Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

[Ben Udell]

Dear all,

In the case of the three science 'branches' (discovery, review, 
practice), Peirce calls the difference a difference of purpose. But for 
more subdivisive classification he refers to differences of kind of 
observation, etc.  See table "Taxa of scientific departments" in


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce) 



Best, Ben

On 9/2/2021 6:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Gary F., List:

CSP (bolded below): The importance of distinguishing between the three
studies is due in the first place to the diversity of their general aims.


As I have said before, this is the basic idea underlying Peirce's entire
classification of the sciences--they are distinguished by their different
*purposes*. It is not a matter of how people *identify *themselves,
professionally or otherwise, but of what they are seeking to *learn *by
embarking upon a particular inquiry. Someone framing pure hypotheses, and
then drawing necessary conclusions from them, is *acting as* a
mathematician. Someone observing whatever is or could be present to the
mind in any way, and then analyzing it into its irreducible elements,
is *acting
as* a phaneroscopist. Someone exploring the distinction between truth and
falsity, along with the theory of how to attain the former and avoid the
latter, is *acting as* a logician. Someone investigating the actual
workings of embodied minds is *acting as* a psychologist.

CSP (bolded below): Phaneroscopy asks what are the possibilities of
consciousness.


This is precisely why I have deliberately adopted the habit of describing
the phaneron as whatever is *or could be* present to the mind in any way.
Moreover, as Edwina has rightly pointed out, phaneroscopy is not
just concerned with our individual human minds, but with mind in Peirce's
much more general sense. In R 645 (1909) as quoted at length below, he
equates "consciousness" with this broader notion of *unmediated *presence
to the mind--immediate consciousness rather than self-consciousness or
cognitive consciousness, feeling/primisense rather than altersense or
medisense (CP 7.540-551, c. 1896), 1ns rather than 2ns or 3ns. From this
standpoint, in accordance with Peirce's tychism, even individual atoms are
"conscious" or "sentient," albeit to a very small degree (CP 6.201, 1898).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 9:21 AM  wrote:
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

CSP (bolded below): The importance of distinguishing between the three
studies is due in the first place to the diversity of their general aims.


As I have said before, this is the basic idea underlying Peirce's entire
classification of the sciences--they are distinguished by their different
*purposes*. It is not a matter of how people *identify *themselves,
professionally or otherwise, but of what they are seeking to *learn *by
embarking upon a particular inquiry. Someone framing pure hypotheses, and
then drawing necessary conclusions from them, is *acting as* a
mathematician. Someone observing whatever is or could be present to the
mind in any way, and then analyzing it into its irreducible elements,
is *acting
as* a phaneroscopist. Someone exploring the distinction between truth and
falsity, along with the theory of how to attain the former and avoid the
latter, is *acting as* a logician. Someone investigating the actual
workings of embodied minds is *acting as* a psychologist.

CSP (bolded below): Phaneroscopy asks what are the possibilities of
consciousness.


This is precisely why I have deliberately adopted the habit of describing
the phaneron as whatever is *or could be* present to the mind in any way.
Moreover, as Edwina has rightly pointed out, phaneroscopy is not
just concerned with our individual human minds, but with mind in Peirce's
much more general sense. In R 645 (1909) as quoted at length below, he
equates "consciousness" with this broader notion of *unmediated *presence
to the mind--immediate consciousness rather than self-consciousness or
cognitive consciousness, feeling/primisense rather than altersense or
medisense (CP 7.540-551, c. 1896), 1ns rather than 2ns or 3ns. From this
standpoint, in accordance with Peirce's tychism, even individual atoms are
"conscious" or "sentient," albeit to a very small degree (CP 6.201, 1898).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 9:21 AM  wrote:

