Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Martin, List

I think his Objective Knowledge is a good text to see his arguments
against induction [which he also calls the Bucket Theory of the Mind]
as a means of developing scientific knowledge. 

The methodological nominalism, which, as you point out, is an
argument against Plato's essentialism of Pure Forms, is rather
similar, I think, to Peirce's pragmatism. That is, Popper is against
focusing on some kind of a priori Pure Truth...which is also why, I
think, he is against historicism with its determinism and is instead,
supporting the Open Society. 

And Peirce was also against beginning inquiry with 'pure doubt' [an
impossible state] and relying only on inductive data [which is also
why phaneroscopy is not a primary science but rests within the
hypothetical constructs of mathematics]. 

With Peirce - his abduction was the development of hypotheses about
the world - and of course, these had to be accepted as fallible. With
Popper - his 'logic of discovery' [Ch 3 in Objective Knowledge] has
similarities since this Three World theory sets up that Third World
as the site of universal concepts [p 156] and mathematical truths and
other propositions or theories. Rather similar to Peirce's Thirdness.
And he suggests that this third world has its own realitiy/autonomy
and also..'man-made' p 159. This has similarities with Peirce's
abduction - but I think Peirce explains it better. And, as we know,
Peirce's Thirdness was universal and found within the
physico-chemical and biological realms, not simply human.

So, induction, which is merely data-gathering without hypothesis
construction, does not get science anywhere.

As for fallibility, I see it as an acknowledgement of openness to
data, rather than a modus tollens - though I see your point.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  3:38 PM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com
sent:
  Thank you, Edwina. 
 I haven’t read "Object Knowledge." Even in "The Open Society and
it’s Enemies” there is a slipperiness in the way Popper defends
“methodological nominalism,” which (in his words)
  “Instead of aiming at finding out what a thing really is, and at
defining its true nature…aims at describing how a thing behaves in
various circumstances, and especially, whether there are any
regularities in its behavior. In other words, methodological
nominalism sees the aim of science in the description of the thing
and events our experience, and in an ‘explanation’ of these
events, i.e. their description with the help of universal laws. And
it sees in our language, and especially in those of its rules which
distinguish properly constructed sentences and inferences for a mere
heap of words, the great instrument of scientific description; words
it considers rather as subsidiary tools for this task, and not as
names of essences.” 
 Of course here we see his plaidoyer against Plato, but one wonders
how universal laws are to be recognized and used to ‘help explain
events’ if (as Popper continues)
 “The methodological nominalist will never think that a question
like ‘What is energy?’ or ‘What is movement?’ or ‘What is
an atom?’ is an important question for physics; but he will attach
importance to a question like ‘How can the energy of the sun be
made useful?’ or ‘How does a planet move? or “Under what
conditions does an atom radiate light?’ And to those philosophers
who tell him that before having answered the ‘what is’ question
he cannot hope to give any exact answers to any of the ‘how’
questions, he will reply, if at all, by pointing out that he much
prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can achieve by his
methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by
theirs.” (p 32) 
 The slipperiness is around induction, meaning how we get from
individual observations to laws of science. In "Logik der
Forschung,” (1935) Popper said that the problem of induction is
insurmountable, and that science is not in fact based on inductive
inferences at all. Popper said that science proceeds by making bold
conjectures, and then attempting to falsify those conjectures. So,
induction gets accounted for by deduction, i.e.: the hypothesis is
falsified by modus tollens.  Popper is desperately trying to avoid
Hume’s problem within the same individualist logic; whereas Peirce
accounts for the validity of induction by his “social theory of
logic.” (“Four Incapacities…,’ “Fixation of Belief,” and
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”)
  Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com [1]303 747 4449 
 On 7 Oct 2021, at 11:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.
 I've always considered him to be against a certain type of realism,
in particular, the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to
speak, of such as Plato . But his Third World, to my understanding,
was not nominalism but realism - an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'.
I understood 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Martin W. Kettelhut]

Thank you, Edwina. 

I haven’t read "Object Knowledge." Even in "The Open Society and it’s Enemies” 
there is a slipperiness in the way Popper defends “methodological nominalism,” 
which (in his words)

“Instead of aiming at finding out what a thing really is, and at defining its 
true nature…aims at describing how a thing behaves in various circumstances, 
and especially, whether there are any regularities in its behavior. In other 
words, methodological nominalism sees the aim of science in the description of 
the thing and events our experience, and in an ‘explanation’ of these events, 
i.e. their description with the help of universal laws. And it sees in our 
language, and especially in those of its rules which distinguish properly 
constructed sentences and inferences for a mere heap of words, the great 
instrument of scientific description; words it considers rather as subsidiary 
tools for this task, and not as names of essences.”

