Re: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Ah, yet another accolade from Those-In-The-Know!!

You are making two assumptions;

1] That my interpretations of Peirce are 'far from what he wrote'. 

2] That your interpretations of Peirce are 'exactly as he wrote'.

Now - who will decide?? I've been called, by some on this List,
'unPeircean, pseudo-Peircean, discredited' and so on.

And yet, off list - I'm asked to write papers referring to Peirce
[next one, thank goodness, not due until February].

Isn't that an odd or should I say, absurd,  situation? Who will
decide?

Edwina
 On Wed 25/08/21  9:48 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
ET: I think that this is becoming absurd –
GF: On that point we agree!

 I will henceforth cease to comment on your interpretations of
Peirce, no matter how far they may wander from what Peirce actually
wrote. You have your own style of interpretation and you are welcome
to it. 
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
 Sent: 25-Aug-21 09:17
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré 
Gary F, list

I think that this is becoming absurd - Words do NOT have a singular
meaning. 

When you wrote 'to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the
sign - I understand the term 'acquainted' in this sentence to mean
what Peirce means when he writes 'tell about it'.  I don't mean what
I think you mean [and I may be wrong] as any kind of direct or even
indirect contact. 

And 'telling about' or knowledge-of, is via the practice of semiosis
which is an action of mediated interpretation. 

Edwina
 On Wed 25/08/21 9:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [1] sent: 

“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It
cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for
that is what is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely,
that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some
further information concerning it.” — Peirce, CP2.231 (1910) 
ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of
'percept' is out of context'?
No, because that use is not out of context, as I explained.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky 
 Sent: 25-Aug-21 08:50

Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to
my use of the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the
USE of the term of 'percept' is out of context'? 

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic
object of the sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of
the sign' is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of
mediated interpretation.

 Edwina
 On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [2] sent:

 Edwina, List,
Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does
not need to define the word “percept” for William James, who was
well acquainted with both the word and its object. It is part of his
explanation  of the difference between psychology and phenomenology.
The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of
“the business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not
yet acquainted with it. There are several definitions to suit
different occasions. In order to become acquainted with the dynamic
object of the sign (the actual  practice of phenomenology), we have
to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming that Peirce’s
definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same thing,
the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This
is necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their
objects, nor can one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent
vagueness of words. That’s why it is a trap to take any definition
of a science or practice as fundamental.  
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu [3] On Behalf Of Edwina
Taborsky
 Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
 To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
 Cc: Jon Awbrey 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré
List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just
lifted from a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with
James, the difference between psychology and his phenomenology.
Therefore, the definition of 'percept' given below is out of context.
 

Edwina


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(
[3] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Edwina, Gary F., List:

ET: I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just
lifted from a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with James,
the difference between psychology and his phenomenology. Therefore, the
definition of 'percept' given below is out of context.


Here is the context. The following excerpt comes right after Peirce's
comments about phenomenology vs. logic and Hegel's *Phänomenologie *that
Gary R. also quoted yesterday (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00321.html).

CSP: At the top of p. 483 you speak of various worlds. But the number is
not so great. F. E. Abbot, one of the strongest thinkers I ever
encountered, first showed me that there were just three; the outer, the
inner, and the logical world. The others are not distinct worlds.
On the same page, a little below, you mention as a difficulty people
will have in understanding this doctrine, that they are so accustomed to
think of percepts as the only realities. "To think of realities as similar
to percepts," I should amend this. That is the chief reason why people do
not understand me, or I them without a special effort. For I am thoroughly
accustomed to think of percepts or rather of perceptual judgments as the
data of all knowledge, and as such having a certain imperfect reality. They
*exist*,--the percepts themselves do. But developed reality only belongs to
signs of a certain description. Percepts are signs for psychology; but they
are not so for phenomenology. (CP 8.299-300, 1904)


The point that I understood Gary R. to be making by quoting the last
sentence is precisely that phenomenology and psychology are different
sciences because they have different purposes. When percepts are
studied *within
phenomenology*, they are not studied *as signs*, but simply as phenomena
that are present to the mind in some way. Again,
phenomenology/phaneroscopy *does
not concern itself* with whether its observations correspond to something
in the outer world of existence, as opposed to the inner world of
imagination and the logical world of pure mathematics. On the other hand,
percepts *are *studied as signs within metaphysics and the special sciences
(including psychology), where their dynamical objects are taken to be in
the outer world.

GF: In order to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign (the
actual *practice *of phenomenology), we have to approach it by a kind of
triangulation, assuming that Peirce’s definitions and descriptions of it
are all views of the same thing, the same phenomenon, viewed from different
angles, as it were.


