In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two
specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the
discussion further.
Hi Jon, list,
I think this is fair. It comes down to whether I can, or cannot, answer these
two questions. I agree with that.
I
the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the
object as it is in itself.
Just to add: along with what has to now be a deductively clear argumentation of
the premisses, by me, this is where we are likely to disagree. The sign,
cannot, in principle, or practice, repr
Jack, Jon, List,
Both Hume´s law, and the "natural fallacy"- theory say, that you cannot conclude from "Is" to "Ought". I think, that is because the two are categorically different approaches. So I guess, that it neither is possible to conclude the other way, from "Ought" to "Is". Now I thi
Jack, List:
I appreciate your honesty, but since you are now rejecting basic principles
of logic (my #1 and #4), there is nothing more for us to discuss. Again,
Peirce affirms them (as well as my #2), so there is also no possibility of
reconciling your position with his. You simply think that he w
Jack, Helmut, List:
Deciding from the outset that no sign can ever represent its object as it
is in itself is blocking the way of inquiry, not to mention begging the
question. Given that stance on Jack's part, again, there is nothing more
for us to discuss.
The supposed "is-ought distinction" is
Jon,
Your note of April 20 (copied below) is indeed a serious question for
pragmatists. It contains claims and assumptions that Peirce would not accept.
I'll start with an issue we had discussed some time ago.
I wrote that the Christians who translated the Greek New Testament to Chinese
chos
