Contribution with a note on Signs, Types and Tokens. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356001421_Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens or https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
Abstract In the Peircean Semiotics, there is certain confusion on the terminological level as on the semantic one on the distinctions or the formal equivalences of the terms: signs, type, token to which one can add, instance, graph, graph-Instance, replica, graph-replica, and probably still others... These confusions can lead, as Peirce underlines it, to "*Imaginary distinctions which are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression"*; but with "*wrangling which ensues real enough*" (CP 5.398) and even to "*to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking"* (CP 5.398). This short note proposes unifying this sector of knowledge of Peirce's work around his ten classes of signs and the relations of embodiment they maintain. It is proved that there can only be six kinds of tokens and only six, relying only on his use of the term "replica" in his definitions of the classes of signs. Best regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le lun. 8 nov. 2021 à 00:50, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> a écrit : > Vinicius, Jack, List: > > VR: My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's. > > > I appreciate this acknowledgment, and I would say the same about my own > approach to speculative grammar. > > VR: I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant, which is > the sign as it is destined to be interpreted. > > > I agree that we must take the final interpretant into account, but I > understand it to be how the sign *would be* interpreted under *ideal > *circumstances, > in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. > Any *actual* interpretation of the sign is a *dynamical *interpretant, > and the final interpretant might never *actually *come about. It is > "final" in the sense of a *final cause* (and "normal" in the sense of > *normative*), not the *last *interpretant in a logical or temporal > sequence. That said, your use of "destined" here is consistent with my > understanding that "the Destinate Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908) is the *final > *interpretant, not the *immediate *interpretant as some scholars claim, > including Tony Jappy. Just curious, what is your view on this? > > VR: A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the > representamen but secondness for the final interpretant. > > > When you say that a replica has "secondness for the final interpretant," > are you referring to the trichotomy "According to the Purpose of the > Eventual Interpretant" such that for a replica (instance) it is "To produce > action," while for a genuine legisign (type) it is "To produce > self-control" (EP 2:490, 1908)? If so, then it seems to me that a > "holisign" is a gratific type and an "altersign" is a gratific token. Is > that right? If so, then why introduce the new terminology? If not, then > what *does *it mean for a sign to "have" 1ns/2ns/3ns "for the final > interpretant"? > > JRKC: I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little. > Perhaps delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to > be, and then how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament" > and "firstness for the final interpretant"? > > > As Vinicius already explained, "degenerate" is adapted from the concept in > geometry of projecting a figure of a certain dimensionality to produce a > figure of lower dimensionality, like a solid object's shadow on a surface > when a light is shining on it. In this context, what I take him to be > saying is that since a legisign (type) is a necessitant (3rd universe) > according to the mode of apprehension of the sign itself, a *genuine *legisign > (type) is also a necessitant according to the purpose of its final > interpretant (to produce self-control), while a *degenerate *legisign > (type) is instead an existent (2nd universe) or a possible (1st universe) > in that respect (to produce action or gratific). I invite his correction if > I am misunderstanding him. > > JRKC: I often read the discourse on this list and wonder if contributors > shouldn't have to furnish practical analogies in order to clarify their use > of terms, because trying to ground some of these concepts is not easy when > everyone seems to be using a similar code with different meanings in > various places. > > > I understand the difficulty, and I apologize for contributing to it. > Unfortunately, as you can probably tell, I tend to be a very abstract > thinker and honestly have a hard time translating ideas and terminology > that are clear within my own mind into concrete analogies and examples for > effective communication to other minds. > > VR: When we look at a painting by Pollock for the first time, we cognize > patterns that produce feelings for their final interpretant. > > > Again, in my view, those *actual *feelings are by definition a *dynamical* > interpretant. They are only a *final *interpretant if they happen to be > the very same feelings that *would be* produced under *ideal *circumstances. > As we have discussed recently on the List, such conformity of a dynamical > interpretant to the final interpretant is any sincere inquirer's *proper > aim* when interpreting any sign. