Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[robert marty]

Gary R.

Thank you for your encouraging words, but I do not imagine for a moment
that your intervention aims at underlining that to be interested in the
principles of the classification of sciences according to Comte and Peirce
is an outdated literalism. In my article "Podium", I quoted Nathan Houser
who in his well-known article *"The Forms of experience"* quotes Beverley
Kent in this way:

*"*Over the course of his more than fifty productive years, Peirce worked
out a number of different classifications, but his efforts had led by 1903
to what Beverley Kent calls his 'perennial classification'.

*' In this mature classification, we find that mathematics is the most
fundamental science, the only science independent of all others, and that
following mathematics comes philosophy which is divided into three
branches: (in order of dependency) phenomenology, normative science, and
metaphysics. After philosophy come the special sciences, physics and
psychics, and these are followed by the sciences of review and the
practical sciences. Logic, we find, is the third of the three normative
sciences (in order of dependency), preceded by aesthetics and ethic*s.'( N.
Houser, “The Form of Experience,” p. 4)

Helmut Pape, for his part, points out in his review of Beverley Kent
that "* she
has strong tendency to regard other versions simply as inconsistent within
the one she prefers*" (p.142). I agree with this criticism, especially when
one knows the mass of undated MS. Consequently, a study without a priori
must take into account the principles of this classification, the first of
which is intangible: among the Sciences of Discovery, Mathematics does not
depend on any other science; and all other sciences will depend on it. This
is what Pape welcomes in the work of Beverley Kent :

"*A remarkable feature of her exposition is the inclusion of several
perspectival diagrams showing that the Hausdorff dimensions of Peirce's
classification, i.e., the property of parts having the same structure as
the whole of which they are parts"* (p.140). He also quotes Beverley Kent:"*
What the meant by logic or normative semiotic must be seen within the
context of a complex diagram that having the three-dimensionality of a
lattice, a diagram that represents his classification*."

This is not true, because the classification of sciences is not a lattice.
Indeed, there is no need to verify the axioms of a lattice; it is enough to
see that if it has an upper bound (the Mathematics) it does not have,
obviously, a lower bound. On the other hand, the Poset 3 --> 2 -->1 that I
propose is a lattice and, secondarily, a diagram, a structure that does not
only belong to the Mathematical Logic but is a simple algebraic structure
belonging to Discrete Mathematics (a Poset) which obviously is obtained by
respecting the laws of this Mathematical Logic.  This Poset gives real
content to the descending structural dependence in the ladder of the "Well
of truth" of Peirce.

Pietarinen makes the observation that these principles are still valid,
which is quite right since all the creations to which they refer are as
many fields of empirical sciences anticipated by Peirce which are situated
in the Idioscopy, that is to say in "(AIII) Idioscopy - Special sciences-
positive sciences (based on special experiences, discover new phenomena)"
of the compiled classification of Tommi Vekhavaara.

Regards,
Robert Marty


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le mer. 20 oct. 2021 à 05:54, Gary Richmond  a
écrit :

> Jon, Robert, John, List,
> As I have in the past, I encourage anyone who wants to explore in detail
> and in depth all of Peirce's versions of a classification of the sciences
> to study the sole monograph on these various versions, Charles S. Peirce:
> Logic and the Classification of the Sciences by Beverley Kent.
> https://www.amazon.com/Charles-S-Peirce-Classification-Sciences/dp/0773505628
> Helmut Pape, in his review of the book [untitled, in *The Journal of
> Speculative Philosophy* New Series, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1988)
> , pp. 140-145] highlights the 40
> pages in which Kent explores these several versions from 1866 to the
> "perennial" classification of 1903.
> More recently, Akti-Veikko Pietarinen in "Interdisciplinarity and Peirce's
> classification of the sciences: A centennial reassessment" (*Perspectives
> on Science*, 14, 2006) comments on the "perennial" classification.
>
> The overall structure of Peirce's [1903] classification, were it to be
> applied in today's situation, would not, in any major respect, be radically
> different from what it was designed to reflect a hundred years ago, in
> spite of the virtually exponential creation and production of new domains
> and the massive increase in investment in research and scientific
> publication.
>
>
>
>
> Best,Gary R
> “Let 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Robert, John, List,
As I have in the past, I encourage anyone who wants to explore in detail
and in depth all of Peirce's versions of a classification of the sciences
to study the sole monograph on these various versions, Charles S. Peirce:
Logic and the Classification of the Sciences by Beverley Kent.
https://www.amazon.com/Charles-S-Peirce-Classification-Sciences/dp/0773505628
Helmut Pape, in his review of the book [untitled, in *The Journal of
Speculative Philosophy* New Series, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1988)
, pp. 140-145] highlights the 40
pages in which Kent explores these several versions from 1866 to the
"perennial" classification of 1903.
More recently, Akti-Veikko Pietarinen in "Interdisciplinarity and Peirce's
classification of the sciences: A centennial reassessment" (*Perspectives
on Science*, 14, 2006) comments on the "perennial" classification.

