Helmut, Jon, List,
HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
JAS: Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent token
in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual material sign."
". . . a mark is an actual material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . .
is never *itself *"an actual material sign." Exactly. When one offers
examples of marks they are invariably composed of or involve some* materia*l:
a mark on a blackboard is chalk; a beauty mark is composed of skin cells; a
mark on a dart board is painted wood, etc. Even when 'mark' is used
figuratively ("mark my words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a
mark of collegiality to 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind.
On the other hand, the tone (timbre) of a flute is its
characteristic sound, it's "tone quality" musicians say, far different
from the timbre of an oboe;, we recognized the characteristic timbre (tone)
of a friend's voice and notice that the tone changes when she is
angry.These tone/timbres are, shall we say, not the physical, material
'instrument', but rather are positioned on or upon the physical source of
the sound (the flute or someone's vocal chords).
I continue to be convinced that the argument for 'tone' v 'mark' (which has
been explicated rather fully by Jon and John) is far stronger for 'tone'.
List members will, of course, make up their own minds.
Best,
Gary
On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 1:48 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Helmut, List:
>
> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>
>
> Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
> about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
> Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent
> token in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual
> material sign."
>
> HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>
>
> The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree
> with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.
>
> HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is
> "either-or".
>
>
> Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903
> trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object
> is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp
> distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting
> any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying
> any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and
> an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a
> *degenerate
> *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c.
> 1901).
>
> HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".
>
>
> Determination in sign classification can be *described *using if-then,
> but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a
> necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be
> in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be
> either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible,
> the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a
> symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign
> or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.
>
> HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the
> categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification
> (3ns).
>
>
> Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic
> relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks
> it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that *composition *is
> itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the
> composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>> List,
>>
>> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
>> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
>> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
>> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>> Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>>
>> "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no
>> precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world
>> itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be
>> counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and
>> shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words
>> 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are
>> so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be
>> obsolete today."
>>
>> Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there
>> are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and
>> function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or,
>> as a matter of retrospection, in the past.
>>
>> In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of
>> classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes,
>> there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think
>> is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then"
>> to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation
>> of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and
>> classification (3ns).
>>
>> Best regards
>> Helmut
>>
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