Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
List, Jon: > On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, > index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. > > According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or > symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and > icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately > iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately > indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones > as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant > Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its > instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other > eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, > although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, > and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be > either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and > semes, and all phemes involve semes. Returning to the 1868 metaphysical definition of substance, one can attempt to ascribe names to substances following the rhetorical guidance that would presumably follow from the agency of these manufactured descriptors. Note the three distinctions that CSP hypotheses for his metaphysics. For example, I could attempt to assign the names of the ordered sequence of saturated hydrocarbons, methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, septane, octane, nonane, decane, and so forth. (It is probable that CSP was aware of the relative compositions of these (the first ten) saturated hydrocarbons.). The molecular formula are given by the general formula, C(n)H(2n+2). Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting point or boiling point and flammability. Each of these substances has a graph, a specific graph of the arrangement of the (n) + (2n+2) atoms in a pattern that was determined by methodologies of chemical ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS. Furthermore, in the late 1890’s, CSP produced a research article on acetylene, a related hydrocarbon that indicated he was knowledgable of the state of the art. Can you create any correlates between the categories ( 9, or 10, or 66 or any other integer) of the semantics you appear to believe in? Or, are semantics merely rhetoric semantics for the sake of argument that can not be related to substances? More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
John, List: JFS: He uses exactly the same word with no change whatsoever for the abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots, lines, and ovals) and the visible graph as it is written on a phemic sheet. It is remarkable that someone can read a short paragraph and then seriously claim that it says *exactly the opposite* of what it plainly says. Peirce *only *uses the word "graph" for "a mere form, an abstraction, a 'general' or as I call it a 'might-be'"; and he states explicitly that "it would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself *is put upon the sheet. For that would be an impossibility." What, then, *is *put upon the sheet? Peirce does not give it *any *name in R L376, but in various other texts, he repeatedly calls it a "graph-instance"; and in a published article, he presents this as a *paradigmatic *example of the distinction between a *type *and a *token *that is an *instance *of a type (CP 4.537, 1906). Again, there is nothing at all in the letter to Risteen about the *other *member of this trichotomy, whether we call it a "tone" or a "mark." JFS: Teachers who are explaining how to draw, use, and talk about EGs call them graphs, not graph instances. Indeed, because what they are discussing (for the most part) are graphs as *general *types, not graph-instances as *individual *tokens. Peirce also acknowledges the *convenience *of talking only about graphs (or words), not graph-instances (or word-instances). CSP: Any shape or combination of shapes that put on the Sheet of Assertion would be an assertion, I term a *graph*, and your act of putting it on any surface by writing or drawing or a mixture of the two I express by saying that you *scribe *that sign on that *area*; and the result of doing so, that is any single one among the inexhaustible multitude of possible embodiments of the graph, I call a graph-instance. To illustrate the utility of this distinction, I call your attention to the fact that we most commonly use the word "word" with a meaning analogous to that of "graph,"--for we say that hounds, beagles, curs, mastiffs, spaniels, terriers, poodles, and an incredible variety of other stocks are alike included under the *single word*, *dog*. Yet when an editor asks me to write him a paragraph of a hundred words on some subject, he means to count every occurrence of "the" as a separate word. He does not mean *words*, but *word-instances*; but in this case the value of brevity outweighs that of accuracy. In the case of graphs and graph-instances, it is quite the other way. (R 650:10-11, LF 1:164-165, 1910 Jul 23) Note well Peirce's last remark here--the value of accuracy in *distinguishing *"graphs" (types) and "graph-instances" (tokens) outweighs that of brevity in simply using "graphs" for both. For example ... CSP: "The father g.o." [g.o. = goes out] is a *graph*, even if it is not scribed on the sheet. For a graph is what is true or false, and its being scribed does not make it so. Also suppose we have on the Sheet of Truth The mother g.o. The mother g.o. The mother g.o. The mother g.o. Then there is only *one *graph on the sheet, but there are *four graph-instances*. This is a very useful distinction to prevent misunderstandings. A *graph-instance* is a single scribing according to this System of that which must either be true or false. A *graph *is the one *form *of all possible graph-instances which express the same meaning in precisely the same way. Thus The MOTHER g.o. and The mother goes out are two instances of the same graph because their differences are entirely *insignificant*, that is do not amount to different ways of expressing the fact, but only to different ways of writing. But The mother g.o. and The