Gary F. can correct me if I am mistaken, but I believe that he is
referencing a *specific *sign in this statement--namely, the term
"phenomenology"--not talking about signs in general. Peirce indeed offers
multiple "definitions and descriptions of"  phenomenology, but these cannot
provide acquaintance--in the sense of *direct *experience--with "the
actual *practice
*of phenomenology," which is the dynamical object of the *word *
"phenomenology."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 8:17 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary F, list
>
> I think that this is becoming absurd - Words do NOT have a singular
> meaning.
>
> When you wrote 'to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the
> sign - I understand the term 'acquainted' in this sentence to mean what
> Peirce means when he writes 'tell about it'.  I don't mean what I think you
> mean [and I may be wrong] as any kind of direct or even indirect contact.
>
> And 'telling about' or knowledge-of, is via the practice of semiosis which
> is an action of mediated interpretation.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 25/08/21 9:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> “The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot
> furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what
> is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it
> presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further information
> concerning it.” — Peirce, CP2.231 (1910)
>
>
>
> ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 'percept' is
> out of context'?
>
>
>
> No, because that use is not out of context, as I explained.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky
> Sent: 25-Aug-21 08:50
>
> Gary F, list
>
> I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to my use
> of the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the
> term of 'percept' is out of context'?
>
> And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic object of
> the sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"
>
> My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of the
> sign' is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of mediated
> interpretation.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[gnox]

ET: I think that this is becoming absurd –

 

GF: On that point we agree!

I will henceforth cease to comment on your interpretations of Peirce, no matter 
how far they may wander from what Peirce actually wrote. You have your own 
style of interpretation and you are welcome to it. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 09:17
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

 

Gary F, list

I think that this is becoming absurd - Words do NOT have a singular meaning. 

When you wrote 'to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign - I 
understand the term 'acquainted' in this sentence to mean what Peirce means 
when he writes 'tell about it'.  I don't mean what I think you mean [and I may 
be wrong] as any kind of direct or even indirect contact.

And 'telling about' or knowledge-of, is via the practice of semiosis which is 
an action of mediated interpretation. 

Edwina

 

On Wed 25/08/21 9:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  sent:

“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish 
acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what is meant in 
this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an 
acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it.” — 
Peirce, CP2.231 (1910) 

 

ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 'percept' is out of 
context'?

 

No, because that use is not out of context, as I explained.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: 25-Aug-21 08:50

Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to my use of 
the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 
'percept' is out of context'?

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the 
sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign' 
is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of mediated interpretation.

Edwina



 

On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca 
  sent:

Edwina, List,

 

Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does not need to 
define the word “percept” for William James, who was well acquainted with both 
the word and its object. It is part of his explanation of the difference 
between psychology and phenomenology.

 

The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of “the 
business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not yet acquainted with 
it. There are several definitions to suit different occasions. In order to 
become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign (the actual practice of 
phenomenology), we have to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming 
that Peirce’s definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same 
thing, the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This is 
necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their objects, nor can 
one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent vagueness of words. That’s 
why it is a trap to take any definition of a science or practice as 
fundamental. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré

 

List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just lifted from 
a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with James, the difference 
between psychology and his phenomenology. Therefore, the definition of 
'percept' given below is out of context. 

Edwina

 

 

 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list

I think that this is becoming absurd - Words do NOT have a singular
meaning. 

When you wrote 'to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the
sign - I understand the term 'acquainted' in this sentence to mean
what Peirce means when he writes 'tell about it'.  I don't mean what
I think you mean [and I may be wrong] as any kind of direct or even
indirect contact.

And 'telling about' or knowledge-of, is via the practice of semiosis
which is an action of mediated interpretation. 

Edwina
 On Wed 25/08/21  9:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It
cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for
that is what is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely,
that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some
further information concerning it.” — Peirce, CP2.231 (1910) 
ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of
'percept' is out of context'?
No, because that use is  not out of context, as I explained.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky  
 Sent:  25-Aug-21 08:50
Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to
my use of the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the
USE of the term of 'percept' is out of context'?

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic
object of the sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

 My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of
the sign' is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of mediated
interpretation.