The overall structure of Peirce's [1903] classification, were it to be
applied in today's situation, would not, in any major respect, be radically
different from what it was designed to reflect a hundred years ago, in
spite of the virtually exponential creation and production of new domains
and the massive increase in investment in research and scientific
publication.




Best,Gary R
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Tue, Oct 19, 2021 at 7:41 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Robert, John, List:
>
> The *word *"phenomenology" appears in these early attempts by Peirce at
> classifying the sciences, but here it *does not* designate what he later
> defines as the study of whatever is or could be present to the mind in any
> way. This is explicit in the first one (R 1345:4-6), where the first branch
> of "phenomenology" is philosophy, whose *only *two branches are logic and
> metaphysics, and the *other *two branches of "phenomenology" correspond
> to what Peirce later designates as the special sciences. Esthetics is
> nowhere to be found, while ethics comes *after *logic, metaphysics, and
> all those special sciences as the first branch of pragmatics. I see no
> reason to interpret the second one (R 1345:7) any differently, while the
> third one (R 1345:37-39, posted separately today) excludes all observation
> from philosophy and omits ethics altogether.
>
> Anybody who prefers R 1345 to Peirce's *mature *classification of the
> sciences obviously disagrees with *his own *explicitly stated assessment
> and multiple supporting arguments that the normative science of logic as
> semeiotic depends for principles on not only the hypothetical science of
> mathematics, but also the distinct positive science of phaneroscopy, as
> well as the other two normative sciences of esthetics and ethics. Frankly,
> it seems to me that this arrangement is so fundamental to Peirce's
> post-1900 thought that rejecting it, and instead subsuming phaneroscopy
> under mathematics (Robert) or semeiotic (John), is effectively abandoning *his
> *"analytic framework" altogether.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 12:39 PM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, Bernard, List,
>>
>> Two other Classification of Sciences from the MS 1345;
>>
>> *FIRST :*
>>
>> MS1345_004
>>
>> Part 3. *Encyclopaedia*
>>
>> The first year I would propose to point my masterly Syllabus of Science
>> of which I have given a table of contents.
>>
>> *Contents of Syllabus of Science.*
>>
>> Dividing all science into
>>
>> I. *Mathematics*, the study of ideal constructions.
>>
>> *II.** Phenomenology, *which observes phenomena and seeks to identify
>> their forms with those that mathematics has studied.
>>
>> *III. **Pragmatics, *which studies how we ought to act in the light of
>> experience.
>>
>> I consider Mathematics
>>
>> 1. *Geometry* and the mathematics of continua, giving only a few
>> generalities§1
>>
>> 2. *Arithmetic*, or the mathematics of discrete infinite collections.
>> The special merle of reasoning explained
>>  
>>§2
>>
>> 3. *The theory of finite groups*. The peculiarity of the reasoning
>> explained.   §3
>>
>> II. Phenomenology being divided into
>>
>> 1. *Philosophy*, or the universal characters of Phenomena
>>
>> 2. *Nomology*, or the discovery of the characters of classes of
>> phenomena, and the accounting for them by the general principles of
>> philosophy,
>>
>> 3. *Descriptive and Explanation* Science, or the description of
>> individual things, and explanation of their 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, John, List:

The *word *"phenomenology" appears in these early attempts by Peirce at
classifying the sciences, but here it *does not* designate what he later
defines as the study of whatever is or could be present to the mind in any
way. This is explicit in the first one (R 1345:4-6), where the first branch
of "phenomenology" is philosophy, whose *only *two branches are logic and
metaphysics, and the *other *two branches of "phenomenology" correspond to
what Peirce later designates as the special sciences. Esthetics is nowhere
to be found, while ethics comes *after *logic, metaphysics, and all those
special sciences as the first branch of pragmatics. I see no reason to
interpret the second one (R 1345:7) any differently, while the third one (R
1345:37-39, posted separately today) excludes all observation from
philosophy and omits ethics altogether.