mother g.o. The mother g.o. are two different graphs, though their meaning is the same. (R 514:7-8, LF 1:478-479, 1904) Again, a graph is a *type*, "a definitely significant Form"; while a graph-instance is a *token*, "A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does" (CP 4.537). Also ... CSP: A *Graph*, then, as the word is used when it is plain that an *Existential *Graph is meant, is not a sign or mark or any other existent or actual individual, but is a *kind *of sign which if scribed on the Phemic Sheet (i.e. if an *Instance *of it stood on the Sheet) would make an assertion. The individual sign that results from the scribing of a Graph has been called an "*Instance*" of the Graph. This word "Instance" might conveniently be introduced into ordinary parlance. For example, only two words in our language are called articles; but one of these, the definite article, *the*, will commonly occur, on an average page of novel or essay, over twenty times. They are reckoned by the editor who asks for an article of so many thousand
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Jon, Gary, List, Please reread the paragraph below by Peirce from L376 (December 1911). The example he uses is 'existential graph'. He uses exactly the same word with no change whatsoever for the abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots, lines, and ovals) and the visible graph as it is written on a phemic sheet. CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an assertion is called a graph. If it actually be so scribed, it would be incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that would be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word,"--any word, say camel. (R L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8) This is Peirce's final word on the subject: the word 'graph' (or the longer phrase 'existential graph') is the correct term to use for BOTH the abstract form and for the visible drawing on a phemic sheet. If you need more examples, look at how Peirce writes about the EGs he is using to SOLVE problem or PROVE a theorem. In every such example, he calls them graphs, not graph-instances. The only cases when he might talk about a graph instance is in METALANGUAGE about the theory. If anybody finds such examples, please let us know. JAS: However, this contradicts John's claim instead of corroborating it, by explicitly stating that we cannot say that what is being observed is the [mark] itself--we need a different word for the embodiment of the [mark], such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if "mark" is the right word for the embodiment, then we need a different word for the form itself. No. That claim confuses two very different ways of talking about two very different topics. Teachers who are explaining how to draw, use, and talk about EGs call them graphs, not graph instances. However, philosophers who are distinguishing theory and practice, use a metalanguage for distinguishing the abstract form (a might-be) from the actual visible drawings. Just look at any book on geometry from Aristotle to the present. The words such as 'circle' or 'triangle' refer to abstract forms. And EXACTLY the same words are used to describe the drawings in a book or computer screen (or even on sand, as they often did in the olden days). But as a philosopher, Plato made a very sharp METALEVEL distinction between the abstract Platonic forms and the visible patterns drawn in ink, chalk, wax, or sand. Nevertheless, all working mathematicians use the simple words circle, triangle, square... when they're solving problems, proving theorems, and writing explanations for both experts and students. Please note how Peirce writes about EGs when he's using them to solve problems. He does not call them graph-instances. In an earlier note, I commented on the last phrase by Peirce in the above quotation: "in that respect [a graph is] just like a "word,"--any word, say camel."Then I gave the following examples to show why the word 'mark' is better than 'tone' in the trichotomy of (Mark Token Type): 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider the following two sentences: 1. A hump is a tone of a camel. 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant. Those two examples not only sound silly, they show why a word like 'tone', which is limited to sounds is much more confusing than the word 'mark', which may be used for any sensory modality. GR: 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the orchestra. 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. GR: "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these examples is used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some mark that might distinguish one tone of voice from another. GR: Now consider the following two sentences: 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in the orchestra. 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. In these two sentences, the word 'mark' is incorrect because the literal word 'tone' would be appropriate. GR: Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean terminological matters Au contraire, please note that I have not claimed any authority of my own. In my comments about Peirce's position, I have used his own words, as he stated them in L376. Nobody has found anything later (or better at any time) on this topic. To reinforce Peirce's claims, I
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Jon, List,
That 'something' which is, as Peirce writes, ". . . a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are," I have for many
years referred to as "a would-be' *if.* . .". That "if" emphasizes the
futurity of generals, of 3ns, or rather of all that "the third Universe
comprises.: What is *necessary *in a "necessitant" is that *if* the
conditions are such -- that is, if they allow for it -- the general *will*
grow (and, of course, if such conditions are *not* in place, or *do not
come into place*, then there is no growth towards the future. This is as
much the case for linguistic symbols in semiosis ("symbols grow") as it is
for the evolution of living organisms in biosemiosis.
