Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Edwina, list,   ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the

[PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic logics... > On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign > while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut, list I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction. With reference to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

Jon, List, One more effort ... if you take the definition of a mathematical category, you'll see that you only need to "flatten" your diagram a little to get the category O → S → I. To do this, we'll consider the abstract category X → Y → Z with three abstract objects X, Y and Z and not two but

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

Ben, List You are confronted with the mathematical notion of the composition of morphisms. This notion appears as an axiom in the definition of a category. Category theory is the study of mathematical structures and their relationships. It's a unifying notion that began with the observation that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut, List: HR: The object determines the sign, the sign the interpretant, and *the interpretant changes the object*, which is some sort of determination too. According to Peirce, the bolded part is incorrect. CSP: As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:18 AM, robert marty wrote: > > Jerry, List > > You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in > mathematics. > Sorry, Robert. Interesting but hardly compelling response. Human communications in multidisciplinary forums such as this are open

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

That's okay Jerry ... I'm just trying to stay within the framework of exact philosophy as Peirce sees it : *The doctrine of exact philosophy, as I understand that phrase, is, that all danger of error in philosophy will be reduced to a minimum by treating the problems as mathematically as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

Jerry, List You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in mathematics. For example, when Peirce names the classes of signs, he doesn't note that symbols are legisigns, any more than he mentions that the three iconic signs are rhematic. Since my diagram represents a

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

List: Here is a modified version of my EG with the two dyadic relations of determining now included. Erasing them in accordance with the usual transformation rules gives the other version of my original EG as posted on Friday, its only difference from the one below being the convention for where