Of course here we see his plaidoyer against Plato, but one wonders how 
universal laws are to be recognized and used to ‘help explain events’ if (as 
Popper continues)

“The methodological nominalist will never think that a question like ‘What is 
energy?’ or ‘What is movement?’ or ‘What is an atom?’ is an important question 
for physics; but he will attach importance to a question like ‘How can the 
energy of the sun be made useful?’ or ‘How does a planet move? or “Under what 
conditions does an atom radiate light?’ And to those philosophers who tell him 
that before having answered the ‘what is’ question he cannot hope to give any 
exact answers to any of the ‘how’ questions, he will reply, if at all, by 
pointing out that he much prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can 
achieve by his methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by 
theirs.” (p 32)

The slipperiness is around induction, meaning how we get from individual 
observations to laws of science. In "Logik der Forschung,” (1935) Popper said 
that the problem of induction is insurmountable, and that science is not in 
fact based on inductive inferences at all. Popper said that science proceeds by 
making bold conjectures, and then attempting to falsify those conjectures. So, 
induction gets accounted for by deduction, i.e.: the hypothesis is falsified by 
modus tollens. Popper is desperately trying to avoid Hume’s problem within the 
same individualist logic; whereas Peirce accounts for the validity of induction 
by his “social theory of logic.” (“Four Incapacities…,’ “Fixation of Belief,” 
and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”)

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
ListeningIsTheKey.com
303 747 4449



> On 7 Oct 2021, at 11:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Martin, List
> 
> Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.  I've 
> always considered him to be against a certain type of realism, in particular, 
> the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to speak, of such as Plato 
> . But his Third World, to my understanding, was not nominalism but realism - 
> an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'. I understood him to describe himself as 
> a metaphysical realist [Objective Knowledge, p 40, footnote. And "I propose 
> to accept realism as the only sensible hypothesis [p 42].
> 
> One has to consider what he means by this 'realism'. It's, again, certainly 
> not Plato's external-to-the-universe Forms, which was, according to Popper, 
> essentially a religious world [153-4]. I'd say it's comparable to Peirce's 
> Thirdness, the realm of developed and developing habits/laws.This is a 
> rational, logical realm, the realm of 'intelligibles, or of ideas in the 
> objective sense'. [p 154]
> 
> The first world is the physical world; the second world is the subjective 
> world, of subjective or personal experiences..and the third world is the 
> realm of 'arguments, logical relations' etc.
> 
> So- my reading of Popper is that I wouldn't really describe him as a 
> nominalist - because of this third world he focuses on.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Thu 07/10/21 11:54 AM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com sent:
> 
> Dear Edwina and Margaretha,
> 
> Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon 
> with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a 
> thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not the least of which 
> is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got is 
> truth in a certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). 
> Popper is afraid that a realist commitment to truth = closedness, or 
> truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or 
> continuity.
> 
> Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
> 
>> On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote:
>> 
>> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third 
>> World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as 
>> analogous with the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[E Valentine Daniel]

Still better than calumny
EVD

> On Oct 7, 2021, at 8:08 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> It was not a joke... I myself committed a lapsus calami by writing "calmi"! 
> Excuse me ...
> RM
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ 
> 
> 
> 
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 17:00, robert marty  > a écrit :
> Margaretha, Edwina, List
> 
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it is 
> not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too... 
> 
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument that 
> genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of 
> qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail -- X 
> represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic relation.†1 
> Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But you can never by 
> such joining make a graph with three tails. You may think that a node 
> connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis will 
> show that it is so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I 
> exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may say, with 
> sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On Wednesday I 
> see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently 
> is the same I saw on Monday." There is a recognition of triadic identity; but 
> it is only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is itself 
> a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I cannot by any such direct 
> experience identify both of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify 
> them if I regard them, not as the very same, but as two different 
> manifestations of the same man. But the idea of manifestation is the idea of 
> a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to 
> some interpretant thought, [emphasize mine]
> 
>  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that while 
> a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two or one 
> tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to build 
> graphs with every higher number of tails. 
> 
> 
>   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic, or 
> of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic 
> relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three 
> elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to be 
> found in the phenomenon "
> 
> Best regards,
> Robert Marty
> 
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ 
> 
> 
> 
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  > a écrit :
> Margaretha
> 
> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this list, 
> with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle but in 
> a Y shape.
> 
> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign - Interpretant do 
> not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is closed, but 
> within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and enable 
> networking with other triads.
> 
> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y 
> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
> 
> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that 
> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his 
> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance, 
> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex 
> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
> 
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third 
> World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as 
> analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his Objective 
> Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open 
> Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and 
> unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper 
> accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in the 
> development of a society.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com 
>  sent:
> 
> List,
> 
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
> between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
> 
> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.
 I've always considered him to be against a certain type of realism,
in particular, the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to
speak, of such as Plato . But his Third World, to my understanding,
was not nominalism but realism - an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'.
I understood him to describe himself as a metaphysical realist
[Objective Knowledge, p 40, footnote. And "I propose to accept
realism as the only sensible hypothesis [p 42]. 