Anybody who prefers R 1345 to Peirce's *mature *classification of the
sciences obviously disagrees with *his own *explicitly stated assessment
and multiple supporting arguments that the normative science of logic as
semeiotic depends for principles on not only the hypothetical science of
mathematics, but also the distinct positive science of phaneroscopy, as
well as the other two normative sciences of esthetics and ethics. Frankly,
it seems to me that this arrangement is so fundamental to Peirce's
post-1900 thought that rejecting it, and instead subsuming phaneroscopy
under mathematics (Robert) or semeiotic (John), is effectively abandoning *his
*"analytic framework" altogether.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 12:39 PM robert marty 
wrote:

> Jon, Bernard, List,
>
> Two other Classification of Sciences from the MS 1345;
>
> *FIRST :*
>
> MS1345_004
>
> Part 3. *Encyclopaedia*
>
> The first year I would propose to point my masterly Syllabus of Science of
> which I have given a table of contents.
>
> *Contents of Syllabus of Science.*
>
> Dividing all science into
>
> I. *Mathematics*, the study of ideal constructions.
>
> *II.** Phenomenology, *which observes phenomena and seeks to identify
> their forms with those that mathematics has studied.
>
> *III. **Pragmatics, *which studies how we ought to act in the light of
> experience.
>
> I consider Mathematics
>
> 1. *Geometry* and the mathematics of continua, giving only a few
> generalities§1
>
> 2. *Arithmetic*, or the mathematics of discrete infinite collections. The
> special merle of reasoning explained
>   
>   §2
>
> 3. *The theory of finite groups*. The peculiarity of the reasoning
> explained.   §3
>
> II. Phenomenology being divided into
>
> 1. *Philosophy*, or the universal characters of Phenomena
>
> 2. *Nomology*, or the discovery of the characters of classes of
> phenomena, and the accounting for them by the general principles of
> philosophy,
>
> 3. *Descriptive and Explanation* Science, or the description of
> individual things, and explanation of their characters by the laws
> discovered by Nomology.
>
>
>
> MS1345_005
>
> *Part 3* continued
>
> I divide *Pragmatics* into
>
> 1*. Ethics*, or the universal principles of conduct
>
> 2. *Arts*, the study of general problems not going back to first
> principles.
>
> 3. *Policy,* or the study of special problems.
>
> _
>
>   Mathematics requires no subdivision for our proposal.
>
>   I divide *Philosophy *into
>
> A  Logic
>
>  B  Metaphysics
>
> I divide *Nomology *into
>
> A  Psychics
>
> B. Physics
>
> I divide *descriptive Science*, or Episcopy, into
>
> A.  Ergography, the account of the works of intelligent beings
>
> B.  Empsychography, the account of those beings themselves
>
> C. Cosmography, the account of inanimate nature.
>
>
>
> MS1345_006
>
> I divide *Ethics* into
>
> A. Private Ethics
>
> B. Public Ethics
>
> I divide *Arts* into
>
> A. Arts practiced by individuals
>
> B. Sociology or public arts.
>
> I divide *Policy* into
>
> A. Policy toward men
>
> B. Religion, or policy toward superior beings
>
> C. Policy toward lower animals
>
> __
>
> No further subdivision of Philosophy is requisite.
>
> I divide Psychics into
>
> a. Psychology groper, or mind viewed partly at least from an internal
> standpoint
>
> b. Anthropology etc (say Empsychonomy) or mind viewed wholly from an
> external Standpoint
>
>   α in individuals, men; spiritual intelligences,
> animals
>
>   β in families
>
>   γ in communities of races
> ___ THE END OF THE FIRST 
>
> *SECOND *:
>
>
> MS1345_007
>
> Part 3. *Encyclopaedia*
>
>  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[robert marty]

Jon, Bernard, List,

Two other Classification of Sciences from the MS 1345;

*FIRST :*

MS1345_004

Part 3. *Encyclopaedia*

The first year I would propose to point my masterly Syllabus of Science of
which I have given a table of contents.

*Contents of Syllabus of Science.*

Dividing all science into

I. *Mathematics*, the study of ideal constructions.

*II.** Phenomenology, *which observes phenomena and seeks to identify their
forms with those that mathematics has studied.

*III. **Pragmatics, *which studies how we ought to act in the light of
experience.

I consider Mathematics

1. *Geometry* and the mathematics of continua, giving only a few
generalities§1

2. *Arithmetic*, or the mathematics of discrete infinite collections. The
special merle of reasoning explained

 §2

3. *The theory of finite groups*. The peculiarity of the reasoning
explained.   §3

II. Phenomenology being divided into

1. *Philosophy*, or the universal characters of Phenomena

2. *Nomology*, or the discovery of the characters of classes of phenomena,
and the accounting for them by the general principles of philosophy,

3. *Descriptive and Explanation* Science, or the description of individual
things, and explanation of their characters by the laws discovered by
Nomology.



