Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Vinicius, List:

Thanks for the additional explanations. I see now that holisigns and
altersigns fit into a phaneroscopic analysis in accordance with Robert
Marty's podium diagram (
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338449971_The_podium_of_the_categories-final
).

[image: image.png]


There are genuine qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2), and legisigns (3);
degenerate altersigns (1/2) and replicas (2/3); and doubly degenerate
holisigns (1/2/3).

VR: If a representamen has firstness for its final interpretant, it's
categorial destiny is sealed.


Again, what exactly does it mean to say that "a representamen has 1ns [or
2ns or 3ns] for its final interpretant"? Perhaps an example of each would
be helpful.

VR: They have different classification principles, though.


I agree, but would appreciate some further elaboration. As I have already
discussed in this thread, while qualisign/sinsign/legisign are three
classes such that each sign is assigned to exactly one of them, I see
tone/token/type as three "dimensions" of the same sign. The sign itself is
a continuum, its types are its continuous portions of the same
dimensionality as definitely significant forms, its tokens are its discrete
embodiments of lower dimensionality that conform to those types, and its
tones are indefinitely significant characters possessed by those tokens.

VR: The first uses degenerations, the second does not and by choosing so
Peirce had to deal with a much longer array of aspects.


Where I see degeneracy in the later taxonomies is in the initial
identification of two objects and three interpretants for each sign.
Referencing Robert's podium diagram again, we have the genuine sign (1),
dynamical object (2), and final interpretant (3); the degenerate immediate
object (1/2) and dynamical interpretant (2/3); and the doubly degenerate
immediate interpretant (1/2/3). Notice that the three genuine correlates
are the ones in the genuine *triadic *relation of representing or mediating.

Here the podium diagram reflects other important aspects, as well. The
immediate object (1/2) and immediate interpretant (1/2/3) are *internal *to
the sign (1), while the dynamical object (2), dynamical interpretant (2/3),
and final interpretant (3) are *external *to the sign (1). That is why each
of the latter three correlates has a *dyadic *relation with the sign,
unlike the first two. The dynamical object (2) determines the immediate
object (1/2), and the final interpretant (3) determines the dynamical
interpretant (2/3), which determines the immediate interpretant
(1/2/3)--not as efficient causes, just in terms of the logical order of
trichotomies where "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a
Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481,
1908). This is another reason why I maintain that "the Destinate
Interpretant" is the final interpretant, not the immediate interpretant.

VR: Speculative Grammar is not easy.


I strongly agree. :-)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 8, 2021 at 3:12 PM Vinicius Romanini  wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> Joh, I agree with (almost) everything you say about the final
> interpretant. My take here is purely logical (and categoriological).
> If a representamen has firstness for its final interpretant, it's
> categorial destiny is sealed. It might have an endless series of dynamic
> interpretants but nothing would change the fact that whichever final
> interpretant it might have in the end, if and when the end of semiosis
> comes, its categorical nature would be a first. If we deny that, then its
> final interpretant was not a first to begin with. I am of the opinion that
> signs eventually do have final interpretants, for even an endless series
> can converge to a final state (at least for all practical purposes).
>
> The immediate interpretant is, for me, the sign's interpretability. If it
> is a symbol, the immediate interpretant is its comprehension - or whatever
> is well known about its object at the outset of semiosis.
> If we strip all meaning and focus on a general representamen, the
> immediate interpretant is just the schema of time, or the continuous
> predicate that grounds all sorts of predication.
>
> Self-control in semiosis (I call it semiostasis) is indeed a property of
> final interpretants (if they are thirdness), but also of the dyadic
> relation between the sign and the final interpretant, and also of the
> aspect of the triadic relation among sign, dynamic object and final
> interpretant. Whenever generality and final interpretants are involved in
> the aspects of the sign, we have some sort of self-control. An argument is
> the highest example for it has a leading principle controlling its
> development, which gives its assurance.
>
> I had never thought of holisigns being gratific types and altersigns being
> gratific 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

Thanks for sharing some additional thoughts on this topic. The linked note
obviously presupposes Peirce's 1903 taxonomy that has only three
trichotomies and ten classes, rather than the later ones that have six
trichotomies (for all the correlates) and 28 classes, or ten trichotomies
(for all the correlates and their external relations) and 66 classes. It
also seems to equate "token" with "replica," but I suggest that "token" is
more closely synonymous with "sinsign," while "instance" is what replaces
"replica" (CP 4.537, 1906).