The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active
power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is
essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not
essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in
its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such,
too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of
a plant. Such is a living constitution -- a daily newspaper, a great
fortune, a social "movement." Peirce: CP 6.455
So, again, that *if* referred to above seems to me of paramount importance,
for lacking it there will be no growth (egs., a newspaper lacking resources
goes out of business; a catastrophic change in an environment results in
the extinction of a species), or it will be thwarted until such *necessary*
conditions doarise. Returning to our text, you wrote:
JAS: Peirce explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as
"a 'general,'' thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are
an existential graph and the word "camel,'' both of which he unambiguously
classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.
Note: I tweaked your generalization for readability (Jon's original is in
the post to which I'm responding).
GR's version of JAS's 'generalization': Any observable form is called a
*type * -- if it were embodied anywhere it would be a token. If it actually
be so embodied it would be incorrect to say that the type *itself* is
embodied. For that would be an impossibility, since the *type* itself is a
mere form, an abstraction, a "general," or as Peirce calls it, a
"would-be", i.e. something which would be if conditions were otherwise than
they are; and in that respect it is just like a "*word*,"--*any* word,
say *camel
*or* rose.*
I remember Peirce once giving 'rose' as an example of this, but in a
half-hour of searching today I couldn't find it. As I recall, he remarks
that the word 'rose' doesn't refer to any particular rose present, past, or
future or, for that matter, imagined. And this is so precisely because it
"is a mere form, an abstraction', a 'general', or. . . a 'would-be'.
From all that we've been arguing, you are undoubtedly correct, Jon, in
concluding that ". . .the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no
relevance whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name."
Best,
Gary
On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 2:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Gary, List:
>
> Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
> quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
> best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
>
> CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would
> be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it
> would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet.
> For that would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere
> form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e.
> something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in
> that respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R
> L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)
>
>
> John also proposed the following generalization.
>
> JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere]
> would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it
> would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that
> would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
> which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel.
>
>
> However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by
> explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Gary, List:
Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would
be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it would
be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet. For that
would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R
L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)
John also proposed the following generalization.
JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere]
would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it
would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that
would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel.
However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by
explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being observed is the
[mark] itself--we need a *different* word for the embodiment of the [mark],
such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if "mark" is
the right word for the embodiment, then we need a *different* word for the
form itself.
Moreover, as I have already explained at length (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00096.html), Peirce
explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as "a
'general,'" thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are an
existential graph and the word "camel," both of which he unambiguously
classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.
JAS: Any [observable] form which, if it were [embodied anywhere] would be
[a token] is called a [*type*]. If it actually be so [embodied], it would
be incorrect to say that the [type] *itself* is [embodied]. For that would
be an impossibility, since the [*type*] itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "[would]-be", i.e. something
which [would] be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*.
After all, Peirce *defines* a necessitant "type" as "a definitely
significant Form" and provides *different* words for its existent
embodiments, namely, "tokens" that are "instances" of the type (CP 4.537,
1906). Hence, the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no relevance
whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 5:50 PM Gary Richmond
wrote:
> John, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> JFS:
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
>
> Compare this to:
>
> GR:
> 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in
> the orchestra.
> 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>
> "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
> the following two sentences:"
>
> 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in
> the orchestra.
> 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>
> Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon: ". . . a mark is an actual
> material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself *"an
> actual material sign."
>
> To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my
> words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to
> 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind."
>
> That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
> camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples of
> synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which is
> the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.
