Jack, List: I appreciate your honesty, but since you are now rejecting basic principles of logic (my #1 and #4), there is nothing more for us to discuss. Again, Peirce affirms them (as well as my #2), so there is also no possibility of reconciling your position with his. You simply think that he was wrong, while I (and many others) think that he was right.
I will just note that an inference (conclusion of an argument) is never an indication (index), it is always a symbol; and anything that we infer is thereby something that we cognize. In other words, as I have said twice before, even if your alleged "proof" demonstrates that the thing-in-itself must be inferred, it still must be capable of being represented, and thus cognizable after all. Cheers, Jon On Sun, Jun 4, 2023 at 2:45 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < [email protected]> wrote: > In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two > specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the > discussion further. > > Hi Jon, list, > > I think this is fair. It comes down to whether I can, or cannot, answer > these two questions. I agree with that. > > I would say, provisionally, that premises 1 and 2, 4 and thus 5 are all > wrong. That the thing in itself can be indicated but its indication comes > by inference (for, as you know, it cannot possibly be cognized). > > But it requires a better treatment from me which I've began drafting (not > overly long as in the last essay-post and more conventional). > > Thanks again. > > Jack > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > Any argumentation that has a "gap" *cannot *be deductively valid. The > whole point is to *show *that the conclusion follows necessarily from the > premisses by spelling them *all *out, especially the ones that are likely > to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in > itself" entails that nothing has been *demonstrated *yet. *Which > premiss(es) are you omitting?* > > By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the *Ding an > sich* is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. > > CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after > all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains > a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or > otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be > prescribed. The *Ding an sich*, however, can neither be indicated nor > found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or > false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be > thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) > > > In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, > we can reformulate it as follows. > > 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or > found (all S is I or F). > 2. The *Ding an sich* can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). > 3. Therefore, the *Ding an sich* cannot be the subject of a meaningful > proposition (no D is S). > > > We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. > > 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E > is S). > > 5. Therefore, the *Ding an sich* does not exist (no D is E). > > > Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). *Which > premiss(es) are you denying?* > > Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the > *non-existence* of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing > misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it > violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction > to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the > full context. > > CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up > in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of > things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the > universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think > Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe > which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to > be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I > cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141, 1911) > > > Similarly, he wrote the following two years later. > > CSP: Immanuel Kant, incomparably the greatest philosopher of knowledge > that ever was, the great scrutinator of Reality, has in one large part of > his *chef d’oeuvre* a good deal to say about the *Ding an sich* meaning > all that is independent at once of Perspection and of Understanding. He > even many times uses the phrase in the plural, possibly as a help to > feebler minds. But it seems impossible upon his own principles that any > meaning whatever should rightly be attached to the phrase. What we can in > some measure know is our universe in such a sense that we cannot *mean* > anything > of what may be "beyond." (R 930, 1913) > > > In short, Peirce is merely using different terms to reiterate his > agreement with Kant that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply > beyond the limits of possible experience" (CP 6.95, 1903). However, he > still disagrees that things in themselves are beyond those limits--note > that they demarcate the range of *possible *experience, not *actual > *experience--and > thus reaffirms that Kant's *Ding an sich* is meaningless. > > I went through your "essay-lite," but as with many of your long List > posts, I frankly had a hard time making heads or tails of it. For example, > you say over and over that our concepts of things are not *identical to* > those things, but this is uncontroversial and irrelevant--the sign *is > not* the object, but the sign *represents *the object, and the question > is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the object *as > it is in itself*. > > In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two > specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the > discussion further. > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Sat, Jun 3, 2023 at 12:32 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > [email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List > > It is deductively valid if you fill in the gap re thing in itself, which I > have done/explained/qualified within the various formalism. It just assumes > basic knowledge of that. > > JAS: "As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the *finite > *community > of humans can ever *actually *attain knowledge of things as they are as > the result of our *finite *inquiries, it is whether it *would be* > possible for an *infinite *community to attain knowledge of things as > they are as the result of *infinite *inquiry." > > I don't see how that is possible except as some variety of ideal which > Kant, differentially, would not even disagree with (as in stressed > objectivity, "fire is hot", and mutual comprehension). Throwing it to an > infinite community, what effect does that have? Because the nature of > infinity is that it continues. Do you have knowlede of an object as it is > in itself after that ideal time? Logically, it seems to me, the key isn't > "infinite community" but whether it is necessary to infer the existence of > the thing in itself. For if this is necessary, then it matters not if the > period of time be finite or infinite. > > And, again, I side with Peirce in the Welby exerpt. I believe it is > necessary. > > Best > > Jack > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not > deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to > those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are > as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). > Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of > things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical > interpretants)--cannot *represent *those things as they are in > themselves, i.e., that we cannot *cognize *those things as they are in > themselves (final interpretant). > > Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. > We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not > at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an > incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is > not whether the *finite *community of humans can ever *actually *attain > knowledge of things as they are as the result of our *finite *inquiries, > it is whether it *would be* possible for an *infinite *community to > attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of *infinite * > inquiry. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > [email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > 1. Things impress upon me, > 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. > 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then > 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. > 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, > beyond our impressions (formal) of them. > > That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. > > I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they > are. We can only know their human aspect”. > > May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. > > Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly > cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions > which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as > they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation > necessitates that such things are in themselves. > > Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies > things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here > rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, > consistently in all manner of logical forms. > > John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is > accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, > when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as > scholar (polymath) until his death. > > Best, > > Jack > >
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