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 5:10 PM Vinicius Romanini <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jack, list >> >> The concept of degeneration comes from projective geometry. It does not >> carry any moral judgement. You can degenerate a tridimensional figure by >> projecting it on a plane, and then further degenerate it by projection on a >> line. Something similar happens when we apply the categories. >> >> A legisign can be seen as a general rule that ought to be applied when we >> generate its replicas. Any word, considered as a representamen, is a >> legisign, or general sign. Whenever and wherever we use it, we generate one >> of its replicas and by doing so we degenerate it from thirdness (general) >> to secondness (its instantiation in space and time). >> >> If we didn't have the Rosetta Stone to decipher the ancient Egyptian, >> every single carved hieroglyph would still be a replica of its legisign. >> It's symbolic nature would be buried though, maybe forever. >> >> Now, a particular hieroglyph before your (a replica) is a cognizable >> pattern that is destined to become a brute fact of your experience. It has >> existence as its final interpretant. In fact, any replica of a legisign is >> cognized as a pattern (a thirdness) that is destined to become a past >> memory of our experience (a secondness). >> >> Legisigns do not end as past memories of particular minds. As generals, >> their final interpretants are all the general possible memories, or >> sensations, that would or could be produced by a community of possible >> interpreters. Its final nature is the esse in futuro. >> >> In the same vein, holosigns are cognizable patterns (thirdness) that are >> destined to become feelings (firstness), maybe even non-conscious ones. >> When we look at a painting by Pollock for the first time, we cognize >> patterns that produce feelings for their final interpretant. If we >> encounter it for a second time, then we might feel the experience of a >> replica, and the effect of memorization is stronger than the original >> effect of musement. >> >> Well, maybe things are now more complicated than when we started. Sorry >> for that. >> >> Vinicius >> >> On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 10:53 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Vincinius, List, >>> >>> *VR*: I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness >>> for the representamen but firstness for the final interpretant. >>> I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little. >>> Perhaps delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to >>> be, and then how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament" >>> and "firstness for the final interpretant"? >>> >>> This is an idiosyncratic request on my part, but lately my mind has been >>> awash with abstract terminology. I often read the discourse on this list >>> and wonder if contributors shouldn't have to furnish practical analogies in >>> order to clarify their use of terms, because trying to ground some of these >>> concepts is not easy when everyone seems to be using a similar code with >>> different meanings in various places. >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Jack >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> >>> on behalf of Vinicius Romanini <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Saturday, November 6, 2021 3:37 PM >>> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >>> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens >>> >>> Dear colleagues, >>> >>> This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions >>> for a while now. >>> My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's. >>> Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than >>> post or ante Peircean, anyway. >>> >>> I will restrict my comment to sign qua sign, or the proper >>> representamen. In my opinion, a truly pragmatic account of signhood must >>> consider not only how the sign is perceived but also how it ought to be >>> experienced in the long run. I mean that we must take into account the >>> final interpretant, which is the sign as it is destined to be interpreted. >>> >>> Roughly, >>> A genuine qualisign has firstness both for the representamen and the >>> final interpretant. >>> A genuine sinsign has secondness both for the representamen and the >>> final interpretant. >>> A genuine legising has thirdness both for the representamen and the >>> final interpretant. >>> >>> I think the above is plain. >>> >>> A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the >>> representamen but secondness for the final interpretant. Replicas are well >>> understood too. >>> >>> I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the >>> representamen but firstness for the final interpretant. >>> I call altersings those degenerate sinsigns that have secondness for the >>> representamen but firstness for the final interpretant. >>> >>> Holisigns are ephemeral patterns. They are patterns but tend to dissolve >>> in experience as qualitative effects. A dune might be seen as a holisign as >>> its shape continuously changes until it vanishes. The melody of jazz music >>> is another example. If you gaze at the clouds in the sky, holisigns will >>> appear in a multitude of changing patterns. A wave in itself is a holisign. >>> General qualities, such as temperature, are holisigns. >>> >>> Altersigns are gentle signs of otherness. They do not have the lasting >>> friction and brute forte of sinsigns. They pop up in perception but >>> dissolve themselves as possibilities. Altersings are instantiations of >>> holisigns as much as sinsigns are instantiations of legisigns. >>> What we perceive of a holisign at any moment is an altersign. It is any >>> alternative configuration of a pattern, if you want. The perceived feeling >>> of a temperature is an altersign. In fact, it is the embodiment of the >>> holisign. >>> >>> Holisings and altersigns are very important to the semeiotic of art. >>> >>> I believe these distinctions are important for the grounding and >>> presentation of the representamen. Others will be necessary if we go up >>> towards representation and communication. Such considerations that can >>> help render semeiotic intelligible and useful, at least as I understand it. >>> >>> All the best, >>> Vinicius >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