> List, after a closer look at the R 645 text I posted, I see a need to make
> an amendment to Ketner’s transcription.
>
> One sentence in the 3rd paragraph reads: “Psychology deals with questions
> of what we are directly conscious of, and involves very little or no
> reasoning.” But it seems to me that this description fits *phaneroscopy*
> and not psychology. In the source manuscript (page 4 as numbered by
> Peirce), the entire sentence after the word “Psychology” is crossed out,
> and the following words, which are *not* crossed out, continue the
> sentence: “endeavours to make known the positive facts of the workings of
> the mind.” (This obviously *does* refer to Psychology, but is omitted
> from Ketner’s transcription.) The last sentence on the page which is not
> crossed out reads: “Logic inquires into the theory [of] what must follow in
> hypothetical cases.”
>
> So I have amended (and bolded) the third paragraph in the text below, in a
> way better reflects the manuscript (and makes more sense):
>
>
>
> CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded:
> Phaneroscopy (as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology
> Proper. One of the three is a Science, though youthful and immature; that
> is Psychology Proper. One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it
> still lacks that considerable body of well-drilled workers pursuing methods
> acknowledged by all, taking advantage of one another's discoveries to push
> research still on and on, and turning out new discoveries at a healthy
> rate; all of which I take to be essential to a developed science. The third
> is Phaneroscopy, still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any
> details of it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure the
> student of it that, under the fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if
> the human culture continues long, it surely will in the future become a
> strong and beneficient science.
>
> By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and
> growths of Minds and their relations to the animal or other organisms in
> which Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it is a sort of
> Physiology of the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction
> between Truth and Falsity, and the theory of how to attain the former
> together with all that the investigator of that theory must make it his
> business to probe. It comes, in my opinion, in the present state of
> science, to a study of the general nature of Signs and the leading kinds of
> Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of whatever consciousness puts into
> one's Immediate and Complete possession, or in other words, the study of
> whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For such Direct objects
> of Consciousness I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some may think this
> word would idly cumber the dictionary 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 16
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/09/02/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-discussion-16/

Re: FB | Semeiotics
https://www.facebook.com/Semeiotic/posts/4441505199249593
::: Marius V. Constantin
https://www.facebook.com/groups/964364967280710/posts/1502285400155328/

Marius Constantin asked a series of questions
which allow me to clear up a number of points.


Have you taken into consideration the difference
between weak negation and strong negation?


I always begin classically where logic is concerned — I guess that means
“strong” negation — we make a stronger start and get better mileage on
that basis before we run into the specialized circumstances, mainly
in computational and generalized semiotic settings, which force us
to weaken our logic.


It is so-called semiotic negation, which, by the way, was an aspect, for me,
in so-called resolution logic (Ch. Sanders Peirce is mentioned on that one).


I had a computer science course on resolution-unification theorem provers
at U. Illinois in the mid 1980s.  If that’s the same sort of resolution,
it generalizes the modus ponens inference rule, all of which exemplify
implicational inference.  Peirce’s logical graphs allow a degree of
equational or information-preserving inference, a fact which
Spencer Brown drew out and made more clear.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

List

What I find disturbing in this compartmentalization of empirical and
analytic explorations of our reality is precisely that: its
compartmentalization. What happens if a scientist, engaged in
examining the phaneron of, let's say, the X-gang in a modern inner
city, ALSO ventures into the realm of psychology to explore the gang
behaviour. Does this bewildered scientist disappear in a puff of
smoke, for violating the purity of each particular science?

Edwina
 On Thu 02/09/21 10:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
List, after a closer look at the R 645 text I posted, I see a need
to make an amendment to Ketner’s transcription. 

One sentence in the 3 rd paragraph reads: “Psychology deals with
questions of what we are directly conscious of, and involves very
little or no reasoning.” But it seems to me that this description
fits phaneroscopy and not psychology. In the source manuscript (page
4 as numbered by Peirce), the entire sentence after the word
“Psychology” is crossed out, and the following words, which are
not crossed out, continue the sentence: “endeavours to make known
the positive facts of the workings of the mind.” (This obviously 
does refer to Psychology, but is omitted from Ketner’s
transcription.) The last sentence on the page which is not crossed
out reads: “Logic inquires into the theory [of] what must follow in
hypothetical cases.” 

