Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Helmut, List: What I have been suggesting is that the entire universe is *one sign* in the sense that it is a vast, ongoing process of *continuous *semiosis. Any "individual" sign within it that we mark off for analysis, such that we can then attempt to sort out its two objects and three interpretants, has boundaries that are at least somewhat arbitrary. For example, this post as a whole seems like a straightforward example of an individual sign. However, we could divide it into multiple individual sentences, which we could divide into multiple individual phrases, which we could divide into multiple individual words, which we could divide into multiple individual letters, and so on. Moreover, we could instead connect it with your post below to constitute one exchange, which we could connect with other exchanges to constitute one thread, which we could connect with other threads to constitute one List archive, and so on. My point here is that at each "level" in both directions, we could (at least theoretically) demarcate and analyze *one sign* that has its two objects and three interpretants. Accordingly, I see no good reason to treat any one of those subsidiary signs as *the *real sign. Instead, it is the *whole *that is the real sign, the entire universe as a semiosic continuum; while its *parts*, all those constituent signs, are *entia rationis*. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 2:17 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Jon, Gary, List, > > I do not understand, how analysis is arbitrary. Neither do I understand, > what the continuity-claim is, besides a mantra. It e.g. has been agreed > some time, that induction is based on rational numbers, whose row is not a > continuum. To say, that discontinuous individual signs are not real, but > merely artefacts of arbitrary analysis, to me seems esoteric. In > electronics, discontinuity is produced by a schmitt-trigger. I am quite > sure, that in semiosis there also are schmitt-trigger-like elements. Of > course you can say, that if you look at the sharp edge of a step with a > microscope, you can see, that it is a bit rounded, at least with the radius > of an atom. But that is a red herring, because for every item, which is > bigger than this atom, it is sharp, and therefore a discontinuity. "Real" > means being valid independently of instantiation, not being valid for > atoms, quarks, or strings too. So the individual sign and discontinuities > are real, not arbitrary, is my opinion. > > Best, helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Jon, Gary, List, I do not understand, how analysis is arbitrary. Neither do I understand, what the continuity-claim is, besides a mantra. It e.g. has been agreed some time, that induction is based on rational numbers, whose row is not a continuum. To say, that discontinuous individual signs are not real, but merely artefacts of arbitrary analysis, to me seems esoteric. In electronics, discontinuity is produced by a schmitt-trigger. I am quite sure, that in semiosis there also are schmitt-trigger-like elements. Of course you can say, that if you look at the sharp edge of a step with a microscope, you can see, that it is a bit rounded, at least with the radius of an atom. But that is a red herring, because for every item, which is bigger than this atom, it is sharp, and therefore a discontinuity. "Real" means being valid independently of instantiation, not being valid for atoms, quarks, or strings too. So the individual sign and discontinuities are real, not arbitrary, is my opinion. Best, helmut 29. Oktober 2021 um 19:59 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: Gary F., List: GF: I was thinking that my top-down approach to these issues (based loosely on the “connected signs theorem” and your post on “Semiosic Synechism”) would turn out to be complementary to your bottom-up approach in this thread, analogous to the complementary views of light as waves and/or particles, but I guess that doesn’t work. In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be "bottom-up" rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any individual sign that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, since we arbitrarily mark it off within the real process of semiosis, which is always continuous. GF: Can we generalize from this to say that only an individual sign (i.e. a discrete and existing sign, a token or sinsign) has three interpretants? Which three interpretants do you have in mind? Again, I see the communicational and effectual interpretants respectively as the immediate and dynamical interpretants of the uttered sign, determinations of the commind and the interpreter's mind; and I see the intentional interpretant as a dynamical interpretant of previous signs, determinations of the utterer's mind that are connected such that they can have that one actual interpretant (CP 4.550). More generally, I have suggested in the past that the immediate interpretant pertains to each type of a sign, the dynamical interpretant to each token of a type, and the final interpretant to the sign itself--the idea being that one sign can have different types within different sign systems, such as "man" in English vs. "homme" in French--but I might need to rethink that