Title: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Gary --
I see now that Merrell is mentioned in the Life of Meaning
resources on your site. Nice collection!
I am surprised, however, to see the entrants under Models and simulations of mind.
Aren't the views of Hofstadter, Dennet and Minsky generally at odds
Vinicius,
[[ I think the best definition of Entelechy given by Peirce, done in
terms of Semeiosis, can be found in his definition of Perfect Sign
(EP2: 545, n.25). ]]
I see what you mean -- although Peirce doesn't mention the word
entelechy there, perfect sign seems synonymous with it.
Kirsti M:
The entelechy or perfection of being Peirce here
refers to is something never attained to full, but strived at, again and
again. Just as with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving
to approach, better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end,
the absolute
Gary,
Your concluding comment:
We are worlds in conversation, turning still.
Sometimes we spin in synchrony and sometimes we don't. When we do, we
have structural coupling, as Maturana and Varela called it. And when we
don't, we may have a chance to learn something new.
for some reason
Ben,
[[ I haven't read Eco or Quillian, and what little I've been able to
garner today from the 'Net about Model Q is vague to me. I think I'm
going to get the Eco novel which makes use of it. It sounds like a heck
of a good novel. ]]
I guess you mean Baudolino -- thanks for mentioning the
Jim:
On May 9, 2006, at 1:06 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote:
Still this account leaves untouched the matter of symbols standing
for =
the meaning of objects. The indexical and iconic functions of
symbols =
tell us what meaning is being refered to but they do not shed any
light
Ben:
Your questions are directly on target. It is such questions that I
seek to explicate.
I agree when you say:
The striking thing to a gawker like me who knows very little about =
chemistry is those symbols, and it's encouraging to one's intuition
to =
be reassured that chemists
A few words of introduction:
My original academic efforts were in the liberal arts, primarily
Religious Studies. I later went back to school and completed degrees
in mathematics, but my interests were in taking on the (ambitious and
thankless, as you all know) task of developing an integrated
Gene,
I wonder if you can comment a bit more on the end of your note--how exactly
does it make sense from a Peircean point of view to claim that poems are
arguments? More specifically, if poems qua aesthetic objects partake most of
firstness, how can they also be arguments?
Jeff