So I have amended (and bolded) the third paragraph in the text
below, in a way better reflects the manuscript (and makes more
sense):
CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded:
Phaneroscopy (as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology
Proper. One of the three is a Science, though youthful and immature;
that is Psychology Proper. One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic,
because it still lacks that considerable body of well-drilled workers
pursuing methods acknowledged by all, taking advantage of one
another's discoveries to push research still on and on, and turning
out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be
essential to a developed science. The third is Phaneroscopy, still in
the condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that,
under the fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human
culture continues long, it surely will in the future become a strong
and beneficient science.  

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings
and growths of Minds and their relations to the animal or other
organisms in which Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it
is a sort of Physiology of the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the
distinction between Truth and Falsity, and the theory of how to attain
the former together with all that the investigator of that theory must
make it his business to probe. It comes, in my opinion, in the present
state of science, to a study of the general nature of Signs and the
leading kinds of Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of whatever
consciousness puts into one's Immediate and Complete possession, or
in other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of
in itself. For such Direct objects of Consciousness I venture to coin
the term “Prebits.” Some may think this word would idly cumber the
dictionary in the unlikely contingency of its ever coming into use.
They will regard it as a superfluous synonym of “appearances,” or
“phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that “datum” might
do. But then many other things are called “data”; as for the word
“phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those
more special meanings to which it is usually restricted; as, for
example, to denote any fact that consists in the uniformity with
which something peculiar and perceptible to the senses (without or
with instrumental aid) will result from the fulfillment of certain
definite conditions, especially if it can be repeated indefinitely.
Thus, the fact that small bits of paper or anything else that is
light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite,
etc. provided this has just before been briskly rubbed upon a soft
surface of suitable material with a harder backing is one single
phenomenon, while the fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few
other substances will attract small filings or other bits of iron, as
magnetite, etc. is a different single phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I
do not mean anything of that nature, but a single Object of immediate
consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for the word
“Appearance,” it would be stretched in an inconvenient and quite
unexpected way if it would be applied to some of the objects I call
Prebits. Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an
example that will bring the truth of this home to him. In the above
Definition of “Prebit,” the adjective “Immediate” is not to
be understood in a Properly 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

[gnox]

List, after a closer look at the R 645 text I posted, I see a need to make an 
amendment to Ketner’s transcription. 

One sentence in the 3rd paragraph reads: “Psychology deals with questions of 
what we are directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning.” 
But it seems to me that this description fits phaneroscopy and not psychology. 
In the source manuscript (page 4 as numbered by Peirce), the entire sentence 
after the word “Psychology” is crossed out, and the following words, which are 
not crossed out, continue the sentence: “endeavours to make known the positive 
facts of the workings of the mind.” (This obviously does refer to Psychology, 
but is omitted from Ketner’s transcription.) The last sentence on the page 
which is not crossed out reads: “Logic inquires into the theory [of] what must 
follow in hypothetical cases.” 

So I have amended (and bolded) the third paragraph in the text below, in a way 
better reflects the manuscript (and makes more sense):

 

CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded: Phaneroscopy 
(as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology Proper. One of the 
three is a Science, though youthful and immature; that is Psychology Proper. 
One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it still lacks that 
considerable body of well-drilled workers pursuing methods acknowledged by all, 
taking advantage of one another's discoveries to push research still on and on, 
and turning out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be 
essential to a developed science. The third is Phaneroscopy, still in the 
condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet 
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the 
fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human culture continues long, 
it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficient science. 

