Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places. JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device." JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas" ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html). JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the other, please let us know. Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Gary, Jon, List, > > My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous > notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.). > > My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the words > 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word pulled > out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark. But some > words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. > They are certainly not memorable. > > Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible > mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word > for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more > often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. > > But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the > triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research to the > issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are > more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the > street). > > And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in > logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for > publications. There are even more lecture slides. (Copies upon request.) > > But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the > future. The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, > and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, > find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone. I discovered that > point while talking to them. That is not a scientific survey, but I could > not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word > 'tone'. > > If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) > one way or the other, please let us know. > > John > > -- > *From*: "Gary Richmond" > List, > > While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as > it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his > reminded me that the principal issue being considered has *not *been resolved > unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, > completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the 'tone' > v. 'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has and, so, > there's no need for further
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical *fallacy*". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an influential figure is used as evidence to support an argument" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority). Quoting a dictionary or encyclopedia--including Wikipedia, as in this case--is *not *a fallacious appeal to authority because such references contain *facts *on which there is broad consensus, not *opinions *whose persuasiveness depends primarily on the eminence and purported expertise of a particular person who holds them. JFS: The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the author's. JFS: In fact, when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Quoting Peirce to support scholarly claims about *his own views* is also not a fallacious appeal to authority. On the contrary, as I have said before, his is the *only *authority that matters in such a context. As someone once said, "Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00085.html). JFS: The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a *term*. Obviously, all these English words *are *terms--no one is disputing that. The issue here is whether they *signify *a certain kind of term. As defined by Peirce in Baldwin's dictionary, that is *precisely *what "mark" signifies; but as defined by Peirce in the various passages that I have repeatedly cited and quoted, that is *not at all* what "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign" signify. JFS: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. I have not accused anyone of anything, nor have I claimed that anyone is making a mistake. I have simply spelled out *Peirce's *relevant views, as amply supported by exact quotations. Besides, as someone once said, "we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00089.html)--not treat it as an accusation. JFS: If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. I have not criticized anyone for believing that "mark" is a better choice than "tone" for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type," even though I strongly disagree. On the contrary, I have explicitly stated more than once that anyone is welcome to hold that opinion and make a case for it. Nevertheless, as I have also stated more than once, no one can accurately claim that it was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, Gary, List, > > First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical > *fallacy".* > > Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an > encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to > cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are > *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their > own claims. In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are > appealing to him as an authority. Of course, everybody is fallible, even > authorities. But rejection of an authority requires some evidence. > > Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted > below): "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever > it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to > say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one > term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or > things can be predicated". > > The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in > exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a *term*. Whatever those > terms may be predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated. > Therefore, the word 'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone' > or
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Gary, Jon, List, My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.). My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark. But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research to the issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the street). And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for publications. There are even more lecture slides. (Copies upon request.) But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the future. The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone. I discovered that point while talking to them. That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the other, please let us know. John From: "Gary Richmond" List, While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded me that the principal issue being considered has not been resolved unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, completely along the lines of his analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled because John says it has and, so, there's no need for further discussion. I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example, contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by Peirce as a kind of term and, so, decidedly not a possible sign. Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an existential one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark. Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of a possible sign include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt to be positively possible." John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague Quality" that his listeners, typically not schooled in Peircean thought, "find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written work. I can only say that that has not been my experience over the years. For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended). Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words! Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with several Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John. And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Jon, Gary, List, First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical fallacy". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are required to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Of course, everybody is fallible, even authorities. But rejection of an authority requires some evidence. Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted below): "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated". The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a term. Whatever those terms may be predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated. Therefore, the word 'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone' or 'potisign' to refer to a possible mark. In conclusion, the word 'mark' may be used to refer to a possible mark. In fact, it's the simplest and most obvious word for the purpose. In 1908, Peirce recognized that point. Whether or not he vacillated on that point is irrelevant. He did not deny that it may be so used, and many or perhaps most speakers of 21st C English find it more natural and more memorable. That is sufficient justification for preferring it. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. JAS: Then why keep posting about it? Because I believe that it's important to avoid confusing the subscribers to Peirce list. I will stop correcting your mistakes as soon as you stop sending them to the list. Remark to Gary: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. If he wants to continue using the word 'tone', he has a right to do so. If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is inconsistent with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a necessitant type embodied in existent tokens, not a possible sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly misunderstands the word "mark" when it is used for a possible sign, the counterpart of an existent "token" and a necessitant "type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely not "that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its Instances or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2). JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'. Tony Jappy uses "mark" rather than
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
List, While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded me that the principal issue being considered has *not *been resolved unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has and, so, there's no need for further discussion. I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example, contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by Peirce as a kind of *term* and, so, decidedly *not *a *possible sign*. Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an *existential* one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark. Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of a *possible sign* include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt to be positively possible." John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague Quality" that his listeners, typically *not* schooled in Peircean thought, "find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written work. I can only say that that has not been my experience over the years. For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended). Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words! Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with* several* Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John. And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages where Peirce uses not only 'tone', but its variants (such as 'tuone' and 'potisgin'). John, on the other hand, has kept repeating his opinions with little textual support. So I ask each member of this forum who has an interest in this topic to honestly weigh the arguments presented by Jon and John and determine for themself who has made the stronger case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'. Perhaps then we can put the matter to rest (at least for a time). Best, Gary Richmond On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 2:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > John, List: > > JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent > with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point > in its favor. > > > As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, > any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's > dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is > *inconsistent *with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," > "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of > term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to > say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these > terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a > *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not a *possible *sign. > On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being > whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling > which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature > incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant > character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), > and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt > to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). > > JFS: But when I
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is *inconsistent *with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not a *possible *sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly *misunderstands *the word "mark" when it is used for a *possible *sign, the counterpart of an *existent *"token" and a *necessitant *"type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely *not *"that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type" ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its *Instances *or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2). JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'. Tony Jappy *uses *"mark" rather than "tone," but does he ever give a *reason *for doing so? Maybe it is just for convenience when quoting the *only *sentence where Peirce himself employs it without qualification--"Consequently an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives" (CP 8.367, EP 2:489, 1908 Dec 25). Either way, as Gary already observed, appeal to authority is a logical *fallacy*, and we also need to be mindful of the danger of confirmation bias. Over the years, I have benefited greatly from my *disagreements *with others on the List because they have prompted me to go back to *Peirce's *relevant writings and then either bolster my arguments (as in this case) or revise my position accordingly, although I never find bald assertions to be persuasive. JFS: I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject. There is nothing new. On the contrary, in my last post ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00049.html), I listed for the first time *all *the different passages where Peirce uses "tone" as well as "tuone," "tinge," "potisign," and even "idea"; and I provided a long excerpt from his Logic Notebook that has not previously appeared in this or any other recent List thread, where he describes what he has in mind (using "tuone") and carefully distinguishes it from a type. By contrast, much of the post below is repetition of previously expressed opinions, with no exact quotations from Peirce to support them. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. Then why keep posting about it? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 9:02 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Gary, Jon, List > > To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions > have to be made. I have stated the reasons why I believe that the > trichotomy (potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and > most detailed reasoning. I also agree with him that (mark token type) are > simpler English words that would be better for widespread use. > > The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with > Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in > its favor. The words 'tone', 'tinge', or 'tuone' are too narrow. They > might be useful for sounds, but they are not as general as 'mark' for >