One has to consider what he means by this 'realism'. It's, again,
certainly not Plato's external-to-the-universe Forms, which was,
according to Popper, essentially a religious world [153-4]. I'd say
it's comparable to Peirce's Thirdness, the realm of developed and
developing habits/laws.This is a rational, logical realm, the realm
of 'intelligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense'. [p 154] 

The first world is the physical world; the second world is the
subjective world, of subjective or personal experiences..and the
third world is the realm of 'arguments, logical relations' etc.

So- my reading of Popper is that I wouldn't really describe him as a
nominalist - because of this third world he focuses on.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21 11:54 AM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com
sent:
  Dear Edwina and Margaretha,
 Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must
reckon with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas
Peirce is a thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not
the least of which is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he
says that all we’ve got is truth in a certain context (like a
chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). Popper is afraid that a
realist commitment to truth = closedness, or truth-with-an-agenda.
Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or continuity. 
  Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
 On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that
Popper's Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's
Thirdness….he even sets it up as analogous with the biological
realm of knowledge. [See his Objective Knowledge]. And I think that
Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open Society, where he
rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and unknown
complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper
accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in
the development of a society. 
 Responding to 
On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
  List,
 How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'mahe3...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

In my view, I don't think that it is a valid comparison in this
discussion of the image of the triadic sign,  to suggest that the use
of the Y-shape vs the triangle depends on what is being diagrammed.
That's a very different issue.

I think that the diagram of the triadic sign - is what we are
talking about. That's all. We aren't talking about diagrams for the
classification of triads as in EP 2.491. We are talking about the
actual operational image of the triadic semiosic Sign, made up of
those three Relations: O-R-I.

And that, from my reading of 1.347 and EP2 /364 is most definitely
diagrammed as a Y shape. Why? To show how the nodal sites of O-R-I
not only interact within the triad but also connect to other triads.
As Peirce noted, "No sign can function as such except so far as it is
interpreted in another sign...Consequently, it is absolutely essential
to a sign that it should affect another sign". 8.225 and footnote.

The diagram of a closed triangle does not, in my view, show us this
constant open networking, whereas Peirce's own diagrams of the Y
shape clearly show us how networking is functional.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21 11:34 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Margaretha, Edwina, Robert, List:
 Whether a triangle or a Y-shape is more appropriate depends on what
exactly is being diagrammed. Peirce uses triangles for sign
classification (EP 2:491, 1908), and Gary R. uses triangles to
illustrate the different "vectors" by which various phenomena are
related with respect to the three universal/formal categories (
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm
[1]). For example, in semiosis, the "vector of determination" is from
the object (2ns) through the sign (1ns) to the interpretant (3ns).
 As Robert indicated, what Peirce shows with the Y-shapes in CP
1.346-347 (1903) are existential graphs of triadic relations (names
a, b, c, d) that each have three correlates (attached lines of
identity) and how they can be arranged to demonstrate "that every
relation which is  tetradic, pentadic, or of any greater number of
correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic relations." He
provides even more examples of this at EP 2:364 (1906). In semiosis,
the sign, the object, and the interpretant are the three correlates
of the irreducible triadic relation of representing or mediating.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer,
Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran
Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
 On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 10:01 AM robert marty  wrote:
 Margaretha, Edwina, List
 Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami
 it is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346
too... 
   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the
argument that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic
relations and of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a
spot with one tail -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails
-- R -- a dyadic relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also
a dyadic relation. But you can never by such joining make a graph
with three tails. You may think that a node connecting three lines of
identity Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis will show that it is
so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim,
"Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may say, with
sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On
Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on
Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a
recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If
I see two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify
both of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I
regard them, not as the very same, but as two different
manifestations of the same man. But the idea of manifestation is the
idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact
or object, B, to some interpretant thought, [emphasize mine]
  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to
remark that while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of
graphs each with two or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three
tails each will suffice to build graphs with every higher number of
tails. 
   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic,
pentadic, or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a
compound of triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find
that beyond the three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness, there is nothing else to be found in the phenomenon "
 Best regards,Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Margaretha Hendrickx]

Thank you for all your feedback and suggested readings.  I will take a look
over the week-end and get back to you.