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and growths 
of Minds and their relations to the animal or other organisms in which 
Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it is a sort of Physiology of 
the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction between Truth and 
Falsity, and the theory of how to attain the former together with all that the 
investigator of that theory must make it his business to probe. It comes, in my 
opinion, in the present state of science, to a study of the general nature of 
Signs and the leading kinds of Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of 
whatever consciousness puts into one's Immediate and Complete possession, or in 
other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For 
such Direct objects of Consciousness I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some 
may think this word would idly cumber the dictionary in the unlikely 
contingency of its ever coming into use. They will regard it as a superfluous 
synonym of “appearances,” or “phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that 
“datum” might do. But then many other things are called “data”; as for the word 
“phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those more special 
meanings to which it is usually restricted; as, for example, to denote any fact 
that consists in the uniformity with which something peculiar and perceptible 
to the senses (without or with instrumental aid) will result from the 
fulfillment of certain definite conditions, especially if it can be repeated 
indefinitely. Thus, the fact that small bits of paper or anything else that is 
light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite, etc. 
provided this has just before been briskly rubbed upon a soft surface of 
suitable material with a harder backing is one single phenomenon, while the 
fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few other substances will attract small 
filings or other bits of iron, as magnetite, etc. is a different single 
phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I do not mean anything of that nature, but a single 
Object of immediate consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for 
the word “Appearance,” it would be stretched in an inconvenient and quite 
unexpected way if it would be applied to some of the objects I call Prebits. 
Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an example that will 
bring the truth of this home to him. In the above Definition of “Prebit,” the 
adjective “Immediate” is not to be understood in a Properly Psychological 
sense, as if it were intended to exclude the case of my becoming aware of a 
Prebit in consequence of becoming aware of another thing, whether Prebit or 
not; but what I do mean is that once I do become aware of the Prebit, I am 
aware not merely before of a Sign Substitute for it, or any sort of proxy, 
vicar, attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or representative of it, but am put facie 
ad faciem before the very Prebit itself. 

The importance of distinguishing between the three studies is due in the first 
place to the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 38

[Jon Awbrey]

Thank you, Gary, for providing a substantial excerpt from Peirce himself,
shorn of of all the zoomy kibitzing from a secondary source.  I only wish
more of our close readings would begin that way.

Regards

Jon

On 9/2/2021 8:13 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Since there has been some discussion in other threads of the differences 
between psychology, phaneroscopy and logic,
some readers may be interested in the context of the quotation from R 645 
(1909) which occupies most of slide 38.
Here it is as published on pp. 328-9 of Kenneth Ketner’s book His Glassy 
Essence (1998):



CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded: Phaneroscopy 
(as I call it, or Phenomenology),
Logic, and Psychology Proper. One of the three is a Science, though youthful 
and immature; that is Psychology Proper.
One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it still lacks that 
considerable body of well-drilled workers
pursuing methods acknowledged by all, taking advantage of one another's 
discoveries to push research still on and on,
and turning out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be 
essential to a developed science. The
third is Phaneroscopy, still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any 
details of it being as yet
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the 
fostering care that it is sure to enjoy,
if the human culture continues long, it surely will in the future become a 
strong and beneficient science.

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and growths 
of Minds and their relations to the
animal or other organisms in which Psychical phenomena can be detected. In 
short, it is a sort of Physiology of the
Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction between Truth and Falsity, 
and the theory of how to attain the
former together with all that the investigator of that theory must make it his 
business to probe. It comes, in my
opinion, in the present state of science, to a study of the general nature of 
Signs and the leading kinds of Signs.
By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of whatever consciousness puts into one's 
Immediate and Complete possession, or in
other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For 
such Direct objects of Consciousness
I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some may think this word would idly 
cumber the dictionary in the unlikely
contingency of its ever coming into use. They will regard it as a superfluous 
synonym of “appearances,” or
“phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that “datum” might do. But then many 
other things are called “data”; as for
the word “phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those more 
special meanings to which it is usually
restricted; as, for example, to denote any fact that consists in the uniformity 
with which something peculiar and
perceptible to the senses (without or with instrumental aid) will result from 
the fulfillment of certain definite
conditions, especially if it can be repeated indefinitely. Thus, the fact that 
small bits of paper or anything else
that is light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite, 
etc. provided this has just before been
briskly rubbed upon a soft surface of suitable material with a harder backing 
is one single phenomenon, while the
fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few other substances will attract small 
filings or other bits of iron, as
magnetite, etc. is a different single phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I do not mean 
anything of that nature, but a single
Object of immediate consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for 
the word “Appearance,” it would be
stretched in an inconvenient and quite unexpected way if it would be applied to 
some of the objects I call Prebits.
Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an example that will 
bring the truth of this home to him. In
the above Definition of “Prebit,” the adjective “Immediate” is not to be 
understood in a Properly Psychological
sense, as if it were intended to exclude the case of my becoming aware of a 
Prebit in consequence of becoming aware
of another thing, whether Prebit or not; but what I do mean is that once I do 
become aware of the Prebit, I am aware
not merely before of a Sign Substitute for it, or any sort of proxy, vicar, 
attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or
representative of it, but am put facie ad faciem before the very Prebit itself.

