Re: Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[John F Sowa]

On 8/12/2017 4:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I have problems with the term "final" or "end" anyway. I guess that the 
pragmatic maxim is only a proposal how to make our ideas clearer, in 
order to be able to talk more reasonably, but not absolutely end-clear.


That 1878 article about the gates of perception and action was early
in Peirce's career.  He certainly knew logic, and he realized that
many arguments take a long path from the starting observations to the
concluding actions.

In his late writings on the logic of pragmatism, he emphasized the
multiple cycles of observations, induction, abduction, deduction,
testing (actions) and repeat.

He never gave up the idea that meaningful concepts must be
related to perception and action.  But there may be multiple
steps along the way.

John

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Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Helmut Raulien]

Stephen, John, List,

that  a token is often one of "an open-ended variety of types", I find interesting and very agreeable. I have problems with the term "final" or "end" anyway. I guess that the pragmatic maxim is only a proposal how to make our ideas clearer, in order to be able to talk more reasonably, but not absolutely end-clear. The nirvana of absolute truth I imagine as very boring, because static, and therefore do not want to believe in it.

Best,

Helmut

 

12. August 2017 um 21:37 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
 

On 8/12/2017 10:43 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end
> a practical actionable something (_expression_, act) that contains
> the initial sign and the index.

Peirce said that the interpretant of any sign is always another sign.
He also said that every meaningful sign must show its passport at the
gates of perception and action. But he put no limits on the number
of intermediate steps.

> In which case the sign would already have been predefined by the
> logical end, though requiring the cogitative process to get there.
> Isn't the end the point of the pragmaticist maxim.

Both gates are essential for meaningful signs. But any mark
may be interpreted as a token of an open-ended variety of types.
A meaningful sign could be encountered on many different steps
of many different paths from perceptible marks to purposive actions.

John

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Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

the plot type is a sign type, but is it a sign? Or are only the tokens signs, because only they are perceived? Like a book that is read. And is the book only a sign when it is being read, because only then it is interpreted, and when it is closed, it sort of sleeps and is not a sign?

And is a complex system, like a person or a society, a sign too? If so, maybe a systems theory is not necessary, but a box-in-box-theory of signs, like a person who reads a book is a sign which interprets another sign. And when nothing is happening, the book is closed and the person asleep, there are no signs, but sign tokens and sign types.

So maybe it would be possible to translate all systems theory terms into Peircean "sign-" terms, and not use the term "system" at all?

Best,

Helmut

 

 12. August 2017 um 15:03 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
wrote:

 

On 8/11/2017 5:09 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> A system, I think, is defined by the part of its structure, that does
> not change. The system exists as long as this part of structure (set of
> relations) exists. Which part of the structure is used to define the
> system, can be arbitrary choice, but usually is something essential,
> whatever this means.

You could apply Peirce's classification of signs to this analysis.

As an example, consider the book _War and Peace_. Peirce would call
the physical book a sign token. The corresponding type would be
the entire text, considered as a string of chapters, paragraphs,
sentences, words -- independent of any method of presentation
or storage.

That type is an abstraction from the physical book. But there is
an even more general abstraction: the detailed plot of the book,
which is the same type for Tolstoy's original Russian and the
translation to English or any other language.

A very similar, but somewhat simplified plot type could be used
to classify a movie made from the book. The plot type for the
movie and the plot type for the book would both be special cases
of a more general plot type.

> Every system has a "Now". This is the signs, that happen every now,
> and this "now" travels through time.

You could apply that description to the movie as it is projected
on a screen (in a theater or on a computer).

But you could also apply it to the process of a person sitting
in a chair and reading the book -- in any language. That process
may be discontinuous, since people don't read _War and Peace_
in a single sitting.

John

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Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List,

 

I think, that the main difference between a sytem and a sign is, that a system can sleep (in the sense of dreamless sleep). A system, I think, is defined by the part of it´s structure, that does not change. The system exists as long as this part of structure (set of relations) exists. Which part of the structure is used to define the system, can be arbitrary choice, but usually is something essential, whatever this means.

Every system has a "Now". This is the signs, that happen every now, and this "now" travels through time. The system´s now of a person, I think, is his/her "I", or ego. The self is something different: the set of memories (conscious and asleep), the body, etc., I guess. When one sleeps dreamlessly, for him/her there is no "now", she/he has no "I", but still a self.

 


I think in a system we have:

1.: Events

2.: Subjects or entities or things

3.: Structure (relations),

 

while in a "system´s now" or signs we have:

1.: Signs (events at work)

2.: Objects (subjects at work)

3.: Interpretants (relations at work).

 

In the sense of the first triad, a system is a subject, and a sign is an event (at work). A person´s self is a subject, a person´s "I" consists of signs.

This is how I temporarily think that it is like.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 


10. August 2017 um 21:23 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 


John, List. 
 

(I preface my remarks with several quotes from earlier posts in an attempt to establish the context of my post and John’s response, which I do not understand.  It is a bit confusing, but I think this is a critically important issue with respect to the scientific foundations of semiotics.  That is, are all signs emanations?) 

 


On Aug 5, 2017, at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 





I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP. Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies: "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of signs.


 

Best,

Helmut










 06. August 2017 um 13:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:



Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense
(meaning) it is used nowadays.

I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in
more detail.

 

 

I wrote 


Jerry LR Chandler 

CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning  was  Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

Armando, List:

 

Consider the meaning of the chromaticity  (spectra) of 

1,2,3…

A, B, C,…

H, He, Li, Be, B, C, N, O, F, Ne,…

A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C,…   (musical scales)

nad A, nad B, and nad C, etc, (genetic symbols with closure over a set of genetic symbols that represent the potential of inheritance of the genome)

 

 

Each of these five symbol systems is an accepted social symbol system that is used publicly in everyday communication and by different academic tribes.  The factual meaning of the latter three symbol systems are established by factual (reproducible) observations from objects.

 

Now, consider the CP 2.230 (1910) in relation to the systems of modern thought.

 

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense—for the word “fast,” which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means “rapidly” and quite another when it means “immovable,” and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must “represent,” as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical “property” the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. 

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence “Cain killed Abel,” which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even