theoretical scheme in light of recent discussions. GF: That would explain why your “Semiosic Synechism” post only mentions one interpretant of the “one sign” that results “if any signs are connected, no matter how.” Is this another consequence of the connected signs theorem? If so, could we also say that only an individual sign has two objects (immediate and dynamic), while the one sign which is a semiosic "perfect continuum" has only one? No, I believe that every sign--including the entire universe, conceived as "a vast representamen" that "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs"--has two objects and three interpretants, but I did not attempt to sort them out in that post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-10/msg00204.html). The immediate object is internal to the sign, the object as represented in that sign, while the dynamical object is external to the sign, the object as it is in itself. The immediate interpretant is internal to the sign, the interpretant as represented in that sign, while the dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of that sign and the final interpretant is the ideal effect of that sign. I have my own opinions about the external correlates in the case of the entire universe, but they tend to be controversial and are not essential to the topic of this thread. GF: If those two suggestions don’t work, perhaps you can propose some other general principle that we can salvage from this failure of communication. At the risk of belaboring the point, the most salient general principle here is that we can only discuss objects and interpretants in relation to a particular sign. In other words, the first step of semeiotic analysis is always demarcating the sign of interest by prescinding it from the continuous process of semiosis, thus marking it off as an ens rationis. Only then can we examine that quasi-individual sign to apprehend its immediate object and interpretant, from which we attempt to identify what dynamical object it is denoting and understand what about that object it is signifying. Again, the dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of the sign of interest, while the final interpretant is its ideal effect.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Gary F., List: GF: I was thinking that my top-down approach to these issues (based loosely on the “connected signs theorem” and your post on “Semiosic Synechism”) would turn out to be complementary to your bottom-up approach in this thread, analogous to the complementary views of light as waves and/or particles, but I guess that doesn’t work. In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be "bottom-up" rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any *individual *sign that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, since we arbitrarily mark it off within the *real *process of semiosis, which is always continuous. GF: Can we generalize from this to say that only an *individual *sign (i.e. a discrete and *existing *sign, a token or sinsign) has three interpretants? Which three interpretants do you have in mind? Again, I see the communicational and effectual interpretants respectively as the immediate and dynamical interpretants of the *uttered *sign, determinations of the commind and the interpreter's mind; and I see the intentional interpretant as a dynamical interpretant of *previous *signs, determinations of the utterer's mind that are connected such that they can have that one *actual *interpretant (CP 4.550). More generally, I have suggested in the past that the immediate interpretant pertains to each *type *of a sign, the dynamical interpretant to each *token *of a type, and the final interpretant to the sign *itself*--the idea being that one sign can have different types within different sign systems, such as "man" in English vs. "homme" in French--but I might need to rethink that theoretical scheme in light of recent discussions. GF: That would explain why your “Semiosic Synechism” post only mentions one interpretant of the “one sign” that results “if any signs are connected, no matter how.” Is this another consequence of the connected signs theorem? If so, could we also say that only an *individual *sign has two objects (immediate and dynamic), while the one sign which is a semiosic "perfect continuum" has only one? No, I believe that every sign--including the entire universe, conceived as "a vast representamen" that "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs"--has two objects and three interpretants, but I did not attempt to sort them out in that post ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-10/msg00204.html). The immediate object is *internal *to the sign, the object as represented *in that sign*, while the dynamical object is *external *to the sign, the object as it is *in itself*. The immediate interpretant is *internal *to the sign, the interpretant as represented *in that sign*, while the dynamical interpretant is any *actual *effect of that sign and the final interpretant is the *ideal* effect of that sign. I have my own opinions about the external correlates in the case of the entire universe, but they tend to be controversial and are not essential to the topic of *this * thread. GF: If those two suggestions don’t work, perhaps you can