Stephen, John, List,
that a token is often one of "an open-ended variety of types", I find interesting and very agreeable. I have problems with the term "final" or "end" anyway. I guess that the pragmatic maxim is only a proposal how to make our ideas clearer, in order to be able to talk more reasonably, but not absolutely end-clear. The nirvana of absolute truth I imagine as very boring, because static, and therefore do not want to believe in it.
Best,
Helmut
12. August 2017 um 21:37 Uhr
"John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
"John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
On 8/12/2017 10:43 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end
> a practical actionable something (_expression_, act) that contains
> the initial sign and the index.
Peirce said that the interpretant of any sign is always another sign.
He also said that every meaningful sign must show its passport at the
gates of perception and action. But he put no limits on the number
of intermediate steps.
> In which case the sign would already have been predefined by the
> logical end, though requiring the cogitative process to get there.
> Isn't the end the point of the pragmaticist maxim.
Both gates are essential for meaningful signs. But any mark
may be interpreted as a token of an open-ended variety of types.
A meaningful sign could be encountered on many different steps
of many different paths from perceptible marks to purposive actions.
John
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> Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end
> a practical actionable something (_expression_, act) that contains
> the initial sign and the index.
Peirce said that the interpretant of any sign is always another sign.
He also said that every meaningful sign must show its passport at the
gates of perception and action. But he put no limits on the number
of intermediate steps.
> In which case the sign would already have been predefined by the
> logical end, though requiring the cogitative process to get there.
> Isn't the end the point of the pragmaticist maxim.
Both gates are essential for meaningful signs. But any mark
may be interpreted as a token of an open-ended variety of types.
A meaningful sign could be encountered on many different steps
of many different paths from perceptible marks to purposive actions.
John
-----------------------------
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