Personally, I am inclined to view all sinsigns/tokens as replicas/instances
of legisigns/types, but others disagree. I suggest accordingly that what
the conclusion lists are the six kinds of replica/instance, rather than the
six kinds of sinsign/token. After all, there are three *additional *kinds
of sinsign/token that are not listed, which correspond to the outermost
oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical
sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 8, 2021 at 12:21 PM robert marty 
wrote:

> Contribution with a note on Signs, Types and Tokens.
>
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356001421_Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>  or https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>
> Abstract
>
> In the Peircean Semiotics, there is certain confusion on the
> terminological level as on the semantic one on the distinctions or the
> formal equivalences of the terms: signs, type, token to which one can add,
> instance, graph, graph-Instance, replica, graph-replica, and probably still
> others... These confusions can lead, as Peirce underlines it, to "*Imaginary
> distinctions which are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in
> their mode of expression"*; but with "*wrangling which ensues real enough*"
> (CP 5.398) and even to "*to mistake the sensation produced by our own
> unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking"*
> (CP 5.398). This short note proposes unifying this sector of knowledge of
> Peirce's work around his ten classes of signs and the relations of
> embodiment they maintain. It is proved that there can only be six kinds of
> tokens and only six, relying only on his use of the term "replica" in his
> definitions of the classes of signs.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Robert Marty
>
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Vinicius Romanini]

Jon, list

Joh, I agree with (almost) everything you say about the final interpretant.
My take here is purely logical (and categoriological).
If a representamen has firstness for its final interpretant, it's
categorial destiny is sealed. It might have an endless series of dynamic
interpretants but nothing would change the fact that whichever final
interpretant it might have in the end, if and when the end of semiosis
comes, its categorical nature would be a first. If we deny that, then its
final interpretant was not a first to begin with. I am of the opinion that
signs eventually do have final interpretants, for even an endless series
can converge to a final state (at least for all practical purposes).

The immediate interpretant is, for me, the sign's interpretability. If it
is a symbol, the immediate interpretant is its comprehension - or whatever
is well known about its object at the outset of semiosis.
If we strip all meaning and focus on a general representamen, the immediate
interpretant is just the schema of time, or the continuous predicate that
grounds all sorts of predication.

Self-control in semiosis (I call it semiostasis) is indeed a property of
final interpretants (if they are thirdness), but also of the dyadic
relation between the sign and the final interpretant, and also of the
aspect of the triadic relation among sign, dynamic object and final
interpretant. Whenever generality and final interpretants are involved in
the aspects of the sign, we have some sort of self-control. An argument is
the highest example for it has a leading principle controlling its
development, which gives its assurance.

I had never thought of holisigns being gratific types and altersigns being
gratific tokens. You are probably right.
I think that holisigns and altersings would work for the 1903
classification and gratific types and gratific tokens for the 1908
classification. They have different classification principles, though. The
first uses degenerations, the second does not and by choosing so Peirce had
to deal with a much longer array of aspects.

Speculative Grammar is not easy.

All the best,
Vinicius

Em seg., 8 de nov. de 2021 às 15:21, robert marty 
escreveu:

