include the qualitative.
And
Jon, Edwina, Gary F, List,
JAS: . . . Gary F. already noted [that] it is questionable whether
*all *hypotheses
are mathematically generated, although Peirce's broad definition of
mathematics as the science which draws necessary conclusions about
hypothetical states of things could arguably be
Edwina, List:
ET: That is - the 'methods for attaining truth include our own location
within and examination of the real, factual world [the phaneron world] and
coming up, abductively, via mathematical reasoning, with hypotheses that
explain this world.
As I keep pointing out, the phaneron as
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