>
> JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
> emphasizes the profound
[PEIRCE-L] Call for Participation: GOD AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN INDIAN TRADITIONS (online and in-person)
Please circulate widely. Apologies for multiple emails. CALL FOR PARTICIPATION (online and in-person) *1st Conference on* *GOD AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN INDIAN TRADITIONS* Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies Worcester College, University of Oxford, UK May 15-17, 2024 Website: https://www.god-and-consciousness.com/oxford-conference Registration: god.and.consciousn...@gmail.com Deadline: May 07, 2024 -- REGISTRATION To register, send an email to god.and.consciousn...@gmail.com, with the subject “Registration at the Oxford Conference” by May 07, 2024. The body of the message should contain the following information: (1) full name, (2) institution/country, and (3) type of attendance (in-person or online). Attendance will be guaranteed on a first come, first served basis. -- THE CONFERENCE This the first (hybrid) conference of the project “Concepts of God and the Variety of Theisms in Indian Traditions: Towards a Theistic Theory of Consciousness”, hosted by the Brazilian Association for the Philosophy of Religion and supported by funding totaling $260,000 from the John Templeton Foundation. https://www.god-and-consciousness.com It is hosted by the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, and will take place in Worcester College, University of Oxford. -- KEYNOTE TALKS • God, Consciousness, and Cosmos: Prospects for a Non-illusory Theistic Monism, Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University, USA) • Of Micropsychism, Memory, and Maheśvara: Utpaladeva on God as the Unifier of Consciousness, Amit Chaturvedi (University of Hong Kong, China) • Is God Conscious? Reflections on Śākta-Śaiva Ideas of Transcendence and Immanence, Gavin Flood (University of Oxford, UK) • Karl Christian Friedrich Krause’s Panentheism and the Vedic Traditions, Benedikt Paul Göcke (Ruhr University Bochum, Germany) • Panpsychism and Divine Embodiment, Joanna Leidenhag (University of Leeds, UK) • Does and Could Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta concern itself with the Hard Problem of Consciousness? Anand Jayprakash Vaidya (San Jose State University, USA) -- CONTRIBUTED TALKS • A Bare Theism for a Fully General Comparative Philosophy of Religion, Ravi M. Gupta and Mike Ashfield (Utah State University, USA) • A Comparative Analysis of Brahman and the Anselmian Being: Exploring Divine Concepts through the Bhagavad Gita, Saheba Saxena (University of Lincoln, UK) • Advaita Vedānta and the God-World Relation, Thomas Oberle (University of Alberta, Canada) • Ascending Concepts of God in the Bhagavad-gītā, Ithamar Theodor (Zefat Academic Colege, Israel) • Between Theism and Atheism: A Jain Paradigm of God, Jinesh R. Sheth (University of Mumbai, India) • Can the Bhagavad Gītā Explain the Existence of Consciousness? Akshay Gupta (Independent scholar) • Consciousness, Agency, and Moral Responsibility in Vedānta, Brett Parris (Balliol College, University of Oxford, UK) • Decombining Perspectives: A Kashmiri Śaivist View of Cosmopsychism, Munema Moiz (University of Toronto, Canada) • Divine Consciousness as Linguistic Consciousness: The Trika Śaiva adaptation of Bhartṛhari’s levels of language as they relate to divine potency, union, and revelation, Veronica Benjamin (Independent scholar affiliated with Ishvar Parvat Samvidālaya Library, India) • Gauḍīya Vaisnavism and Personal Identity: A Reductionist Approach, Alan Herberth (Oxford Centre fo Hindu Studies, UK) • Looking at the Prakṛti-Puruṣa dichotomy through the lens of Feminist Materialism: A Critique of Western Hegemonic Dichotomies and a New Perspective on Dualism, Sarnali Chatterjee (Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India) • Panentheism and the Contradictory God in a Bhedābheda Vedānta Tradition, Ricardo Sousa Silvestre (Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil) • Śiva's Creative Pulsation: A Theistic Understanding of Consciousness and Matter, Klara Margareta Agnes Hedling (University of New Mexico, USA) • The universe as aṁśa of Brahman: Towards a Viśiṣṭādvaitic existence-cosmopsychism, S Siddharth (Sai University, India) • The Vaiṣṇava Vedānta approach to subjective awareness, Shivanand Sharma (University of Birmingham, UK) -- ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITEE • Alan Herbert, Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, UK (chair) • Gabriel Reis de Oliveira, Saint Louis University, USA -- SCIENTIFIC COMMITEE • Ricardo Sousa Silvestre, Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil (chair) • Yujin Nagasawa, University of Oklahoma, USA • Monima Chadha, Monash University, Australia • Swami Medhananda, UCLA and University of Southern California, USA • Ananya Barua, University of Delhi, India • Dilip Loundo, University of