My very best, Margaretha H.

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 11:54 AM Martin W. Kettelhut 
wrote:

> Dear Edwina and Margaretha,
>
> Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon
> with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a
> thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not the least of which
> is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got
> is truth in a certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic
> accelerator). Popper is afraid that a realist commitment to truth =
> closedness, or truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not
> negotiate generality or continuity.
>
> Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
>
> On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets
> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his
> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in
> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an
> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to
> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness
> and Thirdness] in the development of a society.
>
>
> Responding to
>
> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List,
>
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
> connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
>
>
>
>
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Martin W. Kettelhut]

Dear Edwina and Margaretha,

Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon with 
the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a thorough-going 
realist. There are many implications, not the least of which is that Popper 
dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got is truth in a 
certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). Popper is 
afraid that a realist commitment to truth = closedness, or 
truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or 
continuity.

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD

> On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third 
> World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as 
> analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his Objective 
> Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open 
> Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and 
> unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper 
> accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in the 
> development of a society.


Responding to 

On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com 
 sent:

List,

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Margaretha, Edwina, Robert, List:

Whether a triangle or a Y-shape is more appropriate depends on what exactly
is being diagrammed. Peirce uses triangles for sign classification (EP
2:491, 1908), and Gary R. uses triangles to illustrate the different
"vectors" by which various phenomena are related with respect to the three
universal/formal categories (
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm).
For example, in semiosis, the "vector of determination" is from the object
(2ns) through the sign (1ns) to the interpretant (3ns).

As Robert indicated, what Peirce shows with the Y-shapes in CP 1.346-347
(1903) are existential graphs of triadic relations (names a, b, c, d) that
each have three correlates (attached lines of identity) and how they can be
arranged to demonstrate "that every relation which is *tetradic*, *pentadic*,
or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
relations." He provides even more examples of this at EP 2:364 (1906). In
semiosis, the sign, the object, and the interpretant are the three
correlates of the irreducible triadic relation of representing or mediating.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 10:01 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Margaretha, Edwina, List
>
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
> is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...
>
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
> that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
> of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
> -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
> relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
> you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may
> think that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic
> idea. But analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On
> Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on
> Monday." We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced
> the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I
> saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a
> recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
> conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see
> two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both of
> them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them,
> not as the very same, but as two different manifestations of the same man.
> But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is
> something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant
> thought, [emphasize mine]
>
>  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that
> while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two
> or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to
> build graphs with every higher number of tails.
> [image: image.png]
>   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic,
> or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
> relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
> elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
> be found in the phenomenon "
>
> Best regards,
> Robert Marty
>
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a
> écrit :
>
>> Margaretha
>>
>> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this
>> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle
>> but in a Y shape.
>>
>> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
>> Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is
>> closed, but within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and
>> enable networking with other triads.
>>
>> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y
>> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
>>
>> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that
>> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his
>> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance,
>> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex
>> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
>>
>> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
>> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[robert marty]

It was not a joke... I myself committed a lapsus calami by writing "calmi"!
Excuse me ...
RM
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 17:00, robert marty  a
écrit :

> Margaretha, Edwina, List
>
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
> is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...
>
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
> that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
> of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
> -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
> relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
> you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may
> think that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic
> idea. But analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On
> Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on
> Monday." We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced
> the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I
> saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a
> recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
> conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see
> two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both of
> them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them,
> not as the very same, but as two different manifestations of the same man.
> But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is
> something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant
> thought, [emphasize mine]
>
>  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that
> while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two
> or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to
> build graphs with every higher number of tails.
> [image: image.png]
>
>   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic,
> or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
> relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
> elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
> be found in the phenomenon "
>
> Best regards,
> Robert Marty
>
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
>
>
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a
> écrit :
>
>> Margaretha
>>
>> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this
>> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle
>> but in a Y shape.
>>
>> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
>> Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is
>> closed, but within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and
>> enable networking with other triads.
>>
>> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y
>> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
>>
>> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that
>> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his
>> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance,
>> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex
>> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
>>
>> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
>> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets
>> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his
>> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in
>> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an
>> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to
>> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness
>> and Thirdness] in the development of a society.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> List,
>>
>> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
>> connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
>>
>> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
>> intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must
>> be others.
>>
>> As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not
>> in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his
>> work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Ben Udell]