propose some other general principle that we can salvage from this failure of communication. At the risk of belaboring the point, the most salient general principle here is that we can *only *discuss objects and interpretants in relation to a *particular *sign. In other words, the first step of semeiotic analysis is always demarcating the sign of interest by prescinding it from the continuous process of semiosis, thus marking it off as an *ens rationis*. Only then can we examine that quasi-individual sign to apprehend its immediate object and interpretant, from which we attempt to identify what dynamical object it is denoting and understand what *about *that object it is signifying. Again, the dynamical interpretant is any *actual *effect of the sign of interest, while the final interpretant is its *ideal *effect. Accordingly, semeiotic is a *normative *science in the sense that the *aim* of every interpreter of a given sign *ought *to be correctly recognizing its dynamical object *and *conforming one's dynamical interpretant to its final interpretant. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 8:08 AM wrote: > Jon AS, > > Evidently the two 1906 texts we’ve been discussing got fused or “welded” > in my quasi-mind. And meanwhile the sign you had uttered failed to fulfill > its function because the minds of utterer and interpreter were not fused > into a *commens* “at the outset” (EP2:478). I was thinking that my > top-down approach to these issues (based loosely on the “connected signs > theorem” and your post on “Semiosic Synechism”) would turn out to be > complementary to your bottom-up approach in this thread, analogous to the > complementary views of light as waves and/or particles, but I guess that > doesn’t
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Gary F, list, That was slightly opaque, but, yes, exactly that - of the language/language-using "bodymind" being united within the process of semiosis (the unity/binding of substances in/through language more generally). Thanks Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Friday, October 29, 2021 12:33 PM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts Jack, I’m not sure what you mean by “consubstantiality” — maybe the language and the language-using bodymind being of the same substance, or the same kind of agency? Peirce does seem to assert that, and I’ve applied the idea in my book, but I don’t know that it’s scientifically testable. When I said that the object was the “key constituent of the commens”, I meant that it’s the one on which attention is focussed consciously. The shared language has to be functioning implicitly. We don’t think about the the grammatical principles which govern what we say while we are saying it. But I guess that was an infelicitous way of expressing the idea. Gary f. From: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Sent: 28-Oct-21 13:42 To: 'Peirce-L' ; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts Gary F, List, Hi Gary, I'm not sure what prompted the current topic, but I think that when discussing dialogism and Peirce we come closest to the most pragmatic frame of reference which it is possible to establish within a Peircean framework. GF: It is therefore the object, and not the shared language, that is the key constituent of the commens, “that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place.” Whilst I agree with this quite broadly, I would just like to prod you a little. My own reading suggests that it is a mixture of the two (a basically dialectical relationship between shared language and Object) which is the "key constituent of the commens". That is, imagine the Saussurean langue for a moment and take it as unideal - as asymmetrical. If our means of decoding a "shared" language vary according to unique, though overlapping, contextual conditions (collateral experience) which surround the acquisition of language, then there is scope within Saussure's framework for the role of a Peircean object. I wonder, also, what your thoughts are regarding consubstantiality -- of language as volitional movement which seeks to index objective relations which are never, or quite rarely, contained within language itself? Interesting topic which dovetails nicely with some of my own research right now. Best Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Jon AS,
Evidently the two 1906 texts we’ve been discussing got fused or “welded” in my
quasi-mind. And meanwhile the sign you had uttered failed to fulfill its
function because the minds of utterer and interpreter were not fused into a
commens “at the outset” (EP2:478). I was thinking that my top-down approach to
these issues (based loosely on the “connected signs theorem” and your post on
“Semiosic Synechism”) would turn out to be complementary to your bottom-up
approach in this thread, analogous to the complementary views of light as waves
and/or particles, but I guess that doesn’t work.
Let me try to extract a principle or two from this failure so that I can learn
something from it.
JAS: … the uttered sign … is clearly a token in this context, not a type. As
such, it is an individual sign that determines an individual dynamical
interpretant in the individual quasi-mind that is the quasi-interpreter, which
is what I sometimes call an individual event of semiosis.
