Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: Peirce does not say in CP 4.551 that the two minds are welded in
the *uttered
*sign itself.


To what other sign could he be referring in that passage? Every sign has a
quasi-utterer and a quasi-interpreter, and those two quasi-minds are at one
in the sign itself--namely, the specific sign that is uttered by the
quasi-utterer and interpreted by the quasi-interpreter.

GF: Indeed, by your own reasoning, I don’t see how a determination of the
mind of the interpreter can be *included *in a discrete sign whose
utterance precedes the effectual interpretant.


Right, on my reading of EP 2:478, the uttered sign--including its immediate
interpretant, which is the communicational interpretant--is a determination
of the commind, while the intentional interpretant is a *previous
*determination
of the mind of the utterer, and the effectual interpretant is a *subsequent
*determination of the mind of the interpreter.

GF: In the language of “Peirce’s Topical Continuum”, the *uttered *sign is
of a lower dimensionality than the continuous dialogue of which it is a
part, which is itself an argument. An uttered sign can be regarded (in
binocular vision) either as a topical singularity in the continuum (a break
in it) or as a “limit” which joins two portions of the continuum.


At the moment, I am more inclined to view the uttered sign as a *portion*
of the continuous process of semiosis, such that it is of the *same*
dimensionality as the dialogue of which it is a part, while its
"boundaries" are the arbitrary limits of lower dimensionality that we mark
off for the purpose of analysis. However, I have suggested previously that
a proposition is of lower dimensionality than an argument, and that a name
is of lower dimensionality than a proposition. When describing a continuous
process of inference by means of an argumentation in retrospect, we mark
off portions of the argument with propositions as their limits, and we mark
off portions of each proposition with names as their limits.

GF: The way I see it, a communicative dialogue, if genuine, must be the
sign of higher dimensionality which includes all three (intentional,
effectual, and communicational) interpretants.


Peirce's terminology of intentional/effectual/communicational interpretants
is only strictly applicable to an individual sign for which we can identify
one mind as the utterer and another mind as the interpreter. That makes it
very suitable for each utterance *within *a communicative dialogue,
including a text, as well as an entire *internal *dialogue where the
quasi-utterer and quasi-interpreter are temporally sequential stages
of the *same
*mind. In the case of an entire *external *dialogue, where the utterer and
interpreter are different minds that are constantly *exchanging *those
roles back and forth with respect to each succeeding constituent sign, I
suggest that the two of them *together* serve as both the quasi-utterer and
the quasi-interpreter--temporally sequential stages of the *commind *into
which they are "fused" or "welded" in the dialogue as a whole, which is the
sign.

GF: I guess that would make them all *immediate *interpretants, since they
are all *in *the sign?


Only the communicational interpretant is *internal *to the uttered sign,
such that it is the *immediate *interpretant of *that *sign. The
intentional interpretant is always a *dynamical *interpretant of a *previous
*sign in the mind of the utterer, although it may be "betrayed" in the
immediate interpretant of the uttered sign. The effectual interpretant
is a *dynamical
*interpretant of the uttered sign in the mind of the interpreter. All this
is true even for an entire internal or external dialogue--only the
communicational interpretant is internal to it, while the intentional
interpretant precedes it and the effectual interpretant succeeds it.

GF: But I’m finding it hard to breathe in this rarified atmosphere of
abstractions, so I’d better stop now before I expire.


Okay, how about we take a look at some concrete examples?

1. Your post quoted below, to which I am replying, is obviously a sign. You
are the utterer of that sign, and I am its interpreter. The intentional
interpretant is not an interpretant of *that *sign, it is a dynamical
interpretant of *previous *signs in *your *mind (including my previous
post), such that your post was a dynamical interpretant of those previous
signs. The communicational interpretant is the immediate interpretant of
your post, which is common to both of us insofar as we are both competent
in the written English language. The effectual interpretant is the
dynamical interpretant of your post in *my *mind, including this post that
*I* wrote as a result of it.

2. Likewise, this post is obviously a sign. I am the utterer of this sign,
and you are its interpreter. The intentional interpretant is not an
interpretant of *this *sign, it is a dynamical interpretant of *previous *signs
in *my *mind (including your post quoted 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Gary R, thanks for introducing this quote into the thread:

CSP: In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic 
have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the 
severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we 
think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be 
allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful? CP 
2.107 

Indeed, I think the pragmatic result of this conversation should be to bring 
greater self-control to our interpretive habits, and that requires 
psychological realism as well as logical rigor.

JAS: According to Peirce, the intentional, effectual, and communicational (or 
com-) interpretants are determinations of the mind of the utterer, the mind of 
the interpreter, and the commens (or commind), respectively (EP 2:478). He does 
not say that the first two interpretants/determinations are "welded" into the 
third interpretant/determination, he says that the first two (quasi-)minds are 
"welded" into the third (quasi-)mind in the uttered sign itself (CP 4.551).

GF: Peirce does not say in CP 4.551 that the two minds are welded in the 
uttered sign itself. Indeed, by your own reasoning, I don’t see how a 
determination of the mind of the interpreter can be included in a discrete sign 
whose utterance precedes the effectual interpretant. In the language of 
“Peirce’s Topical Continuum”, the uttered sign is of a lower dimensionality 
than the continuous dialogue of which it is a part, which is itself an 
argument. An uttered sign can be regarded (in binocular vision) either as a 
topical singularity in the continuum (a break in it) or as a “limit” which 
joins two portions of the continuum. 

The way I see it, a communicative dialogue, if genuine, must be the sign of 
higher dimensionality which includes all three (intentional, effectual, and 
communicational) interpretants. I guess that would make them all immediate 
interpretants, since they are all in the sign? But I’m finding it hard to 
breathe in this rarified atmosphere of abstractions, so I’d better stop now 
before I expire.

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: 26-Oct-21 17:50
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Gary Fuhrman ; Jon Alan Schmidt 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary F, Jon A.S., List,

 

The introduction of psychological considerations into this discussion is, I 
think, important, posing perhaps some interesting challenges for Peirce's 
logic. 

 

GF: If two minds can be simultaneously distinct and welded into one mind in the 
sign, and the exchange of connected signs we call a “dialogue” can be that one 
sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of the minds of utterer and 
interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant? There is no relation of 
antecedence between interpretants, as there is between object, sign and 
interpretant.

GF: This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted 
above may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a 
binocular vision   (both logical and 
psychological) of semiosis. . . Anyway I think it’s compatible with your own 
explanation.

That "loose talk" includes, however, this rather telling 'binocular' comment:  

"Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of 
Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. ( 
 CP 4.551, 1906)

 

Yet even here the psychology/logic distinction is adumbrated, for dialogic, 
Peirce writes, is a mere fact for psychology, but a necessity for logic. 

That passage in turn reminded me of this remark by Peirce to the effect that 
approaching research into Speculative Rhetoric his rule of excluding 
psychological content could be relaxed in the interest of making the last 
branch of logic as semeiotic "practically useful."  

 

CSP: In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic 
have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the 
severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we 
think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be 
allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful? CP 
2.107 


A few years ago Ben Udell and I contributed a short chapter, "Logic is rooted 
in the social principle, and vice versa" in a volume, Charles Sanders Peirce in 
His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, edited by 
Torkild Thellefsen and Ben Sorensen. I had long been intrigued by the 
juxtaposition of these two snippets of Peirce. . .


1. Logic is rooted in the social principle. CP 2.653 

2. So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.CP 5.354

 

. . . and the invitation to contribute a chapter to that volume offered the 
opportunity to think more deeply on