> Contribution with a note on Signs, Types and Tokens.
>
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356001421_Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>  or https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>
> Abstract
>
> In the Peircean Semiotics, there is certain confusion on the
> terminological level as on the semantic one on the distinctions or the
> formal equivalences of the terms: signs, type, token to which one can add,
> instance, graph, graph-Instance, replica, graph-replica, and probably still
> others... These confusions can lead, as Peirce underlines it, to "*Imaginary
> distinctions which are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in
> their mode of expression"*; but with "*wrangling which ensues real enough*"
> (CP 5.398) and even to "*to mistake the sensation produced by our own
> unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking"*
> (CP 5.398). This short note proposes unifying this sector of knowledge of
> Peirce's work around his ten classes of signs and the relations of
> embodiment they maintain. It is proved that there can only be six kinds of
> tokens and only six, relying only on his use of the term "replica" in his
> definitions of the classes of signs.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Robert Marty
>
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
>
>
> Le lun. 8 nov. 2021 à 00:50, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> a écrit :
>
>> Vinicius, Jack, List:
>>
>> VR: My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
>>
>>
>> I appreciate this acknowledgment, and I would say the same about my own
>> approach to speculative grammar.
>>
>> VR: I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant, which
>> is the sign as it is destined to be interpreted.
>>
>>
>> I agree that we must take the final interpretant into account, but I
>> understand it to be how the sign *would be* interpreted under *ideal 
>> *circumstances,
>> in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.
>> Any *actual* interpretation of the sign is a *dynamical *interpretant,
>> and the final interpretant might never *actually *come about. It is
>> "final" in the sense of a *final cause* (and "normal" in the sense of
>> *normative*), not the *last *interpretant in a logical or temporal
>> sequence. That said, your use of "destined" here is consistent with my
>> understanding that "the Destinate Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908) is the 
>> *final
>> *interpretant, not the *immediate *interpretant as some scholars claim,
>> including Tony Jappy. Just curious, what is your view on this?
>>
>> VR: A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the
>> representamen but 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: It’s lacking an object. It doesn’t represent anything. The
performance *interprets
*the score but doesn’t *represent *it; it simply presents itself.


I honestly do not see how the performance can be accurately described as
interpreting the score *without *representing it. A performance that
"simply presents itself" is not an interpretation of something else. In
this case, the performance is a dynamical interpretant of the score--its
meaning on that occasion, an *existential *meaning that carries with
it an *emotional
*meaning. The theoretical question is whether the otherwise continuous
process of semiosis *terminates *with such a dynamical interpretant, such
that there is a *discontinuity*. It seems to me that the synechistic answer
is instead to treat the performance as another sign token with its own
dynamical interpretants in the minds of those who hear it.

GF: When we drop the distinction between sound and music, each sound is a
percept without a perceptual judgment.


As I said before, every sound consists of the compression and decompression
of air molecules, which impinge on our eardrums and thereby prompt nerve
impulses to our brains. I consider these all to be sign tokens whose
dynamical object is the action that produces them, in this case a musician
playing an instrument. It is an example of what I mean by *degenerate
*semiosis,
a series of material/physical phenomena that is analytically reducible to
dyadic relations--between each dynamical object (as cause) and sign token
(as effect), and between each sign token (as cause) and dynamical
interpretant (as effect)--rather than being a *genuine *triadic relation of
mediation that is *not *reducible in this way.

GF: Percepts are signs for psychology, but not for phenomenology.


What each listener's mind perceives is a dynamical interpretant of all
those connected sign tokens, so the theoretical question is whether that
percept is a sign *for semeiotic*, i.e., another sign token with the same
dynamical object. Again, it seems to me that the synechistic answer is yes,
such that the subsequent effect on the listener is a dynamical interpretant
of the percept--and by extension, another dynamical interpretant of the
sound.

GF: John Cage’s intention was to make unintended music, to make available
an experience uncorrupted by interpretation.


Frankly, that notion strikes me as self-contradictory. If the performance
fulfills the composer's intention of making "unintended music," then I see
it as a sign token whose dynamical object is that very intention and/or the
individual intentions of the performers, as in the case of improvisation.
Moreover, it seems to me that whether a particular experience of the music
is "unreplaced by any interpretation" is primarily up to the interpreter
rather than the composer or the performers, because it requires "that rare
faculty, the faculty of seeing what stares one in the face, just as it
presents itself" (CP 5.42, EP 2:147, 1903).

GF: It’s an affirmation that nature is not an artifice ... I wouldn’t feel
at home in an artificial universe. I gather that you (and Peirce?) do, and
maybe this gets close to the core of the differences between us in how we
experience the world.