The importance of distinguishing between the three studies is due in the first 
place to the diversity of their
general aims. Phaneroscopy asks what are the possibilities of consciousness. 
Psychology deals with questions of what
we are directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning. Logic 
involves no more observation than Pure
Mathematics itself, and is entirely occupied with necessary reasoning. Logic 
inquires into the theory of what must
follow or is likely, or a warrantable assumption in hypothetical 

[PEIRCE-L] CfA: Workshop "Logic(s) in Defective Science"

[Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre]

Apologies for crossposting.


*===CfA: Workshop "Logic(s) in Defective Science"===*
*When: *6-11 April, 2022
*Where: *Orthodox Academy of Crete, Crete, Greece.
*Workshop website: *
https://sites.google.com/view/unilog-2022/workshops/logics-in-defective-science
*Organizers:* María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz (Federal University of Rio
de Janeiro) and Luis Felipe Bartolo-Alegre (National University of San
Marcos)

*Keynote speakers: *Gerhard Schurz (Universität Düsseldorf), Michèle Friend
(Université Lille Nord-Europe/The George Washington University) and Diderik
Batens (Universiteit Gent).

*Deadline for submitting abstracts:* September 9, 2020


*===Description===*This workshop is devoted to exploring connections
between non-classical logics and the rational use of defective information
in the sciences, as well as the inferential practices in the
sciences—particularly, those which make use of defective information.

The workshop welcomes formal and informal contributions on the different
ways to explain and understand defective information in the sciences.
Topics of interest include, but are not limited to the following:
● The problem of defective science from a logical standpoint.
● Rational reconstructions of non-classical scientific inference.
● Proposals for scientific inference from non-classical approaches.
● The role of logic(s) in scientific explanation.
● Applications of non-classical probability to scientific research.
● Studies on the pros and cons of classical vs non-classical approaches to
science.
● Logical pluralistic vs monistic approaches to scientific reasoning.
● Non-classical approaches to epistemic paradoxes.
● Non-classical approaches in the understanding or reconstruction of
scientific theories and laws.
● Non-classical forms of reasoning (e.g. non-monotonic) in scientific
inference.
● The meaning or use of logical symbols (e.g. conditional, conjunction) in
science.
● Classical and non-classical approaches for analyzing defective databases.
● Revisiting classical approaches in the handling of defective science.



*===Abstract submission===*One-page abstracts (plus references) should be
sent to defective.scie...@gmail.com with the subject line: "Submission for
LDS" no later than September 9, 2020.
Notifications of acceptance will be sent by September 21, 2020.