MS1345_005

*Part 3* continued

I divide *Pragmatics* into

1*. Ethics*, or the universal principles of conduct

2. *Arts*, the study of general problems not going back to first principles.

3. *Policy,* or the study of special problems.

_

  Mathematics requires no subdivision for our proposal.

  I divide *Philosophy *into

A  Logic

 B  Metaphysics

I divide *Nomology *into

A  Psychics

B. Physics

I divide *descriptive Science*, or Episcopy, into

A.  Ergography, the account of the works of intelligent beings

B.  Empsychography, the account of those beings themselves

C. Cosmography, the account of inanimate nature.



MS1345_006

I divide *Ethics* into

A. Private Ethics

B. Public Ethics

I divide *Arts* into

A. Arts practiced by individuals

B. Sociology or public arts.

I divide *Policy* into

A. Policy toward men

B. Religion, or policy toward superior beings

C. Policy toward lower animals

__

No further subdivision of Philosophy is requisite.

I divide Psychics into

a. Psychology groper, or mind viewed partly at least from an internal
standpoint

b. Anthropology etc (say Empsychonomy) or mind viewed wholly from an
external Standpoint

  α in individuals, men; spiritual intelligences,
animals

  β in families

  γ in communities of races
___ THE END OF THE FIRST 

*SECOND *:


MS1345_007

Part 3. *Encyclopaedia*

 Here we must adopt a classification of the sciences, not necessarily
inflict upon the user of the encyclopaedia, but *to guide the compiler.*

  I divide all science into *three* parts, the first much the smallest,
the last much the largest. They are

I. *Mathematics,* the study of *ideal constructions* independently of the
question of their real existence.

II*. Empirics*, or *Phenomenolog*y, the study of *phenomena* with the
purpose of identifying their forms with those which mathematics as studied.

III. Pragmatics, the study of *how we ought to act* in the light of
experience.

I divide *mathematics* into 1 Geometry, 2 Arithmetic, and 3 The
theory of finite groups.

I divide Empirics into

1.*Philosophy*, or the study of the universal characters of phenomena.

2.* Nomology*, or the study of those characters of phenomena which though
not universal, belong  to whole classes of phenomena, and the attempt to
account for them by connecting them with the universal laws which
philosophy discovers.

3.*Episcopy*, or the description of individual things, with a view to
explaining them by the laws nomology makes out.


Regards,

Robert Marty



Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le dim. 17 oct. 2021 à 23:08, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, Bernard, List:
>
> RM: this classification of sciences is the simplest he [Peirce] provided
> ... but the most detailed ones are consistent with this matrix.
>
>
> It is indeed his simplest, but there is a *very* *fundamental *difference
> from his more detailed ones. This early (mid-1890s) classification situates 
> *nothing
> *between mathematics and logic, the first branch of empirics, and places
> pragmatics as "the study of how we ought to behave" *after *all the
> special sciences, the later branches of empirics. By contrast, Peirce's
> mature (1902-3) classification *omits *empirics and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[Bernard Morand]

JAS,

Just a factual remark:

When I wrote the two passages that you are quoting below, I was 
addressing the slides from André as well as the comments for their 
defense on the list.


I was not adressing CSP proper work at all.

So you have misread me.

Regards

BM


Le 17/10/2021 à 23:08, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :

Robert, Bernard, List:

RM: this classification of sciences is the simplest he [Peirce]
provided ... but the most detailed ones are consistent with this
matrix.


It is indeed his simplest, but there is a /very/ /fundamental 
/difference from his more detailed ones. This early (mid-1890s) 
classification situates /nothing /between mathematics and logic, the 
first branch of empirics, and places pragmatics as "the study of how 
we ought to behave" /after /all the special sciences, the later 
branches of empirics. By contrast, Peirce's mature (1902-3) 
classification /omits /empirics and pragmatics altogether, instead 
inserting phenomenology/phaneroscopy as the first /positive /science, 
as well as esthetics and ethics as the first two /normative /sciences. 
Was this change a mistake on Peirce's part? Evidently Bernard thinks so.


BM
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-10/msg00151.html
):
On the contrary what has been suggested is to find a place for an
unknown thing into a pretty trichotomy a priori derived from the
logic of the categories. This is too much putting the cart before
the horse.

