In which case he clearly failed and undermined the entire enterprise if we
take him seriously.
Steven
On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 6:17 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
wrote:
Gene, List,
Gene, I completely agree with your neatly argued response to Steven. To
succinctly summarize your
Please offer some support for this totally unsupported claim. What's the
'clear failure'? How did Peirce 'undermine the entire scientific
enterprise'? I, Gene, and many would argue just the opposite. On the face
of it your comment strikes me as patent nonsense.
Best,
Gary
[image: Gary Richmond]
Gene, List,
Gene, I completely agree with your neatly argued response to Steven. To
succinctly summarize your argument in your own words, Peirce challenged
science to come to terms with a more comprehensive living universe, alive
in still active creation and a reasonableness energizing into
What assertion? I didn't assert anything, but disagreed with Steven's
assertion. Please read Gene's post again--which does assert what I *would*
assert--and give a reasonable critique of it. Meanwhile, I have great hopes
that biosemiotics will in time prove itself to be a extraordinarily
valuable
Thanks, Frederik. I think that to properly call a view Platonist it must reject
the existence of particulars in favour of universals. Russell fits this
description because fairly early in his (long) career he explicitly rejected
particulars, and argued that instances were combinations of
Thread:
JW:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15850
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15854
Jim, List,
After a little thought, I can't find any reason
why that last operator equation to fail no matter
what the adicity of ℓ, so Peirce is either
Dear John, lists,
It may not be extreme, but I think that most current realist metaphysicians
(ones who accept universals as real, like myself and David Armstrong, for
example) take a line closer to the Duns Scotus one. The more extreme view seems
to most to be difficult to distinguish from
Inquiry Blog
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-theoretical-entities-1/
Peirce List
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467
FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15800
Jon list,
One thought I had was that although
2 + 2 + 2 = 3 + 3 (dropping 1) are extensionally identical
(2 + 2 + 2) l = ( 3 + 3) l are not. Different index and cycle.
In the meantime, I have read Cayley's two 1854 papers from his Collected Works
on groups (part one and two; available
