Jon, List,
That 'something' which is, as Peirce writes, ". . . a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are," I have for many
years referred to as "a would-be' *if.* . .". That "if" emphasizes the
futurity of generals, of 3ns, or rather of all that "the third Universe
comprises.: What is *necessary *in a "necessitant" is that *if* the
conditions are such -- that is, if they allow for it -- the general *will*
grow (and, of course, if such conditions are *not* in place, or *do not
come into place*, then there is no growth towards the future. This is as
much the case for linguistic symbols in semiosis ("symbols grow") as it is
for the evolution of living organisms in biosemiosis.
The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active
power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is
essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not
essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in
its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such,
too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of
a plant. Such is a living constitution -- a daily newspaper, a great
fortune, a social "movement." Peirce: CP 6.455
So, again, that *if* referred to above seems to me of paramount importance,
for lacking it there will be no growth (egs., a newspaper lacking resources
goes out of business; a catastrophic change in an environment results in
the extinction of a species), or it will be thwarted until such *necessary*
conditions doarise. Returning to our text, you wrote:
JAS: Peirce explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as
"a 'general,'' thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are
an existential graph and the word "camel,'' both of which he unambiguously
classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.
Note: I tweaked your generalization for readability (Jon's original is in
the post to which I'm responding).
GR's version of JAS's 'generalization': Any observable form is called a
*type * -- if it were embodied anywhere it would be a token. If it actually
be so embodied it would be incorrect to say that the type *itself* is
embodied. For that would be an impossibility, since the *type* itself is a
mere form, an abstraction, a "general," or as Peirce calls it, a
"would-be", i.e. something which would be if conditions were otherwise than
they are; and in that respect it is just like a "*word*,"--*any* word,
say *camel
*or* rose.*
I remember Peirce once giving 'rose' as an example of this, but in a
half-hour of searching today I couldn't find it. As I recall, he remarks
that the word 'rose' doesn't refer to any particular rose present, past, or
future or, for that matter, imagined. And this is so precisely because it
"is a mere form, an abstraction', a 'general', or. . . a 'would-be'.
From all that we've been arguing, you are undoubtedly correct, Jon, in
concluding that ". . .the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no
relevance whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name."
Best,
Gary
On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 2:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Gary, List:
>
> Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
> quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
> best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
>
> CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would
> be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it
> would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet.
> For that would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere
> form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e.
> something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in
> that respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R
> L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)
>
>
> John also proposed the following generalization.
>
> JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere]
> would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it
> would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that
> would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
> which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel.
>
>
> However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by
> explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being observed is
> the [mark] itself--we need a *different* word for the embodiment of the
> [mark], such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if
> "mark" is the right word for the embodiment, then we need a *different*
> word for the form itself.
>
> Moreover, as I have already explained at length (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00096.html), Peirce
> explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as "a
> 'general,'" thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are an
> existential graph and the word "camel," both of which he unambiguously
> classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
> Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.
>
> JAS: Any [observable] form which, if it were [embodied anywhere] would be
> [a token] is called a [*type*]. If it actually be so [embodied], it would
> be incorrect to say that the [type] *itself* is [embodied]. For that
> would be an impossibility, since the [*type*] itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "[would]-be", i.e. something
> which [would] be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*.
>
>
> After all, Peirce *defines* a necessitant "type" as "a definitely
> significant Form" and provides *different* words for its existent
> embodiments, namely, "tokens" that are "instances" of the type (CP 4.537,
> 1906). Hence, the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no relevance
> whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
> trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 5:50 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> John, Jon, Helmut, List,
>>
>> JFS:
>> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
>> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>>
>> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
>> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
>> the following two sentences:
>>
>> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
>> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>>
>>
>> Compare this to:
>>
>> GR:
>> 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in
>> the orchestra.
>> 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>>
>> "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
>> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
>> the following two sentences:"
>>
>> 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in
>> the orchestra.
>> 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>>
>> Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon: ". . . a mark is an actual
>> material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself *"an
>> actual material sign."
>>
>> To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my
>> words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to
>> 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind."
>>
>> That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
>> camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples
>> of synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which
>> is the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.
>>
>> JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
>> emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
>> 'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( ____
>> token type)."
>>
>> There is no "profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
>> 'tone' here" and your claiming -- rather *insisting* -- that there *is*
>> only weakens your argument for the use of 'mark' in the trichotomy being
>> discussed.
>>
>> Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion
>> needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean
>> terminological matters -- itself "has no redeeming social or academic
>> value whatsoever." And certainly it is not a collegial stance to take on
>> Peirce-L. "Get rid of it."
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
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