RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10

2014-10-17 Thread Gary Fuhrman
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10 Gary F., lists, Your quote from EP2:286 makes a lot of sense but it's from Sundry Logical Conceptions, MS 478 (EP 2), the third part of the manuscript of Syllabus. In that part Peirce

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10

2014-10-15 Thread Gary Fuhrman
] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10 I am interested in whether language is, in this context, basic to secondness. At some point a sign (a first) is given a name. I have generally thought this naming was a sort of conclusion of firstness and that secondness was where the name (word) encountered

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10

2014-10-15 Thread Benjamin Udell
. Rose *Sent:* 13-Oct-14 12:56 PM *To:* Gary Fuhrman *Cc:* Peirce List; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10 I am interested in whether language is, in this context, basic to secondness. At some point a sign (a first) is given a name. I have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10

2014-10-15 Thread Gary Fuhrman
” — can you point me to that? gary f. From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: 15-Oct-14 2:42 PM To: 'Peirce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:7236] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10 Gary F., Stephen, lists, Gary F. wrote, When an object

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10

2014-10-15 Thread Benjamin Udell
individual” — can you point me to that? gary f. *From:* Benjamin Udell *Sent:* 15-Oct-14 2:42 PM *To:* 'Peirce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee *Subject:* [biosemiotics:7236] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10 Gary F., Stephen, lists, Gary F. wrote, When an /object/ is given

[PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10

2014-10-13 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Lists, After spending three weeks on Chapter 3 of NP, we have one more week to go before Tyler Bennett launches our discussion of Chapter 4. Section 3.10 is again a relatively long and complex one, pointing out some of the other implications of the continuity Peirce sees in semiosis. One

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10

2014-10-13 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I am interested in whether language is, in this context, basic to secondness. At some point a sign (a first) is given a name. I have generally thought this naming was a sort of conclusion of firstness and that secondness was where the name (word) encountered the somewhat brutal function of an