*+info: *defective.scie...@gmail.com
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 38

[gnox]

Since there has been some discussion in other threads of the differences 
between psychology, phaneroscopy and logic, some readers may be interested in 
the context of the quotation from R 645 (1909) which occupies most of slide 38. 
Here it is as published on pp. 328-9 of Kenneth Ketner’s book His Glassy 
Essence (1998):

 

CSP: Three studies are needlessly and very unhappily confounded: Phaneroscopy 
(as I call it, or Phenomenology), Logic, and Psychology Proper. One of the 
three is a Science, though youthful and immature; that is Psychology Proper. 
One is an Embrio-science; so I rate Logic, because it still lacks that 
considerable body of well-drilled workers pursuing methods acknowledged by all, 
taking advantage of one another's discoveries to push research still on and on, 
and turning out new discoveries at a healthy rate; all of which I take to be 
essential to a developed science. The third is Phaneroscopy, still in the 
condition of a science-egg, hardly any details of it being as yet 
distinguishable, though enough to assure the student of it that, under the 
fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if the human culture continues long, 
it surely will in the future become a strong and beneficient science. 

By Psychology Proper I mean the Empirical Science of the workings and growths 
of Minds and their relations to the animal or other organisms in which 
Psychical phenomena can be detected. In short, it is a sort of Physiology of 
the Soul. By Logic I mean the study of the distinction between Truth and 
Falsity, and the theory of how to attain the former together with all that the 
investigator of that theory must make it his business to probe. It comes, in my 
opinion, in the present state of science, to a study of the general nature of 
Signs and the leading kinds of Signs. By Phaneroscopy I mean the study of 
whatever consciousness puts into one's Immediate and Complete possession, or in 
other words, the study of whatever one becomes directly aware of in itself. For 
such Direct objects of Consciousness I venture to coin the term “Prebits.” Some 
may think this word would idly cumber the dictionary in the unlikely 
contingency of its ever coming into use. They will regard it as a superfluous 
synonym of “appearances,” or “phenomena,” “data,” etc., etc. I admit that 
“datum” might do. But then many other things are called “data”; as for the word 
“phenomenon,” I think that is better reserved to express those more special 
meanings to which it is usually restricted; as, for example, to denote any fact 
that consists in the uniformity with which something peculiar and perceptible 
to the senses (without or with instrumental aid) will result from the 
fulfillment of certain definite conditions, especially if it can be repeated 
indefinitely. Thus, the fact that small bits of paper or anything else that is 
light enough will be attracted to a rod of shellac, glass, vulcanite, etc. 
provided this has just before been briskly rubbed upon a soft surface of 
suitable material with a harder backing is one single phenomenon, while the 
fact that a rod of steel or of one of a few other substances will attract small 
filings or other bits of iron, as magnetite, etc. is a different single 
phenomenon. By a “Prebit” I do not mean anything of that nature, but a single 
Object of immediate consciousness, though usually indefinitely denoted. As for 
the word “Appearance,” it would be stretched in an inconvenient and quite 
unexpected way if it would be applied to some of the objects I call Prebits. 
Before he has read many pages the Reader will come upon an example that will 
bring the truth of this home to him. In the above Definition of “Prebit,” the 
adjective “Immediate” is not to be understood in a Properly Psychological 
sense, as if it were intended to exclude the case of my becoming aware of a 
Prebit in consequence of becoming aware of another thing, whether Prebit or 
not; but what I do mean is that once I do become aware of the Prebit, I am 
aware not merely before of a Sign Substitute for it, or any sort of proxy, 
vicar, attorney, succedaneum, dummy, or representative of it, but am put facie 
ad faciem before the very Prebit itself. 

The importance of distinguishing between the three studies is due in the first 
place to the diversity of their general aims. Phaneroscopy asks what are the 
possibilities of consciousness. Psychology deals with questions of what we are 
directly conscious of, and involves very little or no reasoning. Logic involves 
no more observation than Pure Mathematics itself, and is entirely occupied with 
necessary reasoning. Logic inquires into the theory of what must follow or is 
likely, or a warrantable assumption in hypothetical cases. Psychology reunites 
in itself all the methods and all the difficulties of the other Empirical 
Sciences; it endeavors to make known the positive facts of the workings of the 
mind. 

In the Second place, the methods of the three