GF: Can we generalize from this to say that only an individual sign (i.e. a
discrete and existing sign, a token or sinsign) has three interpretants? That
would explain why your “Semiosic Synechism” post only mentions one interpretant
of the “one sign” that results “if any signs are connected, no matter how.” Is
this another consequence of the connected signs theorem?
If so, could we also say that only an individual sign has two objects
(immediate and dynamic), while the one sign which is a semiosic "perfect
continuum" has only one? I’m referring here to this (from your Semiosic
Synechism post):
JAS: Therefore, the entire universe as a vast argument is not a static sign
that is built up of discrete propositions that are built up of discrete names,
it is an ongoing inferential process--a semiosic "perfect continuum" (CP 4.642,
1908), whose "material parts" are its connected constituent signs including all
"external representations" (CP 6.174, 1908). In other words, it is "top-down"
such that the whole is real and the parts are entia rationis, rather than
"bottom-up" such that the parts are real and the whole is an ens rationis.
GF: If those two suggestions don’t work, perhaps you can propose some other
general principle that we can salvage from this failure of communication.
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 28-Oct-21 15:54
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting
texts
Gary F., List:
GF: Peirce does not say in CP 4.551 that the two minds are welded in the
uttered sign itself.
JAS: To what other sign could he be referring in that passage?
GF: I’ll quote the entire passage below, but first we have to resolve the
ambiguity introduced with the term "uttered sign."
You did not quote CP 4.551, you quoted EP 2:478. Here is the actual referenced
passage.
CSP: We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a
sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a
Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign.
Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a
Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in
the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so
to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a
necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic.
(CP 4.551, 1906)
As I said yesterday, paraphrasing the third and fourth quoted sentences, every
sign has a quasi-utterer and a quasi-interpreter, and those two quasi-minds are
at one in the sign itself--namely, the specific sign that is uttered by the
quasi-utterer and interpreted by the quasi-interpreter. This is what I mean by
the uttered sign, and there really is no ambiguity--it is clearly a token in
this context, not a type. As such, it is an individual sign that determines an
individual dynamical interpretant in the individual quasi-mind that is the
quasi-interpreter, which is what I sometimes call an individual event of
semiosis. Here is Peirce's description earlier in the same article
("Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism").
CSP: A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that
one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any
one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring
just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a
single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. (CP
4.537)
Nevertheless, exactly how we mark off each of these individual constituents of
semiosis is a somewhat arbitrary artifact of the analysis because the real
process is continuous. For example, what we are currently discussing is a
single reading of a single text, which obviously
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Jack, I'm not sure what you mean by "consubstantiality" - maybe the language and the language-using bodymind being of the same substance, or the same kind of agency? Peirce does seem to assert that, and I've applied the idea in my book, but I don't know that it's scientifically testable. When I said that the object was the "key constituent of the commens", I meant that it's the one on which attention is focussed consciously. The shared language has to be functioning implicitly. We don't think about the the grammatical principles which govern what we say while we are saying it. But I guess that was an infelicitous way of expressing the idea. Gary f. From: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Sent: 28-Oct-21 13:42 To: 'Peirce-L' ; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts Gary F, List, Hi Gary, I'm not sure what prompted the current topic, but I think that when discussing dialogism and Peirce we come closest to the most pragmatic frame of reference which it is possible to establish within a Peircean framework. GF: It is therefore the object, and not the shared language, that is the key constituent of the commens, "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place." Whilst I agree with this quite broadly, I would just like to prod you a little. My own reading suggests that it is a mixture of the two (a basically dialectical relationship between shared language and Object) which is the "key constituent of the commens". That is, imagine the Saussurean langue for a moment and take it as unideal - as asymmetrical. If our means of decoding a "shared" language vary according to unique, though overlapping, contextual conditions (collateral experience) which surround the acquisition of language, then there is scope within Saussure's framework for the role of a Peircean object. I wonder, also, what your thoughts are regarding consubstantiality -- of language as volitional movement which seeks to index objective relations which are never, or quite rarely, contained within language itself? Interesting topic which dovetails nicely with some of my own research right now. Best Jack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