Probably so, although "artifice" and "artificial" typically imply
*human *agency
in which something is made out of previously existing materials. What I
affirm instead (with Peirce) is that nature is a *creation*, and I
personally would not feel at home in an *uncreated *universe.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 8, 2021 at 5:37 AM  wrote:

> GF: I would say that the [John Cage] score, the set of instructions for
> the performers, was a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or
> sequence of sounds) was a sign.
>
> JAS: Why not? What essential aspect of the definition of "sign" was it
> lacking?
>
> GF: It’s lacking an object. It doesn’t represent anything. The performance
> *interprets* the score but doesn’t *represent* it; it simply presents
> itself. When we drop the distinction between sound and music, each sound is
> a percept without a perceptual judgment. Refraining from perceptual
> judgments is a phenomenological practice, I suppose, a way of prescinding
> the Secondness from the Thirdness of a phenomenon. Percepts are signs for
> psychology, but not for phenomenology. I see it as a meditative practice as
> well. John Cage’s intention was to make unintended music, to make available
> an experience uncorrupted by interpretation. It’s an affirmation that
> nature is not an artifice — which is what it must be *if it has a
> narrator who deliberately selects which events to actualize within it in
> accordance with a purpose.*
>
> I wouldn’t feel at home in an artificial universe. I gather that you (and
> Peirce?) do, and maybe this gets close to the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[robert marty]

Contribution with a note on Signs, Types and Tokens.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356001421_Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
 or https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens

Abstract

In the Peircean Semiotics, there is certain confusion on the terminological
level as on the semantic one on the distinctions or the formal equivalences
of the terms: signs, type, token to which one can add, instance, graph,
graph-Instance, replica, graph-replica, and probably still others... These
confusions can lead, as Peirce underlines it, to "*Imaginary distinctions
which are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of
expression"*; but with "*wrangling which ensues real enough*" (CP 5.398)
and even to "*to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of
thought for a character of the object we are thinking"* (CP 5.398). This
short note proposes unifying this sector of knowledge of Peirce's work
around his ten classes of signs and the relations of embodiment they
maintain. It is proved that there can only be six kinds of tokens and only
six, relying only on his use of the term "replica" in his definitions of
the classes of signs.

Best regards,

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le lun. 8 nov. 2021 à 00:50, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Vinicius, Jack, List:
>
> VR: My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
>
>
> I appreciate this acknowledgment, and I would say the same about my own
> approach to speculative grammar.
>
> VR: I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant, which is
> the sign as it is destined to be interpreted.
>
>
> I agree that we must take the final interpretant into account, but I
> understand it to be how the sign *would be* interpreted under *ideal 
> *circumstances,
> in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.
> Any *actual* interpretation of the sign is a *dynamical *interpretant,
> and the final interpretant might never *actually *come about. It is
> "final" in the sense of a *final cause* (and "normal" in the sense of
> *normative*), not the *last *interpretant in a logical or temporal
> sequence. That said, your use of "destined" here is consistent with my
> understanding that "the Destinate Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908) is the *final
> *interpretant, not the *immediate *interpretant as some scholars claim,
> including Tony Jappy. Just curious, what is your view on this?
>
> VR: A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the
> representamen but secondness for the final interpretant.
>
>
> When you say that a replica has "secondness for the final interpretant,"
> are you referring to the trichotomy "According to the Purpose of the
> Eventual Interpretant" such that for a replica (instance) it is "To produce
> action," while for a genuine legisign (type) it is "To produce
> self-control" (EP 2:490, 1908)? If so, then it seems to me that a
> "holisign" is a gratific type and an "altersign" is a gratific token. Is
> that right? If so, then why introduce the new terminology? If not, then
> what *does *it mean for a sign to "have" 1ns/2ns/3ns "for the final
> interpretant"?
>
> JRKC: I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little.
> Perhaps delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to
> be, and then how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament"
> and "firstness for the final interpretant"?
>
>
> As Vinicius already explained, "degenerate" is adapted from the concept in
> geometry of projecting a figure of a certain dimensionality to produce a
> figure of lower dimensionality, like a solid object's shadow on a surface
> when a light is shining on it. In this context, what I take him to be
> saying is that since a legisign (type) is a necessitant (3rd universe)
> according to the mode of apprehension of the sign itself, a *genuine *legisign
> (type) is also a necessitant according to the purpose of its final
> interpretant (to produce self-control), while a *degenerate *legisign
> (type) is instead an existent (2nd universe) or a possible (1st universe)
> in that respect (to produce action or gratific). I invite his correction if
> I am misunderstanding him.
>
> JRKC: I often read the discourse on this list and wonder if contributors
> shouldn't have to furnish practical analogies in order to clarify their use
> of terms, because trying to ground some of these concepts is not easy when
> everyone seems to be using a similar code with different meanings in
> various places.
>
>
> I understand the difficulty, and I apologize for contributing to it.
> Unfortunately, as you can probably tell, I tend to be a very abstract
> thinker and honestly have a hard time translating ideas and terminology
> that are clear within my own mind into concrete analogies and 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

[gnox]

GF: I would say that the [John Cage] score, the set of instructions for the 
performers, was a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or 
sequence of sounds) was a sign.