BM
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-10/msg00158.html
):
I wanted to underline that to force the description of
Phaneroscopy to obey a preconceived (and hypothetical)
classification of sciences is taking the problem the wrong way
round (like the discussion on the list seems to have shown)


The claim here seems to be that Peirce revised his classification of 
the sciences /only /because he wanted it to conform to "the logic of 
the categories" as an "a priori" or "preconceived" organizing 
principle. But what is the evidence for this allegation? What /other 
/plausible reasons might Peirce have had for recognizing 
phenomenology/phaneroscopy as a distinct science and placing it 
between mathematics and logic, along with esthetics and ethics? Note 
that in seeking to /understand /his thinking on the matter, this is a 
different question from whether he was /correct /to make this 
particular adjustment.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 3:00 AM robert marty > wrote:


Dear Margaretha,

Your conception of attitude is in interpersonal relations, very
psychological. But it is not about that... it is about
epistemology ... Here is for example a very vertical
"/epistemological attitude/" of Peirce :

/""Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a
classification of the sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange
the sciences in a series of steps, each leading another. This
general idea may be adopted, and we may adapt our phraseology to
the image of the well of truth with flights of stairs leading down
into it:/

/We divide the whole into three great parts:/

/ - *mathematics*, the study of ideal constructions without
reference to their real existence,

 - *empirics*, the study of phenomena *with the purpose of
identifying their forms with those mathematics has studied,*/

/ - *pragmatics*, the study of how we ought to behave in the light
of the truths of empirics."/

(C.S. Peirce, MS 1345, undated, transcription 1976: NEM, vol III.2
1122)"

And now try to get a horizontal comment on Peirce-L (/on the
sociological axis/) that takes into account this question of
identification of forms ... and if you are answered "OK" then ask
where and when your interlocutors tried to give content to their
agreement "in the flights of stairs within of well of truth"

NB: this classification of sciences is the simplest he provided
... but the most detailed ones are consistent with this matrix.

Best regards,

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

_https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
_


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[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

Notice Peirce's significant shift in thinking already *within *R 1345.
Empirics and pragmatics have disappeared, with philosophy now coming right
after mathematics, and ethics as "the philosophy of action" falling within
it--inserted between "the philosophical trivium"("speculative grammar,
logic, and speculative rhetoric"; EP 2:19, 1895) as "the philosophy of
thought" and metaphysics as "the philosophy of being."

RM: Do we have the right to develop new hypotheses and to study them in
open and respectful dialogue?


Absolutely, as long as we acknowledge them to be *new *hypotheses rather
than ascribing them to *Peirce*. We also need to recognize the
evolution of *his
own* thought over time, such that mathematics/empirics/pragmatics was a
temporary (even fleeting) stage in his efforts to develop a classification
of the sciences--one with which he was ultimately dissatisfied. Again, that
is not to say that his mature classification is *correct*, or even that it
is *more *correct than his earlier ones; just that his own assessment of
what he wrote down in R 1345 was such that he wrote down something very
different several years later.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 5:28 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Dear Jack,
> Your point is now anthropological and I do not reject it ... my
> preoccupation is strictly epistemological (remember that we are here in the
> Sciences of Discovery): what are the practical consequences of this
> identification of forms for knowledge? Here is another version of the
> classification of sciences in the same MS 1345 :
>
> "Synopsis of Logic
>
> *Chapter I . The Place of Philosophy among The Sciences.*
>
> Art. 1. Division 1. The *Sciences *are divided *according to the distance
> at which they paint nature into**: *
>
> 1.Mathematics.
> 2. Philosophy.
> 3. Nomology: general physics and general physics;
> 4. Natural History, the descriptions of classes;
> 5. Sciences descriptive of individual objects, geography, astronomy,
> ordinary history, etc.
> *Definition 1. Mathematics is the development of hypotheses.*
> *Definition* 2. *Philosophy* is the science which deals with the general
> phenomena of life.
>
> Art 2.* Division* 2. *Philosophy* is divided into
>
> 1. The philosophy of thought: The *Philosophical* *Trivium*
> 2. The philosophy of action: *Ethics*, etc.
> 1. The philosophy of being: *Metaphysics.  "*  [emphasize mine]
>
> What do we do with this? Do we have the right to develop new hypotheses
> and to study them in open and respectful dialogue? Knowing that a bricoleur
> will be able to repair his electrical network but that for a nuclear power
> plant, one will rather call upon a specialist of Dynamics of Fluids ...
> When Newton saw an apple fall and encapsulated this apple in a binary
> relation of attraction with the earth, he opened the possibility for
> humanity to take a big step on the Moon...
>
> Here are the questions ...
>
> Best regards,
>
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
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