Jon, Gary, List, First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical fallacy".
Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are required to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Of course, everybody is fallible, even authorities. But rejection of an authority requires some evidence. Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted below): "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated". The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a term. Whatever those terms may be predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated. Therefore, the word 'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone' or 'potisign' to refer to a possible mark. In conclusion, the word 'mark' may be used to refer to a possible mark. In fact, it's the simplest and most obvious word for the purpose. In 1908, Peirce recognized that point. Whether or not he vacillated on that point is irrelevant. He did not deny that it may be so used, and many or perhaps most speakers of 21st C English find it more natural and more memorable. That is sufficient justification for preferring it. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. JAS: Then why keep posting about it? Because I believe that it's important to avoid confusing the subscribers to Peirce list. I will stop correcting your mistakes as soon as you stop sending them to the list. Remark to Gary: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. If he wants to continue using the word 'tone', he has a right to do so. If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. John ---------------------------------------- From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> John, List: JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is inconsistent with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a necessitant type embodied in existent tokens, not a possible sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly misunderstands the word "mark" when it is used for a possible sign, the counterpart of an existent "token" and a necessitant "type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely not "that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its Instances or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2). JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'. Tony Jappy uses "mark" rather than "tone," but does he ever give a reason for doing so? Maybe it is just for convenience when quoting the only sentence where Peirce himself employs it without qualification--"Consequently an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives" (CP 8.367, EP 2:489, 1908 Dec 25). Either way, as Gary already observed, appeal to authority is a logical fallacy, and we also need to be mindful of the danger of confirmation bias. Over the years, I have benefited greatly from my disagreements with others on the List because they have prompted me to go back to Peirce's relevant writings and then either bolster my arguments (as in this case) or revise my position accordingly, although I never find bald assertions to be persuasive. JFS: I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject. There is nothing new. On the contrary, in my last post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00049.html), I listed for the first time all the different passages where Peirce uses "tone" as well as "tuone," "tinge," "potisign," and even "idea"; and I provided a long excerpt from his Logic Notebook that has not previously appeared in this or any other recent List thread, where he describes what he has in mind (using "tuone") and carefully distinguishes it from a type. By contrast, much of the post below is repetition of previously expressed opinions, with no exact quotations from Peirce to support them. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. Then why keep posting about it? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