"Popper" site:arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/
https://www.google.com/search?q=%22Popper%22+site%3Aarisbe.sitehost.iu.edu%2F

"Popper" "Peirce"
https://www.google.com/search?q=%22Popper%22+%22Peirce%22

- Best, Ben

On 10/7/2021 9:48 AM, Margaretha Hendrickx wrote:


List,

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?

So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection,
the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must be others.

As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not
in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his
work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key
answers to epistemological problems in management research.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[robert marty]

Margaretha, Edwina, List

Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...

  "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
-- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may think
that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic idea. But
analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see
a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may
say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On
Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday,
and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a recognition of
triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a conclusion from two
premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I
cannot by any such direct experience identify both of them with a man I saw
before. I can only identify them if I regard them, not as the very same,
but as two different manifestations of the same man. But the idea of
manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which
denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, [emphasize
mine]

 C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that
while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two
or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to
build graphs with every higher number of tails.
[image: image.png]

  And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic,
or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
be found in the phenomenon "

Best regards,
Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Margaretha
>
> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this
> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle
> but in a Y shape.
>
> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign - Interpretant
> do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is closed, but
> within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and enable
> networking with other triads.
>
> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y
> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
>
> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that
> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his
> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance,
> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex
> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
>
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets
> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his
> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in
> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an
> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to
> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness
> and Thirdness] in the development of a society.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List,
>
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
> connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
>
> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
> intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must
> be others.
>
> As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not
> in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his
> work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key
> answers to epistemological problems in management research.
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Peter Skagestad]

Margaretha,

Several philosophers have written about Peirce and Popper, including Eugene 
Freeman, myself, and others. You will find references in my paper ‘Thinking 
With Machines’. I do not have it ready to hand, but it is available on the 
Arisbe website. I would be delighted to hear your thoughts about my discussion 
there, although I must warn that the paper is somewhat dated - published in 
1993.

Best,
Peter Skagestad 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Oct 7, 2021, at 10:39 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> 
> Margaretha, I haven’t studied the Peirce/Popper connection systematically, 
> but one point in my book Turning Signs about a metaphor they both used, 
> science as a “conversation with nature”:
> Natural Dialogic (TS ·2) (gnusystems.ca).
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
> Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
> Sent: 7-Oct-21 09:49
> To: Peirce-L 
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper
>  
> List,
> 
>  
> 
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
> between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
> 
>  
> 
> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection, 
> the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must be others.
> 
>  
> 
> As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not in 
> philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his work 
> on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key answers to 
> epistemological problems in management research.  
> 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . 
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in 
> the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[gnox]

Margaretha, I haven’t studied the Peirce/Popper connection systematically, but 
one point in my book Turning Signs about a metaphor they both used, science as 
a “conversation with nature”:

Natural Dialogic (TS ·2) (gnusystems.ca) 
 .

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
Sent: 7-Oct-21 09:49
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

 

List,

 

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?

 

So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection, the 
French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must be others.

 

As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not in 
philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his work on 
semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key answers to 
epistemological problems in management research.  

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Margaretha

1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to
this list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as
a triangle but in a Y shape.

That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format,
which is closed, but within that Y shape, where the three
interactions are OPEN and enable networking with other triads.

I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of
these Y shapes connecting with each other [1.327]. 

The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of
that triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other
'Y's...plus his three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness [chance, immediate physical connection and reason-habits]
together enable a complex adaptive system that has the capacity to
self-organize and evolve. 

2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that
Popper's Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's
Thirdness….he even sets it up as analogous with the biological
realm of knowledge. [See his Objective Knowledge]. And I think that
Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open Society, where he
rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and unknown
complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper
accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in
the development of a society.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
sent:
 List,
 How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
 So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there
must be others.
 As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic
management, not in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean
philosophy, and especially his work on semiotic triangles, given that
I believe it provides some key answers to epistemological problems in
management research.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.