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Dear All, Supplement: I want to add, that my classification of relations is not an arbitrary idea, but it is derived after the Peircean categories: Though Peirce said, that composition is thirdness, I think that is because it is a relation. But, if i classify it as a kind of relation, I do so calling it firstness in this respect, determination 2ns, and classification 3ns. I did so, because a composition is the same from any point of view. Determination, 2ns, is different from two points, that of the determining agent and that of the determined one. And it might be regarded actual, even brute somehow. Classification has, maybe in different ways like the interpretant, three points of view, e.g. subclass, superclass, reason for classifying. And it has to do with mediation and representation somehow. I further have catergorally classified composition in 1ns.: Composition of traits, this is 1ns, because you might also call it composition of qualities (this might even be better anyway). Spatiotemporal composition is 2ns, it suits to reaction and actuality. Functional composition is 3ns, it suits mediation. More specificly, these are 1ns of 1ns, 2ns of 1ns, 3ns of 1ns (because composition is 1ns). How to further classify determination and classification I have not satisfyingly worked out yet. At the end there would result a table like that of the sign classes. Maybe it is even more general, because I think, that a sign is a composition (of sounds, patterns,...), an object a determining agent, and an interpretant a classification. Or you might say so about the three correlates sign, sign-object-relation, sign-interpretant relation. The starting point of all this was Stanley N. Sathe´s paper "Salthe12Axiomathes", in which he described composition and subsumption as the two kinds of systems hierarchy. Subsumption, I think, is the relation between super- and subset in a classification. Or maybe it just is classification. I hope, that with this analysing tool, derived from the Peircean categories, it is possible to specify relations, e.g. tell, what involution exactly is in some certain case, e.g. the way a sign triad involves the three correlates exactly is, that the triad´s quality is composed from the qualities of the correlates (qualities-composition, was traits-composition, you see for me the communication with you all helps). Best regards, Helmut Jon, List, my ideas are all very tentative. Maybe composition, determination, classification are the three kinds of relation? These three kinds each have three kinds again, e.g. composition may be one of traits, spatiotemporal, or functional. So it might be possible, to talk more specificly, instead of saying "relation of relations of relations" e.g.: The ten classes of signs is (are as a whole) a classification of compositions of classes. More specifically, the first classification is a double one: ten possible classes versus 17 impossible ones, and the ten possible ones are further classified. The composition is the relation of the three correlates, this is a traits-composition, not a spatial one, as the DO is not close, and not a functional one, because the three correlates donot have a function, the function is irreducibly that of the triad. The last classification is having picked each correlate out of three respectively possibilities. I have called it "traits-composition", not "properties-comp.", because in English "property" has two meanings, trait and ownership. It means, that not the relation, but only the traits of the relation are composed of the traits of the correlates. Same with spatiotemporal and functional. Well, this is tentative, an idea of which I am not sure whether or not it would be good to further pursue it. It makes everything more complicated, but maybe it is complicated? Best regards, Helmut 16. April 2024 um 20:10 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is irreducibly triadic, such that it is not composed of its constituent dyadic relations, although it involves the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant. HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's relation with itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself as a correlate, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's genuine dyadic relations with its (dynamical) object and (final)
[PEIRCE-L] CfP 8th World Congress on the Square of Opposition
The 8th edition of the World Congress on the Square of Opposition will take place in Costa Rica, September 9-13, 2024. Deadline to submit an abstract is May 8 https://sites.google.com/view/square8-2024/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
