> On Oct 9, 2014, at 8:17 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Those who find this concept of causality questionable would do well to post > their questions now.
I confess I’ve always had trouble with the conception of “events” in philosophy. While I’ve long loved reading Davidson his events always seemed mysterious to me. I found the idea of fact for Peirce straightforward but exactly what the relationship with events is something I find more difficult. It seems like Peirce’s conception here of causality with events is mysterious. It appears that his analysis of causes is less a physical one than a logical one relating facts or true propositions. In that sense there’s a certain degree of overlap with how say Davidson conduct’s his analysis. For Davidson in notions like his anomalous monism you have different sorts of descriptions of events and (going by distant memory here) causes are between those. This makes translation between the mental to physical difficult for Davidson due to the different sort of descriptions involved. (As I said, my ability to figure out Davidson’s events was always weak, so I was never sure if I quite got Davidson even though I always loved reading him) Now Peirce’s famous example via continuity on relating causally the mental to the physical and vice versa seems different from Davidson. And there are many other differences. Still I wonder if there’s a certain broad similarity at play.
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