JAS: Why not? What essential aspect of the definition of "sign" was it lacking?

GF: It’s lacking an object. It doesn’t represent anything. The performance 
interprets the score but doesn’t represent it; it simply presents itself. When 
we drop the distinction between sound and music, each sound is a percept 
without a perceptual judgment. Refraining from perceptual judgments is a 
phenomenological practice, I suppose, a way of prescinding the Secondness from 
the Thirdness of a phenomenon. Percepts are signs for psychology, but not for 
phenomenology. I see it as a meditative practice as well. John Cage’s intention 
was to make unintended music, to make available an experience uncorrupted by 
interpretation. It’s an affirmation that nature is not an artifice — which is 
what it must be if it has a narrator who deliberately selects which events to 
actualize within it in accordance with a purpose.

I wouldn’t feel at home in an artificial universe. I gather that you (and 
Peirce?) do, and maybe this gets close to the core of the differences between 
us in how we experience the world. I appreciate the signs of signlessness 
 , as some Buddhists call it. (Maybe my 
unintentional white-on-white text betrays that!)

Gary f. 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 7-Nov-21 16:48
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or 
argument?

 

Gary F., List:

 

FYI, your post once again had some white-on-white text, which I have fixed 
below.

 

GF: A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is 
not necessarily meaningful in any way.

JAS: On the contrary, a narrative is a sign, and every sign is "meaningful" ...

GF: Nothing “contrary” here; a narrative is a representation, and a 
representation is a sign. Its dynamic object is a sequence of events, and that 
object (unlike the sign) is not necessarily meaningful in any way.

 

Here we have a clear example of a misinterpretation on my part--specifically, I 
misidentified the dynamical object of a sign because I misunderstood its 
immediate object. I incorrectly took the referent of the pronoun "which" to be 
"representation," so I misread your statement as, "A narrative is basically a 
representation which is not necessarily meaningful in any way." That is why I 
replied by insisting that every sign is meaningful. It turns out that you 
intended the referent of the pronoun "which" to be "sequence of events," so I 
should have read your statement as, "A narrative is basically a representation 
whose object is a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any 
way." On this, we are in agreement, since a sequence of events is not 
necessarily meaningful in itself--only by virtue of a sign about it that 
determines an interpretant, which is the meaning of that sign.

 

GF: Point a camera out a window, set it to record for an hour, go off and do 
something else, and when you return you’ll have an hour-long visual narrative 
in which no events are selected or treated as significant. Only the point of 
view and the time frame was deliberately selected.

 

Except that by deliberately selecting "the point of view and the time frame," 
one is deliberately selecting only those events that occur within the camera's 
field of view during that time frame for inclusion in the resulting visual 
narrative, thus ignoring any and all events that occur elsewhere and/or outside 
that time frame--i.e., treating the latter as insignificant relative to one's 
purpose in making the recording. In other words, I am having a hard time 
imagining anything qualifying as a narrative that is not "deliberately 
constructed" to at least this minimal extent.

 

GF: The same would apply to a recording of a concert of aleatory music: it 
represents a sequence of sonic events which can be meaningless in themselves.

 

It seems to me that this defines "meaning" too narrowly. For Peirce, any effect 
of any sign is its "meaning," namely, its interpretant. The compression and 
decompression of air molecules that constitute those "sonic events" are an 
"existential meaning"--a dynamical interpretant--of the sign token that is the 
musicians' actual performance, which is itself a dynamical interpretant of the 
score as another sign token, even if it consists only of verbal instructions 
rather than the conventional marks on a staff that convey specific notes to be 
played.

 

GF: I would say that the score, the set of instructions for the performers, was 
a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or sequence of sounds) was 
a sign.

 

Why not? What essential aspect of the definition of "sign" was it lacking?

 

GF: Some of my favorite music is,