[PEIRCE-L] Tone, Token, Type, was, Mark Token Type
Jon, Helmut, List, This is a bald an expression of why "the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly treating it as virtually synonymous with "token." In my opinion (and after reviewing your extended exchange with John Sowa on the topic), it seems to me clear that you have well argued (with *considerable *textual support) as to why 'tone' is *far preferable* to 'mark' for the "possible sign" under consideration. However, if one is 'married' to a term (because, say, he's published work using that term, or plans to use it in future papers and presentations, etc.) then he will find reasons to reject any other term. Yet I am *completely* willing to admit that if he has weighed the arguments and still feels that his argumentation is superior, well, that is that. So, as I began the paragraph above, *all *of this is merely 'my opinion'. Again, I expect Peirce-L members will make up their own minds on the matter. In my thinking, it's really quite simple: either "mark" suggests "a material sign" rather than a possible one, or it does not. But, on the other hand, if one concludes that, in addition to those problematic material associations with the term 'mark', that one finds nothing connoting that which is 'material' about the term, 'tone', and for that reason, along with other reasons which have been argued for it, that it is the nature, and so, superior, term for the 'possible sign' being considered, well that is in my view but an expression of critical commonsense. Best, Gary On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 11:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > John, List: > > On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why > the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the > details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and > misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly > treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of > "tone/tuone/tinge/potisign." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa wrote: > >> Helmut, Jon, List, >> >> That is the reason why the word 'Mark' is the perfect choice: you won't >> be wrong whether or not you know the details of Peirce's semeiotic. >> >> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I >> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs >> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual >> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. >> >> The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use >> a word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody: >> academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical >> sense and everybody else who doesn't know Peirce's technical sense. >> >> In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be >> correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone. He also >> considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the >> sound of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that >> subset of marks that could be tinges. But the word 'mark' covers all those >> sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings. >> >> That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was >> close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended. Since >> the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little >> about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose >> terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly. >> >> John >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
[PEIRCE-L] Tone Token Type, was Mark Token Type
Helmut, Jon, List,
HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
JAS: Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent token
in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual material sign."
". . . a mark is an actual material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . .
is never *itself *"an actual material sign." Exactly. When one offers
examples of marks they are invariably composed of or involve some* materia*l:
a mark on a blackboard is chalk; a beauty mark is composed of skin cells; a
mark on a dart board is painted wood, etc. Even when 'mark' is used
figuratively ("mark my words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a
mark of collegiality to 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind.
On the other hand, the tone (timbre) of a flute is its
characteristic sound, it's "tone quality" musicians say, far different
from the timbre of an oboe;, we recognized the characteristic timbre (tone)
of a friend's voice and notice that the tone changes when she is
angry.These tone/timbres are, shall we say, not the physical, material
'instrument', but rather are positioned on or upon the physical source of
the sound (the flute or someone's vocal chords).
I continue to be convinced that the argument for 'tone' v 'mark' (which has
been explicated rather fully by Jon and John) is far stronger for 'tone'.
List members will, of course, make up their own minds.
Best,
Gary
On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 1:48 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Helmut, List:
>
> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>
>
> Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
> about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
> Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent
> token in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual
> material sign."
>
> HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>
>
> The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree
> with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.
>
> HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is
> "either-or".
>
>
> Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903
> trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object
> is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp
> distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting
> any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying
> any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and
> an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a
> *degenerate
> *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c.
> 1901).
>
> HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".
>
>
> Determination in sign classification can be *described *using if-then,
> but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a
> necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be
> in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be
> either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible,
> the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a
> symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign
> or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.
>
> HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the
> categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification
> (3ns).
>
>
> Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic
> relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks
> it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that *composition *is
> itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the
> composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien wrote:
>
>>
>> List,
>>
>> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
>> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
>> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an