Edwina
 On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [1] sent: 

Edwina, List,
Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does
not need to define the word “percept” for William James, who was
well acquainted with both the word and its object. It is  part of his
explanation of the difference between psychology and phenomenology.
The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of
“the business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not
yet acquainted with it. There are several definitions to suit
different occasions. In order to become acquainted with the dynamic
object of the sign (the actual  practice of phenomenology), we have
to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming that Peirce’s
definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same thing,
the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This
is necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their
objects, nor can one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent
vagueness of words. That’s why it is a trap to take any definition
of a science or practice as fundamental. 
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu [2] On Behalf Of Edwina
Taborsky
 Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
 To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
 Cc: Jon Awbrey 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré
List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just
lifted from a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with
James, the difference between psychology and his phenomenology.
Therefore, the definition of 'percept' given below is out of context.


Edwina


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[gnox]

“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish 
acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what is meant in 
this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an 
acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it.” — 
Peirce, CP2.231 (1910)

 

ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 'percept' is out of 
context'?

 

No, because that use is not out of context, as I explained.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky  
Sent: 25-Aug-21 08:50



Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to my use of 
the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 
'percept' is out of context'?

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the 
sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign' 
is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of mediated interpretation.

Edwina



 

On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

Edwina, List,

 

Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does not need to 
define the word “percept” for William James, who was well acquainted with both 
the word and its object. It is part of his explanation of the difference 
between psychology and phenomenology.

 

The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of “the 
business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not yet acquainted with 
it. There are several definitions to suit different occasions. In order to 
become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign (the actual practice of 
phenomenology), we have to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming 
that Peirce’s definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same 
thing, the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This is 
necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their objects, nor can 
one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent vagueness of words. That’s 
why it is a trap to take any definition of a science or practice as fundamental.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré

 

List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just lifted from 
a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with James, the difference 
between psychology and his phenomenology. Therefore, the definition of 
'percept' given below is out of context.

Edwina

 

 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to
my use of the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the
USE of the term of 'percept' is out of context'?

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic
object of the sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of
the sign' is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of
mediated interpretation.

Edwina
 On Wed 25/08/21  8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, List,
Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a  definition. Peirce does
not need to define the word “percept” for William James, who was
well acquainted with both the word and its object. It is part of his
explanation of the difference between psychology and phenomenology.
 The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of
“the business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not
yet acquainted with it. There are several definitions to suit
different occasions. In order to become acquainted with the dynamic
object of the sign (the actual practice of phenomenology), we have to
approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming that Peirce’s
definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same thing,
the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This
is necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their
objects, nor can one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent
vagueness of words. That’s why it is a trap to take any definition
of a science or practice as  fundamental.
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
 Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
 To: Peirce-L 

; Gary Richmond 
 Cc: Jon Awbrey 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré
List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just
lifted from a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with
James, the difference between psychology and his phenomenology.
Therefore, the definition of 'percept' given below is out of context.

Edwina
 On Tue 24/08/21 10:31 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com [1]
sent: 

JA, JC, List,
 JA: . . .I do remember having

long discussions on the List about what used to be
 a fairly standard Peircean idea that percepts,
 the very data of the senses, are signs. 
CSP: Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so for
phenomenology. CP 8.300 1904-10-03  Letters to William James   
Best.
Gary R
“LET EVERYTHING HAPPEN TO YOU
 BEAUTY AND TERROR
 JUST KEEP GOING
 NO FEELING IS FINAL”
 ― RAINER MARIA RILKE
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 10:03 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

Dear Jerry,
 Not sure about all of that, but I do remember having
 long discussions on the List about what used to be
 a fairly standard Peircean idea that percepts,
 the very data of the senses, are signs.
 Regards,
 Jon
 On 8/24/2021 7:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
 > List:
 > 
 >> On Aug 24, 2021, at 11:39 AM,
 >>
 >> On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy,
not semeiotic.
 > 
 > This sentence is a remarkable example of how emotional rhetorical
thrusts generate the thoughts  that make no sense in the language of
CSP.
 > 
 > Units of thoughts have units of meaning.   These two concepts are
inseparable.
 > 
 > In the engineering sciences, especially the epistemology and
ontology of pragmatic necessities, the connections between
phaneroscopy and semiotics are essential to ethical actions.
 > 
 > The graphic diagrams that illustrate the iconic forms of
engineering work connect, necessarily, the semeiotic with the
phaneroscopy. Indeed, the connections of symbols with the indices of
the diagrams derived from semiotic and phaneroscopy could be a
central thesis of engineering sciences.
 > 
 > Cheers
 > 
 > Jerry
 > 
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to
REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu [3] . 
 ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to 
l...@list.iupui.edu [4] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE
of the message and nothing in the body.  More at
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html [5] .
 ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary
Richmond;  and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jawb...@att.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'peirce-L@list.iupui.edu\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]