RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion

2014-10-09 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Jon, Sung, I think a much clearer answer to Sung’s question is given in Natural Propositions, p. 54: A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object.” (EPII, 307) This definition implicitly posits propositions against predicates without any reference

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7

2014-10-09 Thread Jon Awbrey
Chapter 3.7 GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14615 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14618 Gary, List, Of course, we could try our own hands at sketching an Existential Graph of what Peirce is saying here, whether we read it as assertion

[PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

2014-10-09 Thread Gary Fuhrman
There hasn't been much discussion of NP 3.7, but I'll assume that's because it's clear enough to everyone that we can press on to 3.8, where the concepts of fact and truth come to the fore. Here again our keynote text is Kaina Stoicheia, which Frederik quotes to begin this section: [[ What we

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

2014-10-09 Thread Clark Goble
On Oct 9, 2014, at 8:17 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Those who find this concept of causality questionable would do well to post their questions now. I confess I’ve always had trouble with the conception of “events” in philosophy. While I’ve long

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information (STOI)

2014-10-09 Thread Edwina Taborsky
Jon, you seem to be saying that Information is what someone else perceives. I think this reliance on the decision of another and even, a conscious and cognizant other, as to what is information and what is not, is problematic. I consider that information is 'data that has been organized'.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

2014-10-09 Thread Stephen C. Rose
The notion of a complete cause of any event involves one in speculation for which there is no answer that is not metaphysical. The cause of any event must either be immediate or traceable to the point that it can no longer be traced. Even in such a case the assignment of a cause may differ. What

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

2014-10-09 Thread Clark Goble
On Oct 9, 2014, at 3:05 PM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote: The notion of a complete cause of any event involves one in speculation for which there is no answer that is not metaphysical. The cause of any event must either be immediate or traceable to the point that it can no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

2014-10-09 Thread Gary Richmond
Clark Goble wrote: In terms of Peirce's notion of causation, Richard Smyth, has a rather interesting treatment in *Reading Peirce Reading*. The focus of the book is on how Peirce's thought arises from engagement with other philosophers. Here he sees a similarity between natural causation and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

2014-10-09 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Thanks Clark. I am not competent to do much but say what I have come to think and I have come to think that each bit of matter has within it a free and a less free (mechanical, material) element. That is what enables flexibility. The free aspect is what enables me to type a g instead of an h. By

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion

2014-10-09 Thread Jon Awbrey
STOI. Semiotic Theory Of Information JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14551 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14559 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14614